Notas de versión

Cada cambio destacable de AgenticOS, el más reciente primero. Esta página es CHANGELOG.md del repositorio — se lee en el momento del build en lugar de copiarse, así que el archivo y la página no pueden separarse. Las entradas en sí se quedan en inglés, porque son el historial de commits.

El formato sigue Keep a Changelog y las versiones siguen Semantic Versioning.

Hay dos cosas que se versionan aparte de la lista de abajo.

SPEC_VERSION

El formato del spec del agent. Un agent publicado y el YAML exportado de un cliente lo llevan los dos, así que solo avanza hacia adelante y solo con una migración que mantenga cargables los documentos antiguos. Consulta la referencia del spec.

La cadena de migraciones

backend/alembic/versions/, comprimida en un único 0001_baseline. Los ids de revisión que se nombran más abajo describen cuándo cambió algo, no un archivo que siga existiendo — los cambios de esquema se listan por lo que hacen.

Unreleased

[0.0.436] - 2026-09-15

Changed

• Logfire 5 and Pydantic AI 2.43. The agent-frameworks group, with the third-party notices regenerated for the three versions that moved.
• pydantic-ai-skills is held below 2.0 until #1658. That release makes a clean break with no compatibility shims and the backend does not import against it: SkillsToolset is gone, replaced by SkillsCapability, and parse_skill_md moved out of the package root, so test collection fails on the second and every startup would abort on the first. It is not a rename - 2.0 turns each skill into a deferred capability reached through load_capability, replacing the three tools this platform publishes, documents and lets a spec grant, so migrating begins with deciding what a published spec granting a tool that no longer exists does. The constraint carries that reason in the manifest.

[0.0.435] - 2026-09-15

Added

• A security marker naming every refusal test, and a report a client can read. Tenant isolation, permission and grant refusals, a budget checked before the model call, an approval decided once, secret confidentiality, spec publish validation - all already tested, but scattered with nothing naming them as a set, so "does this meet the standard" was answered by showing tests rather than by asserting it. make test-security runs the marked set and make security-report writes the count and the list, which CI uploads as an artifact on each backend run. --strict-markers means a misspelled marker fails the run instead of silently dropping a test from the set. (#1417)
• A guard that keeps the set complete as the suite grows. A test whose name or module mentions a tenant, a permission, a budget, an approval, a secret or plaintext must carry the marker or be exempted with a one-line reason. It caught its first drift on the way in: three refusals written since the branch opened carried no marker, and two exemptions named tests that had been renamed. The marker is for the report, not a second gate - make check still runs everything. (#1417)

[0.0.434] - 2026-09-15

Changed

• Fifteen backend dependencies moved to their current patch and minor releases, and the third-party notices with them. No component enters or leaves the closure and no licence changes.

[0.0.433] - 2026-09-15

Added

• The audit trail is tamper-evident. app_admin_audit_logs is the record of every privileged action and the app-admin bypass story leans on it, but a row was only a row: an operator with the database could rewrite or delete an entry and leave nothing that said so. Each entry now joins a per-organization hash chain - its own hash over its canonical fields with the previous entry's folded in, plus a deployment-wide seq giving the chain a deterministic order even when one transaction writes two entries on the same transaction-stable timestamp. Editing, reordering, inserting or deleting an entry diverges every hash after it. Two audited writes for one organization cannot fork the chain: each appends under a per-organization lock. (#1622)
• agenticos cmd audit-verify walks each chain, recomputes the hashes and names the first entry that no longer matches; with no argument it checks every chain, including the deployment-wide one holding tenant-less actions, and exits non-zero if any fails. This is detection, not prevention - an operator who rewrites a row can recompute every hash after it - and two deletions it cannot see on its own are dropping a chain's newest entries and deleting a chain outright, since the survivors stay internally consistent. Both are named in the governance page rather than left for a reader to discover. (#1622)

[0.0.432] - 2026-09-15

Fixed

• A skill's files never reached the sandbox. They were materialised at /skills, and the container runtimes run as an unprivileged user for whom / is root's - so mkdir -p /skills failed, every write was refused, and an agent promised its scripts on disk found nothing there. They live under /workspace/skills now, the one directory every backend guarantees writable.
• Materialised skills were listed, counted and postable as the agent's work. The file browser and the channel attachment filter both matched on skills/ after stripping the leading slash, which the new root does not begin with. Both now read one shared tuple holding every spelling a skills path arrives in - workspace/skills/ from a state backend and from a container listing absolute paths, skills/ from one listing relative to its own root, and from any workspace written before the move.
• A workspace from before the move kept a second copy of every skill. Nothing writes under the old root any more and nothing removed it, so the next run wrote a complete second tree beside it and both were persisted and charged against the workspace's storage cap. The legacy tree is dropped at flush, where spills are.

Changed

• The model is told where its skills are. The path was only ever discoverable from a skill's own body, which made every skill written against the old root the sole authority for a location the platform had since changed. A run that materialised anything now says the directory once, so a body naming the old one is stale text rather than the answer.

[0.0.431] - 2026-09-15

Added

• An MCP server can be connected with a client the operator registered by hand. Most servers register this app dynamically, but HubSpot's remote server publishes no registration endpoint and hands out client credentials only through an auth app created in the account, so there was no way to tell the flow about them. client_id and client_secret can now be supplied at OAuth start; the secret is sealed into the pending payload with the rest of the flow state and never read back over the API. (#1620)

Fixed

• Three ways a pre-registered client failed after consent rather than before it. A client_secret with no client_id was accepted and then discarded, because the flow registers dynamically whenever the id is absent - so the caller consented against a client they never named. A truncated secret passed the start and failed the token exchange, since the secret is not used until the callback; it now meets the same eight-character floor as every other credential. And a client registered for client_secret_basic completed consent and could never exchange or refresh, because this flow only ever puts the secret in the form body - a server whose metadata allows no such method is refused at start instead. A server that names no method is taken as accepting it, which is what RFC 8414 leaves open and what the servers this exists for actually do. (#1620)

[0.0.430] - 2026-09-15

Added

• The security page a HIPAA- or SOC 2-shaped review asks for, in one copy. docs/security.md sets out the trust boundaries a request crosses on its way to the data, what leaves the deployment and to whom, what is encrypted where - and a controls matrix that names, for each control, the mechanism in this codebase that satisfies it and the test that holds it true. It describes what is, not what would be nice: a row with no mechanism says so and links the issue that would build it, and the things the vault does not seal - short-lived bearer tokens, uploaded files, message bodies, RAG rows and sandbox workspaces - are stated rather than left to be discovered. Published in all four languages. (#1412)

Changed

• SECURITY.md keeps only the two things a repository's SECURITY.md is read for. How to report a vulnerability, and the production hardening checklist. The security model it used to restate now lives in one copy on the page above, with pointers to it and to Data protection and Licences.

[0.0.429] - 2026-09-15

Fixed

• make check depended on whichever python3 the host happened to have. One guard script had already been pinned to the backend interpreter after it crashed outright on a machine whose system Python predates 3.10; the other four and the dependency audit were still invoked as a bare python3, surviving only because none of them happens to use 3.10-only syntax yet. All of them now run under the interpreter backend/.python-version names, in the Makefile and in pre-commit alike, and a test refuses the next target written the fragile way.

[0.0.428] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• Two RAG commands were unconditionally broken. rag-sources and rag-source-sync --all iterated and counted SyncSourceList - a Pydantic model wrapping items and total - as if it were the list itself. Both read the fields now.
• A failed LlamaParse page was read as if it had succeeded. The parse result is a discriminated union whose failure branch has no markdown, so a bad page risked an AttributeError mid-ingestion with nothing saying which page or why. It now raises an error naming both.
• A sync that refused before its flow ran left the log running forever. A manual trigger creates the sync log and hands the flow its id; the unknown connector and unassigned collection paths returned without completing it, so nothing was ever going to finish it. Both complete the log as errored first.
• make check crashed on a machine whose system Python predates 3.10. The check-routes guard uses X | Y in an isinstance call and was running under the host interpreter rather than the pinned backend one.
• A local e2e run made ESLint report hundreds of errors. playwright-report/ and test-results/ are gitignored but were still walked, and they hold a vendored, minified trace-viewer bundle.

Changed

• ty check reports nothing against the template-inherited code. It runs in make lint but only warns there, so its 61 diagnostics across the RAG pipeline, connectors, worker tasks and repositories had never been worked through. Most were stub imprecision, corrected with the constructs SQLAlchemy ships for those shapes rather than with suppressions; the two live bugs are above.

[0.0.427] - 2026-09-14

Added

• The admin drawer's organization rows are links now. They were plain text because there was nowhere for an app admin to go: the tenant-scoped page 404s for anybody who is not a member. Each row opens /admin/organizations/{id}, which reads the metadata endpoint - name, members and their roles, size, owner and budget. The conversation rows stay text, deliberately: there is no admin-readable destination for a single conversation, and adding one would relax the tenant boundary the architecture page holds. Both drawer comments now record that decision. (#1245)

[0.0.426] - 2026-09-14

Added

• The audit trail exports, as CSV or JSONL. GET /audit/export takes the same window the tab does, gated on audit:read. It is the one export that also offers JSONL (?fmt=jsonl), one JSON object per line, because an audit trail is as often ingested by a log pipeline as opened in a spreadsheet: the two describe the same entries, with details flattened to a JSON string in the CSV cell and kept as a nested object in the lines. It ships exactly the fields the read model exposes - the stored ip_address is not on that tab, so it is not in the export either - and records its own read in the trail, naming the window, the format and the row count. Documented in all four languages. (#1422)

[0.0.425] - 2026-09-14

Added

• A deployment admin can read one organization's metadata. An app admin could see every tenant in the admin listing and open none of them: /orgs/{id} resolves through membership, and the common case is the target's own personal organization, which the admin belongs to none of. GET /admin/organizations/{id} gates on app-admin and answers with the name, members and their roles, size, owner and budget - metadata only, reaching no agent, conversation or secret, and writing its own audit entry for the cross-tenant read. The member list is bounded at 500; member_count still carries the true total, so a larger tenant shows the count beside the first names rather than an unbounded fetch on a page nobody pages. Deliberately a separate endpoint rather than an is_app_admin bypass in get_for_user: an app-admin context already carries every permission at the widest scope, so widening the membership path would have granted full read and write of a foreign tenant. (#1245)

[0.0.424] - 2026-09-14

Added

• A written plan for the notification center, before any of it is built. docs/design/notification-center-plan.md sets out ten decisions grounded in the code that exists: a code-defined event catalog reusing the agent spec's AlertAudience shape rather than stretching NotificationSpec to cover events that are not about one agent; a per-recipient row plus a separate deliveries table for the retryable side channels; why the announcement composer gates on app-admin rather than on any permission. With a phased breakdown, an explicit out-of-scope list and the open questions that do not block starting. Repository only, like the rest of docs/design/. (#1598)

[0.0.423] - 2026-09-14

Added

• An agent can be traced without its prompts. observability.content on the agent spec takes full (the default, everything as before) or none - timing, tokens, cost and tool names, with no message text and no tool arguments. Until now an agent redirecting its traces to a Logfire project, often a client's own, sent the user's message, the model's output and every tool argument and result with no switch: for a deployment whose runs touch health, legal or HR data, a copy of the protected content left the machine per run. The choice is enforced where the agent is instrumented rather than in the Builder, so a spec that says none produces content-free spans however the run is started, and it survives the environment-tracing merge - an environment redirects where traces go, not how much they carry. The Builder offers both modes beside the token, locked until one is chosen. content is optional with a default, so stored specs load unchanged and SPEC_VERSION stays 11. The redacted mode from the issue needs a span processor of its own and is tracked in #1616. (#1413)

[0.0.422] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• The exposure form described a channel lookup differently from the model. Its checklist still read each tool's short hand-typed blurb from the catalog while the Toolbox panel served the real, docstring-derived description, so the two disagreed about the same tool. Both now read tool_contracts(). Two things had to come with it: the real description arrives wrapped in <summary> and <returns> markup for the model's benefit, which would have rendered as literal tags in a checkbox label, and the fallback tested whether a tool's id was in the contracts rather than whether it had a description, so a tool without a docstring would have rendered blank. (#1473)

Added

• A guard against the blurb and the description drifting again. Every capability's declared tool description is asserted to be a prefix of the one its built toolset serves. capability_contracts.py had never been listed in the platform layer's coverage and typing gates either, and now is. (#1473)

[0.0.421] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• A capability that failed to build once stayed broken until the next redeploy. tool_contracts() cached its whole-catalog build in a bare module global with no lock: a transient failure during one capability's build cached an empty contract set for it and, because the global was then set, every later call returned that empty result for the life of the process. Two requests arriving before the cache warmed also both built the whole catalog. The build now runs under a lock with a re-check inside it, and only a build that completed every capability is cached - a failure still degrades that one answer, and is retried on the next call. Reached routinely since the exposures endpoint became a second caller. (#1621)

[0.0.420] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• A registry entry with a namespaced key prefilled a tool prefix the form refuses. Connecting an MCP server from the catalog seeded the Tool prefix field with the raw registry key, so com.snitcher/snitcher met a name pattern of lowercase letters, digits and hyphens and could never be submitted. HubSpot worked only because its key is already a valid name. The three places that seeded from the key now slug it - the segment after the last slash, lower-cased and hyphenated, bounded to 32 characters - and a key with nothing usable in it leaves the field blank rather than prefilling a refusal. (#1628)

[0.0.419] - 2026-09-14

Security

• A malformed MCP OAuth token response wrote the token to the logs. _token_request parses the provider's answer with OAuthToken.model_validate_json, and a Pydantic ValidationError echoes the input it rejected - which, for a token response, is the token. The logger.exception beside the raise then wrote a live credential, traceback and all. The failure is now logged as field locations and error types only, through exc.errors(include_url=False, include_input=False), at error rather than exception so no traceback carries the payload. The refusal shown to the caller was already the class name alone. (#1626)

[0.0.418] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• Deleting a skill resource answered 500 and rolled the delete back. remove_resource deletes the row and then bumps the skill's version, whose db.refresh(skill) walks skill.resources - still holding the instance just deleted, which SQLAlchemy refuses to refresh. The collection is expired after the delete, so the refresh reloads it from the table and the route answers 204.

[0.0.417] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• A Slack bot saved without a signing secret answered 500. The three channel webhook receivers had drifted: Telegram and Mattermost refuse an event they cannot verify with 403, because a bot with no secret is an unauthenticated endpoint that would run an agent on an organization's budget. Slack alone raised, which sent Slack's retrier a bodiless error instead of a refusal. It now logs which bot to configure and refuses with 403 like its siblings; a wrong signature was already 403 on all three. (#555)

[0.0.416] - 2026-09-14

Fixed

• The knowledge-base howto still sent the reader to a deployment default that no longer exists. EMBEDDING_MODEL went with the rest of the deployment-wide embedding settings, so "leave it at the deployment default" named nothing: the form offers the models the chosen provider serves and preselects the first. Corrected in English and in the three translations. (#1604)

[0.0.415] - 2026-09-14

Added

• The documentation site publishes in four languages. All 54 published pages and the four files GitHub renders - README.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, SECURITY.md, CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md - are translated into Polish, German and Spanish. mkdocs-static-i18n in suffix mode, so a translation is <page>.<locale>.md beside its English source and the English URLs do not move: /install/ stays and /pl/install/ appears next to it. One nav, four builds, and a language switcher that keeps the reader on the same page.
• A gate that keeps the three translations honest. mkdocs build --strict validates a link's path and not its #fragment, so a translated heading silently moves an anchor and every link into it lands at the top of the page, in one language, with a green build. So a translated heading pins the English anchor explicitly, each translation records the fingerprint of the English revision it was made from, and scripts/check_docs_i18n.py runs in make lint: it names a page with no translation, a translation older than its source, headings that no longer line up and a repository file whose links go somewhere the English one does not. A page rendered from a stale or missing translation carries a notice in the reader's own language. docs/howto/translate.md is the workflow, with the glossary and the terminology that has to be exact.

Fixed

• A prose line in docs/file-processing.md rendered as a heading. It started at column zero with an issue reference, and Python-Markdown's ATX rule does not require a space after the hashes, so the published page carried an <h1> nobody wrote. The translation gate found it by counting anchors.

[0.0.414] - 2026-09-14

Added

• Local services: the servers on the deployment's own network a collection may be pointed at. A row per organization - or per deployment, registered by its administrator and offered to every organization - of kind embedding (an Ollama, reached through its OpenAI-compatible root) or ocr (a LiteParse OCR server), with base_url validated the way a sandbox host's is. Managed under Knowledge → Integrations behind connections:manage, on /local-services; migration 0078_local_services. (#1632)
• A self-hosted embedding provider. ollama is in embedding_providers.json as a keyless entry with no address of its own: a collection on it names a local service (embedding_endpoint_id) where a keyed collection names the vault key, so a knowledge base can stay on the deployment's own hardware. The form asks for a server rather than a key, a key named for it is refused, and five of Ollama's embedding models are catalogued with their widths. (#1632)
• An app-scoped collection embeds through a keyless provider, or not at all. It belongs to no organization and so has no vault to hold a key; it names a deployment-wide local service instead, and choosing OpenRouter or OpenAI for one is refused where the provider is chosen, at creation and on a move, instead of producing a collection that fails on its first document. (#1631)
• An OCR server is a per-collection choice. ingestion_config.ocr_endpoint_id names a local service of kind ocr; nothing named runs the Tesseract bundled with the worker.
• docs/data-protection.md - where personal data lives, what leaves the deployment and under which setting, the controls with their proof or their open issue, what deletion reaches, and a reproducible verification checklist for one deployment. Linked from the security-review table, SECURITY.md and the topic map. (#1596)

Changed

• Embeddings are paid for with the collection's vault key, and nothing else. OPENROUTER_API_KEY is gone: it was a deployment-wide fallback for one provider, left over from when openrouter.ai was hardcoded, and the only reason the catalog carried a deployment_key flag, the resolver two fallback states and the form a "Deployment key" row. A new personal or organization collection names its provider from embedding_providers.json and the vault key that pays, or is refused on that field; a collection whose key is missing, unusable or never chosen refuses to index or search with a message naming the collection and the reason, and the ingestion flow log says so. A key can be replaced but no longer cleared (clear_embedding_secret is removed), because there is nothing to fall back to. scripts/server-init.sh no longer asks for the key and docs/deploy.md no longer lists it as a prerequisite. The resolution says which of six situations it landed on - a key never chosen, no vault to choose one from, the chosen secret missing, unusable or of the wrong kind, or a provider this build no longer offers - each with its own remedy. (#1596)

Removed

• EMBEDDING_MODEL, LLAMAPARSE_API_KEY and LITEPARSE_OCR_SERVER_URL are gone. Each was one value for every tenant, set where no tenant could see it. The model is chosen from what the collection's provider serves; a LlamaParse key is the vault entry the collection names, and a collection on LlamaParse without one is refused at the form; an OCR server is a local service the collection names. GET /rag/embedding-models no longer answers a default.

[0.0.413] - 2026-09-14

Changed

• The stack runs Valkey where it used to run Redis. redis:7-alpine resolves to Redis 7.4, and from 7.4.0 Redis is RSALv2 or SSPL-1.0 rather than BSD-3-Clause - neither an OSI-approved licence. Nothing was broken by it: the image is pulled by the operator rather than redistributed here, and RSALv2 permits running Redis inside your own application. But the default docker compose up started a non-open component without saying so. Every compose file and every CI service now uses valkey/valkey:8-alpine, the Linux Foundation fork of Redis 7.2 under BSD-3-Clause. It speaks the same protocol on the same port, so the service name, the redis:// scheme, the redis_data volume and every REDIS_* setting are unchanged, and so is the client - only the image, the server binary and the CLI in the healthchecks differ. A deployment on a managed Redis, Valkey or Elasticache is unaffected. The licence review drops to one open finding. (#1603)

[0.0.412] - 2026-09-14

Added

• A licence review of everything the images ship, with generated notices and a check. THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md is generated from the two lockfiles by scripts/license_inventory.py and lists every distribution in either image with its SPDX licence, source and the evidence the licence was read from. Decisions live in licenses/policy.toml (overrides with evidence, review entries for copyleft and share-alike components) and licenses/components.toml (images, Debian packages, fonts, glyphs, data files, compose services). make licenses-check runs in the security job and make check: stale notices, a component with no readable licence, a copyleft component with no decision, or a decision about a licence that has since changed all fail it; tracked open findings pass and are counted, and so does a package that ships no licence file without an author to attribute or a text to place beside it. Both images now carry their licence files: the backend image LICENSE, NOTICE, the notices and the texts of the licences nine wheels declare but do not ship; the frontend image every package's own licence file under /app/licenses/, which the standalone build had been dropping, a NOTICE and the licence text for a package that publishes none (@img/sharp-libvips-linux-* ships an LGPL library with no copy of the LGPL), the fonts' OFL and the brand-mark attributions. docs/licenses.md is the review: scope, obligations per licence family and how each is met, hosted-provider terms and model-weight licences as deployment-time decisions, the maintenance workflow and a release checklist. One finding is open and tracked - redis:7 resolves to Redis 7.4 under RSALv2/SSPLv1 (#1603) - and one is a deployment-time review, the sandbox runtime built at the deployment. The third is settled here: pymupdf, the default PDF parser, is AGPL-3.0-only and is kept, so the backend image as a whole is conveyed under AGPL-3.0 terms. Running an unmodified release owes nothing, because this repository is public and Apache-2.0; a deployment that modifies the platform and serves it over a network owes its users the modified source under section 13, and docs/licenses.md gives the three exits for a deployment that cannot take those terms. (#1600, #1602)

Fixed

• Three prose lines in docs/code-review.md rendered as headings. Each started at column zero with an issue reference, and Python-Markdown's ATX rule does not require a space after the hashes, so the published page carried three <h1>s nobody wrote - in the table of contents and in the search index. The built page now has the 14 headings the file declares. (#1605)

[0.0.411] - 2026-09-13

Security

• A secret too short to hint safely is refused. The listing shows the last four characters of a credential as its hint, so ApiKeySecret(api_key="1234") used to publish the whole key to everyone with secrets:view and into the audit entry. Every field that authenticates - an API key, a secret access key, a session token, an OAuth client secret - now needs at least eight characters, minLength is on the schema the forms are generated from, and the refusal says so while the form is open. A key shorter than that stored before this release fails to open and has to be saved again. (#1608)
• An MCP OAuth payload masks its credentials. client_secret, access_token and refresh_token are SecretStr, so a payload that reaches a log line or a traceback whole shows **********; only the sealed JSON on its way into the vault carries the real values. The guarantee used to hold by accident of one except clause. (#1608)

Removed

• model_profiles.allow_byo. Written by the create route and read by nothing - the resolver always spends the profile's own key - so the flag looked like a security control and changed no behaviour. Migration 0077_drop_allow_byo drops the column. (#1608)

[0.0.410] - 2026-09-13

Changed

• The repository's agent guidance is a brief, not a history. CLAUDE.md now carries project-wide decisions and pointers: what the product is, the quality bar, the hard boundaries, rule and skill routing, commands, verification and the documentation topic map. Incident anecdotes and pinned framework versions are gone; issue-board conventions moved to .claude/references/issue-triage.md. The rule files under .claude/rules/ declare their scope with the paths frontmatter key Claude Code matches on, so the code-style rule now covers scripts/ and the testing rule covers the Playwright layer. scripts/docs_drift.py is the one path-to-page trigger map and gained the sandbox, agent-template, skill-gallery and Makefile mappings that used to live only in CLAUDE.md. (#1601)

[0.0.409] - 2026-09-11

Security

• The console's security headers are complete, asserted and documented. object-src 'none' closes the plugin-content vector default-src does not cover; Permissions-Policy allows the microphone on this origin alone so the chat's dictation works, camera and geolocation still denied; every header lives in src/lib/security-headers.ts with a test per header. connect-src is built from the deployment's PUBLIC_API_URL and PUBLIC_WS_URL at runtime, so a split-origin deployment's uploads and socket are allowed and nothing else is, and the bundled nginx passes the application's headers through instead of adding a conflicting set. SECURITY.md and docs/deployment.md name the real policy. script-src still carries 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval' for Next's App Router; the nonce is #1416's remaining item. (#1580)

[0.0.408] - 2026-09-11

Added

• Encrypted connections to Postgres and Redis, and a doctor line saying so. POSTGRES_SSLMODE builds the parameter each driver understands - ssl= for asyncpg, sslmode= for Alembic's psycopg2 - and REDIS_SSL switches the scheme to rediss:// with hostname verification on. Both default off, so a plaintext deployment is unchanged. agenticos cmd doctor reports postgres: tls=on/off from pg_stat_ssl, the transport actually used, and redis: tls=on/off from the URL. docs/configuration.md shows the managed- store setup, every consumer included, and how a private CA is trusted. (#1578)

[0.0.407] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• A tool-prefix collision is decided once, and the model is told about it. Publish refused two MCP bindings reducing to one prefix while the run re-computed the same rule and dropped the loser with a log line, so a connection renamed after publish, or an agent published before the check, lost a server nobody was told about. One prefix_collisions serves both; the run records each dropped binding on the toolsets' unavailable list, the briefing says the server is not available this turn, and the connect card leaves it out because renaming a connection is the author's job. (#1576)

[0.0.406] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• Whether a personal MCP connection is usable is decided once, on the server. The console re-derived it and disagreed with the backend: a bearer token whose sealing key had been rotated away read Connected in the chat controls and unavailable in the next turn. McpConnection.account_authorized is the single side-effect-free answer - an OAuth grant with a payload, a token whose key version is still configured, or no token at all - the run path uses it, and McpConnectionRead carries it to the client as authorized. (#1575)

[0.0.405] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• Telegram rooms are group, like every other platform's. The Telegram parser emitted the raw supergroup and channel types while Slack and Mattermost fold everything but a DM to group, so channel_sessions.chat_type held a different vocabulary per platform and the first consumer to write chat_type == "group" would have missed every Telegram room. The parser folds them now, and migration 0076_normalize_channel_chat_type folds the rows already written. (#1574)

[0.0.404] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• Removing a member is decided by the catalog, like changing a role. MemberService.remove refused Admin-removes-Admin with a literal role check while change_role used assignable_roles, so a custom role holding members:manage that does not outrank an Admin would be refused one action and allowed the other. Both now use the same ceiling; the built-in roles behave exactly as before. (#1573)

[0.0.403] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• The connect-services card navigates in the app, and the runner no longer builds console URLs. personal_service_gap quoted FRONTEND_URL/mcp-servers to both the model and the card, which 404s under a locale prefix. The frame now carries the catalog key and the gap only: the card resolves the entry it has and pushes the locale-aware route, a console reader is named the page in words, and only a channel reader gets an absolute link, built beside the other channel URLs. (#1572)

[0.0.402] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• A signed-in API caller is no longer told that nobody is signed in. A run through POST /agents/{id}/run with a person's own token may not reach their personal MCP bindings, which is right, but the briefing explained it with a false sentence the model repeated back. The briefing now knows a person is behind the run and says it does not act as their account; a run with genuinely nobody - a schedule, an anonymous embed - reads as before. (#1571)

[0.0.401] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• The sandbox connection dialog's store-failure test no longer flakes under coverage. The local-service path debounces a probe that clears the same failure state a save reports through; on a loaded run the probe fired after the save and erased the message the assertion waited for. The case now waits for the probe before it submits. (#1570)

[0.0.400] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• The stale-reference banner no longer flashes on every agent load. Each list it consults defaulted to empty while its query loaded, so on first paint every referenced collection, context file, skill and MCP connection read as deleted, the alarm-coloured banner rendered for a second, and its button would have stripped live references from the draft on a fast click. It now computes nothing until every list has answered. (#1569)

[0.0.399] - 2026-09-11

Fixed

• Two AgenticOS stacks can share a host, and the installer refuses to take one over. Compose names a project after its directory, so a clone at ~/agenticos and a quickstart install at ./agenticos were one project to Docker: the second up recreated the first's containers on the published images, on the first's volumes, under a VAULT_MASTER_KEY generated a moment before. The compose files fix no container_name any more, so each project names its own containers, and deploy.sh and quickstart.sh wait for health by service. Outside a clone the quickstart now checks the project before it writes a key: containers of the same project from another directory, or volumes of it with no .env here, stop it with a message naming the other stack and the ways out. (#1577)
• One unreadable bot token no longer keeps the API from starting. A bot whose token the vault cannot unseal - a rotated master key, a database started under another installation's key - raised out of the lifespan and the container crash-looped. It is logged and skipped now; the other bots start. (#1577)

[0.0.398] - 2026-09-10

Added

• Published images, and one compose file as the whole product. ghcr.io/vstorm-co/agenticos-backend and agenticos-frontend are built for amd64 and arm64 on every push to main (edge, sha-<short>) and every release (<version>, latest), scanned by Trivy after publishing, and only ever from a commit on main. docker-compose.yml pulls them and runs the API, worker, console, Postgres, Redis, Prefect and a migrate service the API waits on, every variable defaulted; docker-compose.override.yml is what a clone merges in for make dev. scripts/quickstart.sh needs Docker alone: outside a clone it downloads that one file at the latest release into ./agenticos, writes a .env with generated keys, and pulls. scripts/deploy.sh pins AGENTICOS_VERSION=sha-<short> and pulls rather than building on the host. (#1546)

Changed

• The frontend reads its public URLs at runtime. NEXT_PUBLIC_* were build arguments, so one image carried one deployment's hostnames. The root layout reads PUBLIC_API_URL, PUBLIC_WS_URL, PUBLIC_SITE_URL, CHAT_MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB and OAUTH_PROVIDERS per request and hands them down through PublicConfigProvider; robots and sitemap render dynamically. NEXT_PUBLIC_RAG_ENABLED, read by nothing, is gone. (#1546)
• The backend image is built from the repository root, so emails/compiled/ ships inside it rather than bind-mounted from a checkout, and the root .dockerignore is an allowlist that excludes backend/.env. The docker job in ci.yml is replaced by the publishing workflow. (#1546)

[0.0.397] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• The default SMTP configuration sends mail. SMTP_PORT defaults to 587, the STARTTLS port, but SMTP_TLS=true opened implicit TLS from the first byte, so a server configured exactly as documented refused every handshake and passwordless sign-in, password resets, invitations and every notification failed silently. The scheme now follows the port - 465 implicit TLS, 587 and 25 STARTTLS, SMTP_TLS=false plaintext - and an empty SMTP_USER is an unauthenticated relay rather than a refused login. A server that speaks implicit TLS on a non-standard port sets SMTP_TLS_MODE=implicit (starttls forces the other scheme; auto, the default, keeps the port rule). (#1548)

[0.0.396] - 2026-09-10

Security

• An invitation token never reaches JavaScript storage. A signed-out invitee carried the raw token through the whole sign-in round trip - in returnTo, in browser history and, on the OAuth path, in sessionStorage. The token is now exchanged server-side before the redirect: POST /invitations/stage stores it in Redis under an opaque single-use handle carried in an httpOnly cookie, and POST /invitations/staged/accept redeems the handle after sign-in through the same accept every check already guards. Registration and OAuth sign-up carry the handle too, so an invite_only deployment still admits the invitee. Both public routes are rate limited per IP and refuse a dead token uniformly. Each staging is bound to its own flow - two invitation links opened in two tabs redeem two different handles - a staging that fails keeps the invitee on the link with a Retry rather than losing it, and a 429 or a 5xx leaves the unspent handle in place. (#1547)

[0.0.395] - 2026-09-10

Changed

• A connector's config is described as JSON Schema, like a capability's. Each connector declares a Pydantic CONFIG_MODEL and the listing publishes its model_json_schema(); the required-field check derives from the model, and a placeholder default is marked on the model rather than by a frontend adapter. ConnectorConfigField, ConnectorFieldType and the connectorConfigToJsonSchema bridge are gone; the wizard hands the schema to SchemaForm unadapted. Stored connector configs are untouched. (#1538)

[0.0.394] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• The lifespan drain test no longer flakes on a shared event loop. Shutdown closes three module-global httpx clients; two were stubbed and the web research client was not, so under xdist the test closed a client another worker's loop had opened and raised Event loop is closed. All three are stubbed now. (#1541)

[0.0.393] - 2026-09-10

Changed

• The orgs/**, me/** and admin/** forwarders are platformProxy mounts. Twenty-odd hand-rolled route files each repeated the cookie check, the bearer, the error mapping and the JSON response, and silently dropped the active-organization header, byte-accurate bodies and no-store. They are one-line mounts now, about 1200 lines fewer. Admin routes drop a redundant frontend pre-check the backend's CurrentAppAdmin already enforces, and the whole query string is forwarded, which fixes the users table's dropped sort_by and sort_dir. The avatar, integrations, OAuth callback and impersonate routes stay hand-rolled because each does something a plain forward cannot. (#1539)

[0.0.392] - 2026-09-10

Security

• Revoking a session closes its open chat. A chat WebSocket authenticated once, at the handshake, and was served for its whole life - an impersonation ended or an account suspended mid-conversation kept answering until the client hung up. The session re-validates the handshake credential before every incoming frame and, on a refusal, cancels the in-flight turn and closes the socket with 4001. A turn already streaming finishes; the revocation lands on the next frame. A merely expired access token is tolerated, so a live socket outlives its thirty-minute token as before. (#1536)

[0.0.391] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• A tracing token is validated at publish. observability.token_secret_id was the one credential reference publish validation never checked, so a wrong-kind or cross-tenant id published fine and the agent ran untraced. It now runs through the same existence, tenant and kind checks a capability's secret gets. (#1535)
• spec_version is read, not only written. An imported YAML whose spec_version is newer than this deployment's is refused, and publish stamps the deployment's SPEC_VERSION onto the frozen copy. A stored spec is unaffected. (#1535)
• The Slack Socket Mode client is closed on every session exit. A cancel or a crash-reconnect orphaned the aiohttp session, the WSS connection and the listener; _run_socket_mode now closes the client in a finally, as Mattermost's stream already did. (#1535)

[0.0.390] - 2026-09-10

Security

• An unlinked channel guest can no longer borrow the owner's personal MCP connections. On the publisher-fallback admission an unidentified visitor runs under the binding's publisher, and personal-MCP resolution fell back to the owner - so an anonymous guest could reach a third-party MCP server with the publisher's connected-account credentials. Resolution is now gated on the subject being a real person, on a fresh run and on a resume, where the fact is carried in the parked terms. docs/mcp.md already said so. (#1524)

[0.0.389] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• The Agents "?" walk offers to create an agent again. The offer at the end of the first-run tour is suppressed for an organization that already has an agent, and that suppression also swallowed the offer at the end of the Agents help walk - the walk whose whole point is asking to build one. The count gate now applies only to the tour; a "?" replay offers regardless. (#1515)

[0.0.388] - 2026-09-10

Performance

• The dashboard window's slices come from one scan, not five. The day buckets and the surface, status, model and provider splits were five aggregate queries over the same rows; they are one GROUPING SETS query now, with a GROUPING flag telling a genuine NULL model apart from a row that is not that slice. The composed usage response issues four agent_runs queries instead of eight, and a test counts them so the next dimension cannot become a ninth. (#1514)

[0.0.387] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• A thread backfill under a link-required policy quotes linked members only. Under jwt_linked and require_link the backfill filtered earlier authors only in whitelist mode, so an unlinked participant's earlier posts reached the prompt the first time a linked member spoke. Authors are now resolved in one query to accounts linked to an active member of the bot's organization; everyone else is dropped, as the whitelist branch already did. (#1513)

[0.0.386] - 2026-09-10

Changed

• The 2026-08-10 backend duplication audit is closed. InvitationCreate.email carries the max_length its siblings do, RAGCollectionList and ConnectorList carry total, doctor and the agent runner drop their Any parameters, the owner-or-org-or-shared visibility predicate is one helper shared by skills and knowledge bases, the MCP tool-prefix normaliser has a parity fixture between backend and frontend, get_agent and get_version validate the Read schema rather than hand-mapping fields, and parent_doc_id reaches the vector store as a typed argument. The chat socket now sends cost_usd as the same Decimal string every REST surface does. (#1511)

[0.0.385] - 2026-09-10

Performance

• A spec's references resolve in one query, not one each. Publish validation of collections, MCP connections and delegates, the MCP toolset build and the environment listing each read their list of ids a row at a time. Each now reads the whole list in one query with the same tenant and scope filters, so the refusals are unchanged and preparing a run with five bound collections awaits the collection read once. (#1510)

[0.0.384] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• A crash on a mention answers the same apology a crash on a direct message does. The mention path and the default path ran the same turn as two copies that had drifted: a crash on a mention propagated, released the dedupe claim and answered nothing while the platform redelivered it. Both paths now run through one _run_turn, which apologises once and keeps the claim, posts a refusal wherever the bot was addressed, and discards a crashed turn's files instead of orphaning them. (#1508)

[0.0.383] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• /new and /unlink honour the room's link requirement. Commands ran before identity resolution and the admission gate, so an unlinked participant in a link-required room could reset the shared conversation. Both now take the same admission the turn takes; /start, /help and /link stay open, and /new attributes the new conversation to whoever issued it rather than to the room's first speaker. (#1502)

[0.0.382] - 2026-09-10

Fixed

• A departed member's linked chat account no longer costs a transcription before it is refused. The router read the membership only at the run, after the message's attachments had been fetched, stored and a voice note billed to the organization's transcription credential. A direct message now reads the membership first; a linked identity whose member is gone is treated as unlinked from that point, and the invite-on-refusal path is rate limited. (#1500)

[0.0.381] - 2026-09-10

Security

• A password change revokes the account's other sessions. Changing a password from Settings hashed the new one and stopped, so every other browser's refresh token - and any impersonation of the account - stayed valid. Ordinary access tokens now carry a sid naming their session, and a password change deactivates every session but the one that made it; a change that names no session (an admin resetting another account, a token minted before this) revokes all of them. Ships the self-service password-change endpoint, and an explicit password: null is a no-op rather than a 500. (#1498)

[0.0.380] - 2026-09-10

Documentation

• The SMTP settings are documented. SMTP_HOST, SMTP_PORT, SMTP_USER, SMTP_PASSWORD, SMTP_TLS, EMAIL_FROM and EMAIL_FROM_NAME appeared nowhere in docs/configuration.md. A new section lists each with its default and what depends on mail - invitations, password resets, notifications - all of which go silently unsent without it, and the production checklist says why email is deliberately not on it. (#1542)

Changed

• The frontend's package.json version literal is caught up. The 0.0.379 cut moved the backend's version and the lock but left frontend/package.json at 0.0.378; it reads 0.0.380 from this release on. (#1549)

[0.0.379] - 2026-09-10

Security

• Binding an identity while impersonating is refused. Confirming a chat-link code, starting a personal or organization MCP OAuth flow, the GitHub and portal variants, and typing a bearer token into a member's MCP connection all fastened the administrator's own identity or credential onto the impersonated account, and the binding outlived the impersonation's hour. Every one of those seams now answers 403 under an impersonation, before a token is read or a pending row is written. (#1491)

[0.0.378] - 2026-09-08

Added

• A desktop app, as an add-on. desktop/ is a Tauri shell around the same console the server serves — same sign-in, same permissions, nothing bundled — for whoever wants it on the dock. The console stays a web app and that is how it is used; the shell asks for the server's address once, probes it before pointing the webview anywhere, and puts you back on the form with the reason when nothing answers. make desktop-dev, make desktop-build, make desktop-check; the page is docs/desktop.md. (#1531)
• A pet. Five to choose from — Orbit, Boxy, Ghost, Sprout and Amigo, in a sombrero — in a transparent always-on-top window, drawn from pixel data composed at runtime. Drag it, click it to wave and hear a line, stroke it for a heart, double-click for the console; it idles, looks at the cursor, strolls and turns back at the screen's edge, dozes after dark. Its right-click menu, the tray icon and the menu bar share one set of items. (#1531)
• A screenshot into a new chat. ⌘⇧A anywhere gives the Cmd+Shift+4 crosshair; the region lands attached to a fresh chat, handed to the composer's own file input on the configured server's origin only, within two minutes. Rebound under Settings (⌘,); a binding another application holds is named there rather than shown as bound. macOS asks for Screen Recording the first time, and the pet says so when it was refused. (#1531)

Fixed

• A production build served over plain HTTP set session cookies WebKit discards. secure followed NODE_ENV, so make dev-frontend at http://localhost:3000 marked both tokens Secure — which Safari, and every WKWebView, drops on localhost. Login answered 200 and every request after it was "Not authenticated", with nothing in any log. The flag now follows the scheme the visitor is on, X-Forwarded-Proto first, in every route that sets or clears a session cookie. (#1531)

Security

• httpx2 and httpcore2 to 2.12.0. Five advisories against the locked 2.9.1 (CVE-2026-84378 through -84382), both transitive through pydantic-ai-slim; the lock alone moves. (#1531)
• The desktop shell refuses cleartext http:// to any host but this machine, and names the host in its title whenever the window shows a site other than the server, since it has no address bar. Google sign-in works through Safari's version tokens on the same engine; the system-browser handoff Google prefers is #1532. (#1531)

[0.0.377] - 2026-09-07

Fixed

• Connecting an MCP server through OAuth authorized, then sent the browser nowhere. The provider returned somebody to http://0.0.0.0:3000/mcp-servers?mcp_oauth=success — the connection made, the person on a page nothing can reach. NextResponse.redirect requires an absolute URL, and the only origin a standalone Next process knows is the address it binds to, so behind any reverse proxy the Location header carried it. The callback emits a relative one now, which the browser resolves against the URL it actually asked for. Local development never showed it, because there the bind address is the address the browser used.

[0.0.376] - 2026-09-07

Fixed

• The vector-store check predicted a failure it had never checked, and hid the one that would really happen. It read whether pgvector had been created in this database and then reported what the first ingestion would do — but that row cannot tell a fresh deployment from a stock-Postgres one, a restricted role, or a data directory that outlived the image holding the library. A healthy production said document ingestion would fail; a deployment where it really will fail said the same thing. What the image ships and what the connecting role may do with it are now both asked before any consequence is claimed, and each of the four outcomes says which it is.
• The sandbox could not be turned on as documented, and a deploy stopped one that was. install -d -o 10001 — in two compose files and the configuration page — fails on Ubuntu, because install resolves the owner through the passwd database and 10001 is the service's uid, not an account. And the service sits behind a compose profile, which up -d without that profile does not ignore: it stops it. So starting the sandbox by hand held until the next merge to main, after which an agent's code execution failed for reasons nowhere near the deploy that caused it — with the deploy green throughout. scripts/deploy.sh now reads the host the way it already reads the proxy.
• The sandbox never had the group that owns the Docker socket. Every compose file interpolates ${DOCKER_GID:-0} into its group_add and nothing set it, so the service ran in group 0 — the socket's owner on almost no Linux distribution — and could not open the socket at all. Read off the socket now, in the deploy and in make dev.

[0.0.375] - 2026-09-07

Added

• invite-members, for onboarding a team rather than a person. agenticos cmd invite-members <org-id> a@example.com b@example.com --role admin creates one invitation per address and prints them as address link, one per line and nothing between them, because that output is meant to be copied. It exists for the same reason the fix below does: nothing is emailed on a deployment with no SMTP_*, and the accept token is returned once and stored nowhere a second read can reach. It goes through the same service the console does, so the role ceiling, the seat cap and the duplicate checks apply exactly as they do to somebody clicking the button - which is why it invites as somebody, defaulting to the organization's first owner. One refused address is reported and skipped rather than costing the rest.

Fixed

• An invitee with no account lost the invitation on the way to the sign-up form. They opened the link, were sent to sign in, clicked "create an account", registered - and arrived in no organization at all, with the token gone and nowhere to read it from again. The chain that carries it is built and tested: the auth guard bounces them to /login?returnTo=<the invitation>, and everything downstream reads the token back out of that one parameter. The invitation page then overrode it with a redirect of its own writing ?redirect=, a name nothing reads - and since the page renders only once the guard has decided, that push reliably replaced the guard's. On an invite_only deployment the bare sign-up form it produced refuses them as well.

[0.0.374] - 2026-09-07

Fixed

• A deploy reported success having never built the frontend. The workflow piped scripts/deploy.sh into bash -s over ssh, so the script was the shell's own standard input - and docker compose exec forwards stdin to the container even with -T. The migration consumed every line below itself, bash reached EOF, and the run exited 0 without building the frontend, waiting for a container or pruning an image; the site answered the proxy's own 404 because no frontend container existed, while the deployment history said the deploy had worked. The script is now copied to the host under a name unique to the run and executed from a file, and every docker compose call in it reads from /dev/null - so it stays correct for anyone who pipes it anyway. Caught by the one step that could catch it: the external curl at the URL a person visits.

[0.0.373] - 2026-09-07

Changed

• Backend dependency floors: authlib 1.3.0 to 1.8.0, anyio 4.14.2 to 4.15.0, pydantic-ai-harness 0.27.0 to 0.29.0, prefect 3.8.4 to 3.8.5, liteparse 2.14.2 to 2.14.3, google-api-python-client 2.199.0 to 2.200.0.

[0.0.372] - 2026-09-07

Fixed

• Inviting a teammate said "sent" on a deployment that emails nobody. With no SMTP_* configured - which is every deployment on its first day - the dialog reported the invitation as sent and closed, and the accept link went with it: the token comes back exactly once, is in no cache and is not refetchable, so the invitation existed, pending, reachable by nobody. The backend had been returning that link all along, and the hook discarded it on the way past. Delivery is now reported rather than logged - email_delivered on the wire, read beside a new EmailProvider.delivers so the development log provider accepting a message is not mistaken for a message that left the deployment - and the dialog stays open holding the link with a copy control, saying plainly which of the two happened. Found on the first real deployment.

[0.0.371] - 2026-09-07

Fixed

• Bringing the frontend up called the backend an orphan, and offered to remove it. Docker Compose names a project after the directory it runs in, so the two production stacks shared one - and starting the frontend reported the API, the database, Redis and both Prefect services as orphans of it, with compose's own suggestion to run the command again with --remove-orphans. Taking that advice stops all five; the volumes survive and nothing else does. The frontend is its own compose project now, in the make targets, in scripts/deploy.sh and in the commands the compose files themselves advertise. Seen on the first real deployment.

[0.0.370] - 2026-09-06

Added

• A deployment somebody else can repeat. docs/deploy.md is rewritten around the path that actually works, and the pieces it needs now exist: scripts/server-init.sh writes backend/.env once - five generated secrets, four answers it cannot invent, and the public URLs and CORS origin derived from them - and scripts/deploy.sh fetches a named commit, rebuilds, migrates and fails on a container that does not report healthy. The page it replaces could not be followed to a running deployment: it ran compose without the production file, migrated with a command the image does not have, and pointed at an Nginx config that does not exist.
• Traefik, as two overlay files. make prod PROXY=traefik puts the API and the site on an existing Traefik's network with the labels it discovers them by. Nothing else in the stack is labelled, so under exposedByDefault: false Postgres, Redis, Prefect and the sandbox daemon are unreachable by construction rather than by omission. For a host with no proxy at all, docker-compose-traefik.yml and traefik/ are a working one, with HSTS on the secure entrypoint - the one header the application deliberately leaves to whatever terminates TLS.
• Deploying from GitHub, behind an approval. A merge to main offers itself for deployment and waits for a reviewer on the production environment. The ref is resolved in a job holding no secrets, which refuses anything that is not already an ancestor of main - so what an approver approves is a commit that has been through the pull-request gate, and moving a tag afterwards changes nothing.

Fixed

• The production stack was sized to be killed. app had a 1 GB memory limit for four uvicorn workers, and a worker measures 460 MiB - spawned rather than forked, so nothing is shared. Four of them are 1.9 GB before a request arrives, so the shipped ceiling OOM-killed the API as soon as all four were warm. Worker count is now UVICORN_WORKERS and the limit is sized for the default.
• Three more from the same measurement pass. prefect-server had no limit at all; Postgres ran on the 128 MB shared_buffers it ships with, and with the 64 MB of /dev/shm Docker gives a container, which a parallel scan over a collection's vectors exhausts; and Redis had no maxmemory.
• The deployed frontend could not be built from the example. docker-compose-prod.frontend.yml requires PUBLIC_API_URL, PUBLIC_WS_URL and PUBLIC_SITE_URL and refuses to start without them, and none of the three was in backend/.env.example.
• The Nginx template pointed at names that resolve nowhere. Its upstreams were Docker network aliases while the compose file publishes on the loopback and the documentation describes a proxy on the host - three sources, each saying something different.
• An end-to-end spec reloaded over the write it was testing, failing four times in nine runs on branches that touched none of it. Clicking a button returns when the click is dispatched, and the reload on the next line aborted the request it started.

[0.0.369] - 2026-09-06

Added

• An agent keeps notes of its own, indexed by a MEMORY.md it maintains. The memory_files capability gives it five tools over named notes, and the index is spliced into its instructions every request the way a bound context file is - so it meets what it saved before it decides anything, rather than having to choose to call a listing tool a lighter model rarely calls. A note belongs to a person or to a group chat, and a run touches exactly the conversation's own: alone with somebody it is theirs and nobody else reads it, in a channel it is the chat's. No tool takes a scope, because there is nothing for the model to choose.
• Semantic memory in a mem0 service, as its own capability. memory_mem0 remembers a fact and recalls it by meaning rather than by name, against mem0's cloud or a self-hosted deployment, through the vendor SDK. The whole scope is the mem0 user_id ({org}:{agent}:{owner}), so one mem0 account cannot mix two organisations', two agents' or two people's memories. A self-hosted base_url must be https and on MEM0_ALLOWED_HOSTS; an empty allowlist refuses self-hosted mem0 outright, because the key travels in a request header and a builder who may bind a shared key must not be able to aim it at their own server.
• An agent can find a past conversation by what was said in it. conversation_search searches message bodies and opens a thread as a readable transcript, split into USER: and AI: with the speaker named where a channel has several people in it. Memory could only recall what some earlier turn thought worth writing down; everything else was said, stored, and unreachable - so "what did we decide about the pricing" answered "I have no record of that" in a product holding the whole exchange. PostgreSQL full-text search rather than a LIKE, which matches inside words and cannot rank, and rather than embeddings, which is what knowledge search already is. Words are matched whole and case-folded but not stemmed, and the tool says so, because the configuration is fixed in the database and stemming one language would mangle every other.
• Erasing what agents remember about you. A person clears it from their own profile settings, and an administrator holding members:manage can do it for a colleague. It spans every agent in the organisation, because "forget everything you know about me" is a fact about a person rather than about one agent they happened to talk to, and it reaches mem0 as well - raising rather than reporting a success it did not achieve. One agent's notes are cleared from inside its capability panel.

Security

• A personal corpus is never read out to a room. Conversation search answers only where the person asking is the only listener; in a group chat both of its tools refuse and say why. What it can reach at all is that one person's - their own conversations, ones shared with them, and channel threads the platform still confirms them a member of. A trigger's run-log is outside it: that is a transcript of runs made under somebody else's authority, and an agent searching on a person's behalf holds no permission of theirs to check it with.
• A note is read back only where its writer could have influenced nobody else. An agent's MEMORY.md reaches the instructions in a one-to-one conversation and never in a channel, where a sentence one colleague left behind would arrive as another colleague's orders. It stays reachable there with read_memory, which is a result the model weighs rather than an order it obeys.
• conversations:read is the deployment-wide off switch for agents reading past conversations, for somewhere that considers a transcript too sensitive to be searchable however narrowly the corpus is scoped.

Changed

• There is no console for reading somebody's memory. An operator paging through what an agent wrote about a named colleague is a surveillance affordance rather than a feature, and standing knowledge somebody wants an agent to have belongs in context files. What is left on that surface is erasure.

[0.0.368] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A handful of logins locked the whole deployment out. Auth requests reach the API server-side through the frontend's own /api/auth/* routes, so the address the per-IP bucket counted was the frontend container's and everyone shared one allowance. Those routes now forward the caller's X-Forwarded-For, which the backend reads where RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR is on. Production now publishes both containers on 127.0.0.1 by default, because the frontend's port is the API's port for this setting - anything that can reach past the reverse proxy chooses the address its attempts are counted against. BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0 reopens them for a proxy that runs elsewhere.
• A rate limit read as an expired session and signed people out. The BFF flattened the backend's 429 to "login failed" or "session expired", clearing both cookies and dropping the Retry-After. Worst on GET /api/auth/me, which makes the refresh nobody asked for on every page load once the 15-minute access cookie is out: its 429 cleared the session outright, which is the deployment-wide sign-out the change exists to prevent. The envelope and its interval now reach the browser, and the cookies are left alone.
• Signing out under a rate limit no longer strands a live token. Every other backend failure means the refresh token is already worthless, so clearing the jar loses nothing; a 429 means the backend never looked at it, and dropping the browser's only copy left a token valid until expiry that nobody could revoke and no way to retry.

[0.0.367] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A collection name shared by two organizations resolved the wrong tenant's embedding configuration. knowledge_bases.collection_name is indexed but not unique, and resolution by name alone answered with whichever row the database ordered first - so an embedding call for one organization could read another's model and unseal their vault key, billing them and running this organization's text through their credential. Resolution is now scoped to the organization the embedding is for, falling back to an app-scoped collection but never to a third tenant's.
• One collection name is one embedding space, and nothing used to enforce it. A name is one physical vector table, so several knowledge bases can index into the same vectors - at different widths, where pgvector then refuses the comparison outright, or at the same width with different models, where it ranks one embedding space against another and answers with plausible nonsense. The credential had the same shape of problem: whichever sibling was read is the key that got billed. A row created against a name that already exists now adopts that collection's model, width, provider and vault key, and a caller who named a different one is refused rather than silently overridden.

[0.0.366] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• The channel router's two module-level dicts grew without bound. One held an asyncio lock per chat, the other a rate-limit window per sender, and neither ever dropped an entry - a long-running API worker kept one of each for every chat and every chat account it had ever heard from. The lock map is now reference-counted and drops a lock when the last waiter leaves it; the window map drops what has expired on every write, so it is the size of the callers seen in the last minute.
• The per-sender channel limit survives a Redis outage. rate_limit.consume fails open when Redis is unreachable, which is the documented trade for a public widget - but for a channel bot rate_limit_rpm is a production control, and a limiter that vanishes for the length of an outage lets a permitted participant run the model as fast as they can type. Decision now says whether it counted at all, and a turn it could not count is counted in a bounded per-process window instead: wrong by the worker count, and still a floor where there had been none.

[0.0.365] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• Slack's attachment download sent the bot token to whatever host the event named. The payload is signed, so this is the second lock rather than the first - but a token posted to a host somebody else chose is a token gone. The host is checked against slack.com and slack-files.com over TLS before anything is sent, and anything else is refused with the client untouched.
• Telegram's webhook secret is compared through encode_untrusted, as Slack and Mattermost already did. Safe today, because Starlette decodes headers as latin-1; the same defence in depth regardless.

Changed

• router.py names its domain objects. db, bot, identity and session were Any forty-three times. The first thing the type checker found was a /start branch reading a welcome_message field no model, schema, page or test has ever had; list_platforms() went the same way, defined and exported and called by nothing. The HTTP-client decision is written once on ChannelAdapter, and a prepare_connection hook replaces getattr duck-typing in the supervisor.

[0.0.364] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A quiet Telegram bot read unknown on the channels listing while polling fine. record_up fires once when the poll opens and the connection entry expires on a fifteen-minute TTL, with nothing re-stamping it - the defect #1351 fixed for Slack Socket Mode and the Mattermost event stream, whose own body named Telegram polling as the same shape. It gets the same heartbeat.

[0.0.363] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A Telegram bot with a token Telegram rejects was retried for ever. Each adapter carried its own reconnect loop and the three disagreed - a fixed five seconds against a 5s-to-60s backoff, the sleep inside the except in one and outside it in the others, and a stop-on-misconfiguration branch in two of the three. So that bot logged a traceback and wrote a fresh down record every five seconds, where the same bot on Slack or Mattermost recorded down once and stopped. One supervised loop serves all three, with the backoff, the stop condition and the accounting written once.

[0.0.362] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A bot saved as jwt_linked admitted senders with no linked account. The mode decided nothing on its own: with require_link off, which is the default, it admitted an unlinked room sender under the binding's creator exactly as open did - the access check enforced only whitelist and group_only, and the one place that read the mode required both switches. An operator who picks a mode named for a linked account has asked for one, so the mode requires it.
• A collection teardown and a claim could deadlock each other. Every path that drops a collection takes its teardown lock before any row lock now, so a claim - which takes the teardown lock and then the organization FK - cannot cross a teardown into an ABBA deadlock.
• A purge could drop a collection without reserving its name, and another organization could then inherit its vectors. The purge locks the names its snapshot saw, taken before the organization row is; one created between that snapshot and the row lock is found only by the authoritative scan, and was dropped unreserved - so a claim in the commit-to-drop window adopted the name, and the deferred cleanup, finding the table newly referenced, preserved it with the deleted organization's rows still in it. That lock is taken without waiting now: free, and the name reserves like any other; held by a claim already in flight, and the purge refuses rather than dropping unreserved.

[0.0.361] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A new chart type would have been drawn as a line chart, silently. The charts capability's ChartType and the channel renderer's dispatch are two lists in two packages that have to agree, and nothing checked them against each other: the renderer named three types and sent everything else to the line drawer. There is one renderer per member now, and a test that fails when the two lists drift.

[0.0.360] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A chart in a channel reply stalled every other channel turn while it drew. The PNG was rasterised and encoded by Pillow synchronously on the event loop the worker's pollers and webhooks all share. It is handed to a thread now, like the upload parse and the worker's file hash before it.

[0.0.359] - 2026-09-05

Changed

• Impersonation is a session an administrator can end, not a token on the clipboard. It was a bare one-hour bearer token, copied to the operating system clipboard, that nothing could revoke. It is started from the console with no token exposed, shown in a banner while it lasts, and ended by the administrator, by the person's own sign-out-everywhere or password reset, by the hour, or by the administrator's account being deleted - whichever comes first. sessions.impersonator_user_id marks the row and the token carries sid beside act, so every request binds the token to its row and refuses it once the row is gone, deactivated, expired, held by another administrator or for another account. A deployment can tell the impersonated person it happened (notify_impersonated_users).

[0.0.358] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A member deactivated in the console kept answering through a channel. Their chat account is still linked and the bot still routes to it, so the turn ran under a person the organization had switched off, with their role, their grants and their budget. The channel path now asks for a membership that can sign in - the same question access.publisher_context already asks of a binding's creator, so the two answers cannot drift.

[0.0.357] - 2026-09-05

Fixed

• A teardown reservation nobody released blocked a collection name for ever. The reservation is committed with the delete and released when the durable drop runs; a drop lost to a crash in the commit-to-dispatch gap, or failing past the flow's retries, left the row behind and claim refused that name from then on, with nothing to reattempt it. An hourly teardown-reservation-sweep retries the drop for any reservation older than its window, the way the other reap-sweeps do.
• An upload could repopulate a collection on its way out. dispatch_upload refuses a name under teardown, which claim already did.
• An organization whose default collection was dropped kept pointing at it.

[0.0.356] - 2026-09-05

Changed

• An MCP binding says whose account it speaks through, and that is its kind. SPEC_VERSION 11: mcp_servers entries carry account, either organization with a connection_id — everybody's, on every surface, as before — or personal with a catalog_key and no connection at all: whoever talks to the agent connects their own Notion and the agent speaks as them, in the dashboard, in a direct message and in a channel alike. The account is always the author of the message, never the thread's. Where nobody is talking — an API key, the widget, a schedule, an unlinked chat sender — the server is absent from that run and the agent is told why and where the person connects one, rather than answering as though it never had the tool. The Builder asks whose account on the card; /mcp-servers?connect=<key> opens the personal connect flow the agent links to. use_personal_when_available, which substituted a credential in private conversations only, is withdrawn: a stored binding that had it loads as the organization's and says so in the log.
• The chat connects the account, not just the agent's sentence about it. A turn that finds a personal service this person cannot reach sends personal_services_unavailable before the model answers, and the chat draws a card with a connect button beside the refusal. The chat's controls list the agent's personal services with each one's status - connected, not connected, several with no default, needs authorizing - so a new member sees what to connect before their first question. Personal connections made from the console now carry their catalog key, without which no binding could have matched them; 0071_mcp_connection_catalog_key backfills the key on every connection made from a catalog entry before the console sent it. A consent started from the chat returns to the conversation, not to the servers page.
• The Builder clears stale references and probes a server's tools in place. A draft naming a deleted collection, context file, skill or connection is refused at publish, and used to say so only there; a notice above the tabs now names them and removes them in one click. The tool picker for a binding probes a connection nobody has checked yet, for a caller who may, instead of opening empty.

[0.0.355] - 2026-09-02

Added

• One command from nothing to a running agent. scripts/quickstart.sh checks what the machine is missing and says how to get it, asks four questions, and hands back a console with a working agent in it. The plain make route is unchanged and documented beside it, for anyone who would rather read the steps than answer prompts.
• 5,802 MCP servers in the picker, searchable by name. 99 are curated — connected and checked by hand, with their OAuth flows wired and 71 of them connectable without a URL — and the rest are mirrored from the official public registry, carrying reviewed: false because nobody here has looked at them. The mirror lives in the database because a file cannot be paged, and agenticos cmd mcp-registry-sync prunes only what it has seen a full listing for.
• An agent can speak as whoever is running it, per binding and off by default: a member's own Notion in the chat they are having alone with it, the organization's everywhere else. Only the credential is substituted — the tool prefix stays the organization's, so the agent presents the same tools to everyone. A member nominates which of their accounts an agent speaks as, and a connection can carry a label a person reads rather than a slug.
• A voice message is transcribed into the turn that carried it, on the organization's own credential, with a catalog of the models that do it. The transcript arrives as part of the message rather than as an attachment nobody opens.
• A thread is the unit of conversation, in a direct message as well as a channel, and Mattermost is level with Slack on both threads and connection state. A bot brought into a thread partway through reads what was said before it arrived, with that thread's earlier files, and a row says when its connection is not up.
• Twenty-eight agent templates, four per industry, browsable from the agents page, and an opt-in gallery of seventy skills across seven industries browsable from the skills page.
• The documentation site, rebuilt: seven tabs organised by what the reader is doing, every module screenshotted in both themes, docs/screens.md, llms.txt as the single copy of the pitch that models read, and a twenty-slide client presentation at /presentation/ — published as a page because the PDF it renders is 6.4 MB.

Changed

• AgentSpec.mcp_server_ids is now mcp_servers, a list of typed references rather than bare ids, because the binding grew a policy and an id had nowhere to carry it. SPEC_VERSION 9 → 10; a stored v9 spec migrates on load, so nothing published before this stops loading, and an exported YAML keeps working. Publish now refuses two questions that have no answer at run time: a substituting binding whose connection has no catalog_key, and two substituting bindings sharing one.
• The README was rebuilt against what breakout repositories actually do, and the site's headings are sentence case throughout, with a guard that fails a documentation paragraph over 115 words.

Fixed

• Slack. A bot answered messages nobody sent it; every message carrying a file was dropped; the mention token reached the prompt; Socket Mode's payload was parsed in halves; and the first chunk of an answer was not streamed, only the rest.
• Channels. The agent read the history of some other thread than the one it was answering in; a thread was re-read once per new row instead of once per session; a quiet connection reported itself down after fifteen minutes; and the channel CLI acted without the organization it was acting for.
• MCP. The Builder could widen an allowlist it was meant to narrow; a personal account could leak into a room with other readers in it; two concurrent nominations of a default account both succeeded and one 500'd on the unique index; a repointed connection kept the previous host's cached tool list; and organization-scoped OAuth posted to a path that does not exist.
• Approvals. The queue is paged, so an alert can reach a request that is not on the first page, and a resumed run is restored on what it was admitted on rather than on whoever approved it.
• Users. The heir choice is made inside the locks that ordered it, so a self-delete cannot take a user row's lock outside the ascending sequence that closed the deadlock in #1134. (#1268)

[0.0.354] - 2026-09-01

Fixed

• An agent's knowledge search could be handed a database connection made on another event loop. The capability caches its retrieval store for the life of the process, and since #948 took the store's private pool away that store rode vector_engine, the process's shared vector pool. A pooled asyncpg connection belongs to the loop that opened it, and an agent is the one vector caller that does not know which loop it is on - it runs on the API's loop in one process and on a Prefect flow's loop in another - so a worker running two flows in one process handed the second loop a connection the first had opened and the search failed with InterfaceError: attached to a different loop, intermittently and invisibly to any test with one loop in it. (#1079)
• The rule is now stated once, in the layer that owns the engines. The API's lifespan claims the process pools with claim_pooled_engines: it serves every request and disposes them at shutdown, so it is the one loop whose connections they may cache. get_db_context is pooled on that loop and behaves like get_worker_db_context anywhere else - a NullPool engine for the call, disposed at the end - and close_db gives the claim up, so a second lifespan in one process (a test, a reload) does not inherit a stamp naming a loop that has gone. That half was found reviewing the first fix and reaches further than the agent: get_db_context is also reached from five worker flows - the report, MCP refresh, invitation and approval tasks and the channel loops - and from embeddings_for_collection, which every search consults before querying vectors. (#1079)
• The knowledge capability follows the same rule for its vector store: the process store on the owning loop, and a store on the new pool-less agent_vector_engine anywhere else. Keeping the pooled store for the API is what bounds this - NullPool opens a connection per checkout and caps nothing, where the pool queues at DB_POOL_SIZE + DB_MAX_OVERFLOW - and off that loop the bound is the worker's own flow concurrency. (#1079)

Changed

• 1128 is closed rather than merged. It keyed the cached store on the running

  loop, which was right for the store's pre-#948 private pool and buys nothing once the store shares the process pool - two loops keyed separately still check out of one pool. Its trade-off note is what pointed at the layer below. (#1079)

[0.0.353] - 2026-09-01

Changed

• knip to 6.32.2 from 5.88.1. bun run lint:deps - the narrowed run that gates lint-frontend on a declared dependency nothing imports - is clean on the major with the existing knip.jsonc. The bump arrived with frontend/package.json changed and bun.lock untouched, which is not a lockfile drift the frontend jobs tolerate: bun install --frozen-lockfile refused it, so test-frontend and e2e failed before either ran a test. The lockfile is refreshed in the same change. (#1358)

[0.0.352] - 2026-09-01

Changed

• GitHub Actions: openai/codex-action 1.12, astral-sh/setup-uv 10.0.1 and docker/setup-buildx-action 4.3.0. (#1357)

[0.0.351] - 2026-09-01

Changed

• Backend dependencies: pydantic[email] 2.13.5, prefect 3.8.4, pydantic-ai-harness 0.27.0, llama-cloud 2.15.0, liteparse 2.14.2, google-auth 2.57.0, boto3 1.43.83, click 8.5.0, tavily-python 0.8.0, cryptography 50.0.1, aiogram 3.31.0, slack-sdk 3.44.0, and the dev pins ruff 0.16.5 and ty 0.0.75. (#1367)

[0.0.350] - 2026-09-01

Changed

• pydantic-ai-slim to 2.35.3, both extras sets - the runtime one (anthropic, cohere, duckduckgo, google, groq, huggingface, mistral, openrouter, web-fetch, xai) and mcp - from 2.33.0. The agent runtime is the one dependency where a lag is felt in every run, so the group moves on its own. (#1345)

[0.0.349] - 2026-09-01

Fixed

• A name freed by a deferred drop could adopt the table it was about to drop. The teardown removes a collection's rag_<name> table only after the request that deleted its knowledge-base rows commits, so between the commit and the drop the name is free of any row while the populated table lingers - and a concurrent POST /rag/collections/{name} had _ensure_collection's CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS adopt it and read another tenant's chunks. The #1355 advisory lock serializes claim against drop; it does not stop the claim winning the race. A tombstone committed with the delete does: the new collection_teardowns table (the name is the key, deployment-global) with an idempotent reserve / is_reserved / release, reserved in the delete's own transaction by every path that schedules a drop - KnowledgeBaseService.delete, delete_for_rag_collection, OrganizationService.purge, UserService._purge_personal_collections. claim refuses a reserved name, and cleanup_external_state drops the table and then releases the reservation, so the name is never free while the populated table exists and a failed drop keeps it for the retry. The flow drops unconditionally now, and the "is another base still on this name?" check runs inline in each delete path instead of once in the flow. (#1362)
• Dropping a default collection clears its table rather than leaving the deleted chunks searchable; the default row is kept, so the table recreates empty on the next write. The inline reference check excludes the base being torn down, which is what the flow's own check could not do. (#1362)

Added

• collection_teardowns - the drop reservation, one row per name, released by the cleanup that finishes the drop. (#1362)

[0.0.348] - 2026-09-01

Fixed

• The last two collection drops that ran in the request now go through the durable teardown. DELETE /rag/collections/{name} dropped the table directly, with no #913 reference re-check and no lock, so it could drop a table a second knowledge base still referenced and could race a concurrent claim of the name; UserService._purge_personal_collections (#1131) re-checked and then dropped with nothing held in between. Both now delete their document and knowledge-base rows in the request and hand the files and the table drop to dispatch_external_state_cleanup, which takes the COLLECTION_TEARDOWN lock, re-reads the reference check on its own session, and drops only what no base still claims. drop_collection's drop moves into KnowledgeBaseService.delete_for_rag_collection, so the route loses its vector_store dependency the way delete_knowledge_base did. (#1359)
• The reserved-name refusal that gated drop_collection in-request is now the store's, inside the flow: the route answers 204 and removes the records, and a pre-rule collection whose name folds onto a model table keeps that table. The same deferral tradeoff delete_knowledge_base already makes. (#1359)
• The window every deferred drop leaves - a populated table with no row naming it, which a concurrent claim can adopt - is closed by 0.0.349 (#1362), the tip of this arc. (#1359)

[0.0.347] - 2026-09-01

Fixed

• A collection's name could be claimed while its vector table was being dropped. The teardown re-reads list_by_collection_name before dropping a rag_<name> table (#913), but the re-check and the drop are two statements and the claim path is two more: under READ COMMITTED a claim reading "this name is free" and a drop reading "no base holds this name" both act, and the drop then removes the table the claim just created and committed a row against. POST /rag/collections/{name} creates the table before committing its row, so the window was reachable. Both ends now take a transaction-scoped advisory lock keyed on the collection name - hold_name, the string-subject sibling of hold_subject, under a new COLLECTION_TEARDOWN scope in app/db/locks.py. CollectionAccessService.claim takes it after the identifier rule and before the taken-check, holding it past create_collection until the request commits; cleanup_external_state takes it before each collection's re-check and holds it through the drop. Either the claim commits first and the drop's re-check skips, or the drop commits first and the claim recreates the table its row points at. (#1355)
• Two pre-existing in-request drops still bypass that teardown - DELETE /rag/collections/{name} and _purge_personal_collections - so the invariant stays reachable through them until #1359. (#1355)

[0.0.346] - 2026-09-01

Changed

• The bulk RAG teardown's cleanup is durable across a restart. #1293 and #1347 moved the file unlinks and the vector-store work past the request commit with spawn_after_commit, which fixed the ordering but not the durability: an in-process task dies with the worker that queued it, orphaning the files and tables it had left to clean. The durable Prefect deployment #1274 gave the org purge now serves both callers - org_purge_cleanup becomes external_state_cleanup, same (storage_paths, collections) signature, and its #913 reference re-check runs on the worker's own session. rag_document's _retire_superseded and delete_by_collection dispatch it instead of an in-process unlink, and knowledge_base.delete dispatches the files and the collection drop in one durable run - so it no longer takes a vector_store, and the delete_knowledge_base route drops the parameter with it. Sync-source deactivation stays inline. (#1349)
• delete_document - a single document - stays in-process on purpose: what a lost task strands there is one file and one document's vectors, which a durable Prefect run per delete is disproportionate to, and making it durable would undo #992's structural guarantee. Its docstring says so. (#1349)
• The commit-to-dispatch window #1274 documented stays open: a crash after the commit but before run_deployment fires still loses the cleanup, which only an outbox closes. (#1349)

[0.0.345] - 2026-09-01

Fixed

• The RAG delete paths did their vector-store work inside the request transaction. #1293 deferred the file unlinks; the store side effects stayed where they were, so the same rollback left the vectors gone. RAGDocumentService.delete_document's remove_document and KnowledgeBaseService.delete's delete_collection DROP TABLE now go over with spawn_after_commit too. The collection drop is the sharper of the two: a rollback used to restore the knowledge-base and rag_documents rows pointing at a table that no longer existed, which is a correctness fault rather than a recoverable leak. The deferred drop re-reads its list_by_collection_name reference check on a session of its own, because the name is not tenant-unique and a second organization can reclaim it in the window between the commit and the drop (#913) - the same re-check the org purge's durable cleanup makes. (#1347)
• Still deferred in-process, so a crash between the commit and the dispatch loses the cleanup; that durability gap is #1349. (#1347)

[0.0.344] - 2026-09-01

Fixed

• The RAG delete paths unlinked stored uploads inside the request transaction. rag_document.delete_by_collection, delete_document, complete_ingestion's _retire_superseded and knowledge_base.delete all removed the file before the commit, so a commit that then failed rolled the rag_documents rows back and left the files gone - a restored row pointing at a missing upload, its download and re-ingestion broken, and the original that could have rebuilt the vectors lost. All four now hand the unlink to spawn_after_commit after deleting the rows, through one shared delete_files_best_effort(paths) in app/services/file_storage.py which holds only ids, resolves the storage backend when it runs, and suppresses a file already gone. The table drop and the sync-source deactivation stay in the transaction. (#1293)
• The vector-store half of those same paths - delete_document's remove_document and knowledge_base.delete's DROP TABLE - still runs before the commit, which is the same rollback class on the store's own engine and needs the #913 reference re-check moved with it. Filed as #1347 rather than widened into this change. (#1293)

[0.0.343] - 2026-08-28

Changed

• The org teardown's external cleanup is a durable Prefect deployment. It was deferred to an in-process spawn_after_commit task (#1137), which closed the commit-ordering window but left a durability gap: spawn_after_commit is not durable, so a process that died after the commit but before or during the cleanup lost it - orphaning a rag_<collection> table and its files with no record of what to drop. OrganizationService.purge still hands the work over after the commit, but hands over a run_deployment submission rather than the work: the run and its parameters - the paths and collection names, all that is left of the deleted rows - are recorded on the Prefect server, executed by a worker, and re-run by the flow's retries if that worker dies. New app/worker/tasks/teardown_tasks.py holds the idempotent cleanup, the durable flow wrapper and the submit-and-return dispatch; the flow re-checks each collection name against the knowledge-base table before dropping it, because the name is not tenant-unique (#913), so a name a second organization claimed between the commit and the drop keeps its table. The inline _purge_external_state and _collection_still_referenced go with it. (#1274)
• The gap that remains is commit-to-dispatch: a crash before spawn_after_commit fires still loses the cleanup, which only a record committed with the delete - an outbox - would close. (#1274)

[0.0.342] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• LocalFileStorage.delete was async def over three blocking syscalls with no yield point - realpath inside _resolve_safe_path, Path.exists and Path.unlink. The RAG teardown loops (collection drop, knowledge-base delete) call it once per file with no bound, so dropping a large collection unlinked every upload in a single event-loop turn and stalled every other request the worker was serving. It runs through run_blocking now - the dedicated file pool load already uses - so every caller yields and the teardown loops interleave. This is the delete case #25 did not reach: it offloaded save and load, and delete only became a hot path once the bulk teardown loops started calling it per file. Behaviour is unchanged; it still removes the file and tolerates a missing one. (#1294)

[0.0.341] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• The card grids clipped by 34px on a 390px viewport. grid gap-3 md:grid-cols-2 xl:grid-cols-3 declares no column count below md, so the single implicit track is auto and sizes to its items' content: the grid box measured 324px while its own grid-template-columns computed 391.094px. min-width: 0 injected at every level of the ancestor chain changes nothing - the track is what is too wide, not the item - where grid-cols-1, that is repeat(1, minmax(0, 1fr)), makes the track the container's 324px and the card's own truncate finally has something to truncate against. Applied to fourteen grids across nine files: the ones whose cards carry user-supplied unbreakable text - a slug, an email, a URL, an id - because those are the ones whose min-content is unbounded. The sweep found 71 grids with the same shape and deliberately leaves the other 57: the pattern is only a defect when something inside cannot be broken, and a no-op class on 57 files is a diff nobody can review. (#120)
• The chat control bar ran 27px past the composer at 390px. Three controls, 358px of them, in a justify-between row with the connection pill. The pill is shrink-0 now - two words, nothing to give - and the control group min-w-0, which AgentPicker's trigger needed too: its max-w-[160px] on the name is a cap, not permission for a flex item to shrink. (#120)
• A dashboard widget's info button was a 14x14 tap target, a third of the 44px both mobile platforms ask for. A before:absolute before:-inset-[15px] pseudo-element takes it to 44x44 without moving anything on screen. (#120)

Changed

• 120 had "describe it later" in every field, so the issue body is now the audit:

  measured at 390x780 and 768x1024 in Chromium against the running app, fourteen pages, each scrolled to the end, recording overflow, tap-target size, text size and anything intersecting the fixed tab bar. Good news up front - the document never scrolls horizontally, at either width, on any of the fourteen pages. Three things are deliberately left and scoped on the issue rather than fixed here: the three data tables, which each sit in their own overflow-x-auto scroller so no column is lost but which want to be cards below md (Activity is 1155px in a 364px column); 45 sub-40px tap targets, most of them the repository's own icon-sm, which want one hit-area token below md rather than bigger buttons; and the 10-11px mono label register, which is a design decision about a phone. (#120)

[0.0.340] - 2026-08-28

Added

• A README front page: hero, pitch, badges, nav, then the spec sample and what the product looks like. The content was already strong; what it lacked was the visual first impression. The graphics are authored in this repository - no icon package, no external asset host, no hand-copied path data: .github/assets/hero-{light,dark}.svg, one per theme and served through a <picture>, drawing the sentence the README opens with rather than decorating it - one spec, one runner, the surfaces that reach it and the four refusals underneath, in the app's own palette read out of globals.css and converted rather than eyeballed; and docs/assets/mark.svg, the same mark alone, which is now the docs site's logo and favicon, which the site did not have. One file, not two: an earlier draft had a copy in .github/assets/, which is the second-source defect this repository keeps citing. (#783)
• Release and stars badges - the two the header lacked - plus a star-history image before the footer. Image paths are relative, so they render in a pull request as well as on main; absolute raw.githubusercontent URLs would show broken images to whoever reviews a change about graphics. (#783)
• Three screenshots - the builder, the catalog, the chat surface - at 1600px, palette-reduced to 220 colours, 392KB for all three. Taken from a make dev run against a throwaway database rather than a developer's own, which held eleven E2E fixtures and four scratch agents; the fresh one was dropped afterwards and the developer's eleven agents verified still there. No shot shows a live model answer, deliberately: the alternatives were to spend somebody's tokens or to fake a transcript, so the chat shot is the composer with a real question typed and the agent picker showing which agent will answer. (#783)

Fixed

• The docs table promised "Spec, version, exposure, run - the four nouns" where concepts.md has five: the trigger was added and one of the two pages updated. (#783)

[0.0.339] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• /runs had 0px under its last run row where every other list page gets 64px. It was in FULL_HEIGHT_ROUTES, so PageTransition gave it min-h-0 and withheld PAGE_CLEARANCE - and it stopped being a full-height route in #914: the page's root is an ordinary scrolling flex flex-col and the run detail is sticky inside the page's own scroll rather than a pane with a scrollbar of its own. One regex was answering two different questions on the page's behalf, so it is two now: OWN_SCROLL_PANE (/chat alone, which needs the constrained chain so the transcript scrolls instead of the page) and OWN_BOTTOM_ROOM (/chat and /runs, both having something that must reach the bottom edge). Activity then declares PAGE_CLEARANCE one level in, on its list column - and that placement is the whole point, because padding on the box around the two-column row shortens the containing block the sticky panel is clamped to. Measured at 1440x800 against a transcription of the page's own chain: room on the outer box gives 64px of clearance and a panel top of -48px with its header cut off by 56px, which is the figure in the issue; room on the list column gives 64px and a panel pinned 8px from the window top, header visible. (#1206)
• Below lg, the run detail panel's last 56px sat behind the mobile tab bar. The list column is hidden there and the panel is the only column, so its flat h-[calc(100dvh-1rem)] ran under a bar that is fixed bottom-0, min-h-[56px] plus the safe-area inset. Measured at 390x780: 56px hidden before, 8px clear after, which matches the 8px it already keeps at the top. The full height stays above lg, where the bar is hidden. Same element, two lines, so it is here rather than in a second change. (#1206)
• page-transition.test.tsx was asserting the old reason - "constrains Activity too, where the list and the run detail scroll apart", true before the page was rebuilt and false since. It asserts both halves of what is true now: no min-h-0, and no pb- either, with the prefix-match case still checking that /runsomething gets the room. (#1206)

[0.0.338] - 2026-08-28

Changed

• A presentation and correctness pass over every page of the site - 25 concept and reference pages, the 8 guides, the 3 reference stubs. The site was accurate and almost unreadable: 27 pages of unbroken prose, one mermaid diagram between them, no content tabs anywhere, ~20 pages with no callouts at all, and three flows drawn in ASCII that only line up in a monospace font. The words are mostly unchanged; what changes is what a reader sees before they start reading. 17 mermaid diagrams where prose or ASCII described a flow - the request path and the transaction's ordering, both ingestion pipelines, the three permission layers, park -> decide -> resume, the sandbox's three processes, envelope encryption, MCP's OAuth 2.1 handshake, a sync's six stages. ~130 callouts, each promoting a rule the page already stated and whose violation costs something: a 2xx means the write is readable, a budget is checked before the request, an empty origin list allows nothing, the sandbox token is root-equivalent. Content tabs where alternatives were stacked vertically, and prose restructured where it was a table or a list in disguise. (#784)

Fixed

• Four pages were teaching things that are not true here. patterns.md's three worked examples had all drifted off the code - a DI example injecting Depends(get_db) and Depends(get_current_user), neither of which exists, where the aliases do and DBSession's scope="function" is load-bearing (#353); a repository written as a ConversationRepository class, the one shape the architecture rule rules out; and a service holding self.repo, which no service in the codebase does. howto/customize-agent-prompt.md taught editing app/agents/prompts.py and overriding DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT, with a get_system_prompt_with_rag() and an AI_TEMPERATURE that do not exist - contradicting the sentence CLAUDE.md calls the whole design; it is rewritten around the spec and default_instructions.py. howto/add-background-task.md step 2 was asyncio.create_task(...), which is exactly the shape #417 was: the task starts before the request commits, so a flow reading its own row finds nothing, and the exception is dropped too - now spawn_after_commit / spawn. And howto/add-api-endpoint.md was a second, already-diverging copy of adding_features.md's walkthrough; it is the single copy now, with adding_features.md pointing at it. (#784)
• Smaller corrections: configure-sync-sources.md named app/rag/connectors/ twice for a package that is app/services/rag/connectors/, and had a sentence ending in a colon with nothing after it; ROADMAP.md was dated 2026-07-27 and contradicted itself about the 100% gate, with three items describing features that have shipped; index.md promised "four nouns" where concepts.md has five; and a dead anchor in configuration.md, which mkdocs reports at INFO so --strict never caught it. (#784)

[0.0.337] - 2026-08-28

Added

• A per-conversation approval mode in the chat. The spec decides which tools are gated, at publish time, per tool - which is right for a statement about what the agent is, and says nothing about the mood of one session. Somebody working through twenty turns with an agent that gates three tools answered the same three questions every turn, and their only way out was to republish the agent, changing it for everybody, permanently, to fix an afternoon. Three modes ride the send frame beside the model override: Follow the agent (the default, and exactly what existed before), Approve everything (standing consent for this conversation - every gated call granted without parking, each one still writing its row), and Ask about everything (gate every tool the agent can reach, including the ones the spec left ungated and the ones no capability owns). (#925)
• Four things make it a session setting rather than a hole in the model. A caller who may not waive is refused, never downgraded - quietly following the spec would leave somebody believing they had turned the questions off, and the next parked run says the opposite; the check is in AgentRunnerService.prepare, the one funnel a fresh run and a resumed one share. Waiving needs approvals:decide and the organization's leave: a standing consent is the decision the queue exists to record, so organizations.chat_may_waive_approvals is the ceiling - off by default, changed by somebody holding approvals:decide - and without it a Builder's deliberate gate on send_email would be one click from nothing in every conversation. No channel still means no: only the web chat may waive, because ApprovalGate already refuses a run with nobody to ask. And every waived call is recorded - the row is written approved, names the consenting account and carries decided_via = "standing", its own column rather than a sentence in note, because a waived run indistinguishable from an agent that was never gated is docs/governance.md's trail quietly ceasing to be one. (#925)
• "Ask about everything" gates MCP tools too. The spec-driven gate leaves them alone because their approval is a property of the connection; a person who does not trust an agent yet is asking about everything it can do. It only tightens, so it takes no permission, no ceiling and no surface check - ApprovalRequest.capability_id is nullable for exactly this case. (#925)
• docs/governance.md gains How much one conversation wants to be asked; the tour gains chat-approval-mode.

Changed

• New column organizations.chat_may_waive_approvals, default off, with its own switch beside the spending limit - so an upgrade changes nobody's behaviour and the waive option does not render until an owner turns it on.

[0.0.336] - 2026-08-28

Added

• An Owner column on the workspaces table. It said who else could see a workspace and never who it belongs to: access_label describes the scope - "everybody who talks to this agent", "one person" - which is a different fact, and on an agent-scoped workspace shared by six people it is not the one an operator is asking. owner_label was already on the row and already rendered by the chat panel, used here only as a fallback heading. Plain text and never a link, because owner_ref is a string and a Slack-sourced workspace's owner is a platform id rather than an account (#131), so a linked cell would be broken on half the rows. Sortable, because grouping a deployment by holder is what somebody opens this to do. (#137)

Changed

• One folder tree, not two. /skills and /workspaces/{id} had written the same tree twice - the same recursion, the same expand-collapse set keyed on a folder's path, the same chevron and two folder icons, the same role="tree" with aria-expanded - over two node shapes and two polarities of open state, one holding what was collapsed and the other what was open. PathTree in components/files is now the mechanics and the semantics: indentation by depth, the roles, one selected file, the open set. What a row says stays with the caller, because a skill's file is a name and a workspace's is a name, a size and a download - which is why there are two render props: renderFile inside the button that opens the file, so that is all a screen reader announces, and renderFileMeta beside it, because the workspace's download must not need the file opened first and a button inside a button is invalid. workspace-explorer.tsx is 110 lines lighter, skill-files.tsx 80, against one 203-line component. One deliberate visual change: a skill's file rows were indented twelve pixels further than its folders and the workspace's were not, so the two trees disagreed about the same question. They indent alike now. (#137)

[0.0.335] - 2026-08-28

Changed

• The Share conversation dialog picks a person rather than asking for an email address. It had a text field and a hand-rolled suggestion list that appeared only once something had been typed, so the control's default state was a blank box you had to already know the answer to fill, and every mistyped address was a 404. MemberPicker - a popover over a cmdk list - opens with the organization in it, each row a face and a name over the address, and somebody who already has access is not offered again. The API has always accepted shared_with beside shared_with_email, so this is a client change rather than a contract change, and sharing outside the organization becomes impossible by construction - #930's client half. matchingMembers and its four tests go with the field. (#931)
• View and Edit carry icons and a sentence. Eye and Pencil, in the select and on every row, with one line saying what the level permits - because "edit" on a conversation is not obvious: it is rename, archive, delete and append turns, which ConversationService._may_write decides and nothing on the dialog used to say. (#931)
• The access list reads as people. MemberIdentity, the same row the members table and the alerts picker draw, resolved against the organization's members - with a fallback to whatever the share itself holds, because a share whose member is gone still has to be revocable. The level is the catalog's word now: the badge printed the API's raw view/edit, so that one row was English in every locale while the select above it was translated, and the i18n guard could not see it because it is an expression rather than a literal. (#931)
• DIALOG_FORM instead of DIALOG_CONFIRM, and three separated sections - invite, who has access, the link - rather than three controls on one row. A share token is not a person, so it keeps its own row. (#931)

[0.0.334] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• Every notification link was organization-agnostic, and the page it opens acts on whichever organization the reader last used. apiClient stamps X-Organization-Id from a selection persisted per browser, so somebody in two organizations who was last working in Globex opened the approval alert for a run in Acme and read Globex's queue: very likely empty, and reading as nothing is waiting about a run that is parked and ageing towards ApprovalService.expire_stale. The agent links were wrong more quietly - /agents/{id} under the wrong organization is a refusal for an agent the reader can genuinely see, one switch away. run.organization_id and agent.organization_id were in scope at all four call sites and discarded. Every link now carries org=<id>, built in one place - NotificationService._link, which picks the separator from the path because the approvals link already carries ?tab=approvals. (#1204)
• The console adopts it the way it adopts /orgs/{id}. organizationInQuery reads it under the same two rules as the path's reader and for the same reasons #1032 gives: a UUID only, so a future ?org=new is not adopted as a tenant id and refused on every request, and lower-cased, because the value is stored and found by === against ids the server serialises in canonical lower case. The adoption is the existing layout effect in the recovery hook, before the tenant cache reset and before the page's own queries, so the first request the page makes already carries the right tenant. Two rules follow from what the parameter is: the path outranks it, since /orgs/{id} is that organization while ?org= only says which one an alert was about; and adoption is keyed on the path and the adopted id together, because two alerts about two organizations arrive at the same path and keying on the path alone would read the first one's tenant. (#1204)
• A reader who has since left that organization is told the link is the reason, rather than being moved in silence and reading another organization's page as the answer to the alert. It cannot name the organization: they are not a member, so it is not in their list. (#1204)

Added

• docs/governance.md gains Every link says which organization it is about under Alerts.

[0.0.333] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• An ingestion that had already read its file kept writing when the collection was deleted underneath it. insert_document reaches _ensure_collection, whose CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS recreated the just-dropped rag_<collection> table and inserted the chunks - leaving an untracked table of stale vectors reachable by a later same-named collection, and then failing to record completion because the document row was gone. IngestionService.ingest_file takes an optional still_wanted check, run after the parse and before the write: the upload flow checks its own rag_documents row, which the delete removes, and the two sync flows check that the collection still has a knowledge base. When it reports the collection gone the write is skipped and a failure returned rather than the table resurrected. (#1275)
• Both checks are fail-safe: any error answers "still wanted", so the guard can only ever skip a write it is certain is unwanted and never blocks a legitimate ingestion. It closes the parse-duration window, which is the wide one - parsing a large file is seconds where the insert is fast. Two residuals stay, both narrow and pre-existing: a collection dropped in the instant between the check and the insert, and the sync check being collection-level rather than tenant-precise while collection names are not tenant-unique (#913). (#1275)

[0.0.332] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• A new turn no longer starts from a checklist that is already finished. keep_plan records whatever the store held when the run ended, completed steps included, and the next turn seeded from it - so a thread whose three steps were all ticked off in August opened in November with the tail reminder calling them "your current plan" and read_plan answering with them, and the agent worked to a checklist about a task nobody is doing. The filter is at the seed rather than at the moment the last step is ticked: within the turn that finishes a plan the store still holds it, so read_plan, the reminder and the transcript agree and the agent can summarise what it just did - and it is the next question that starts clean, with the ticked checklist still in the messages above it where it reads as what was done. Nothing is deleted; the row keeps the finished plan and still_open decides only what a fresh turn is seeded with. Finished means at least one step and every step completed or cancelled - blocked is work outstanding and keeps the plan. (#1221)

Changed

• The rule is written down in both places: the seeding rule's docstring in planning/_capability.py, and docs/reference/capabilities.md, whose paragraph said the opposite ("A finished checklist is kept rather than cleared").

[0.0.331] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• DELETE /kb/{id} deleted only the knowledge_bases row. Its rag_documents rows, whose FK is SET NULL, survived detached and readable by a later same-named collection; the uploaded files stayed on disk; and the physical rag_<collection> table was left behind with the collection name still blocking reuse. The full teardown existed only on the org purge path. KnowledgeBaseService.delete now takes the vector store - required, not optional, the shape #992 used so a delete route cannot silently skip the teardown again - and runs it: the base's document rows and their stored files, then the row, then the rag_<collection> table, dropped only when no other base still references the name, which is not tenant-unique (#913). The route wires in the VectorStoreSvc it did not have. (#1266, #1290)

[0.0.330] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• A magic link ignored where the visitor was headed. /auth/magic-link called postSignInDestination() with nothing, so somebody who arrived at ?returnTo=/agents/a-1 landed on /dashboard - which door somebody came through still deciding where they end up. #121 removed that drift on the roles axis and #135 on the provider axis; this was the last door with it. The path travels in the token, as a signed rt claim: #135's sessionStorage is allowed because the OAuth round trip starts and ends in the same tab, where a magic link is followed from an email - another tab, often another application, sometimes another browser - and that store is empty by construction. No schema change, and nothing between the mint and the landing can edit it. (#1214)
• Refused before it is signed, and judged again at the landing. MagicLinkRequest.return_to accepts a path on this deployment and nothing with a scheme, a second leading slash, a backslash or a control character - the same five shapes frontend/src/lib/auth-landing.ts refuses - so a token holding an arbitrary string never exists rather than existing and being filtered on read. postSignInDestination judges it again anyway: a check that ran once, on the server, on a value that then travelled through an email is not a check the client can rely on having happened. (#1214)
• POST /auth/magic-link/verify answers with MagicLinkToken - the pair plus return_to, unapplied, because the client navigates and the landing owns that judgement. Its own schema rather than a nullable field on Token: the login and refresh responses have no return path to carry, and a field that is always null on most responses is one a client learns to ignore. The page also goes through goToDestination now, so a destination carrying a fragment is no longer double-appended by next@16.2's segment cache. (#1214)

Added

• docs/architecture.md gains Where a fresh session lands - the one decision, and the three transports that carry it.

[0.0.329] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• Dropping a collection orphaned every file it held. DELETE /rag/collections/{name} dropped the vector table and deleted the rag_documents rows, but delete_by_collection was a bulk delete returning only a rowcount - so nothing unlinked the uploads and each one stayed on disk. The repository deletes RETURNING storage_path now and answers with the non-null paths, the shape delete_by_knowledge_base already used, and the service unlinks each one best-effort: a file already gone is not a reason to fail the drop. Keyed on collection_name, so it clears the files for every knowledge base backing that physical collection - which is what the drop route means. (#1265)

[0.0.328] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• make test-frontend-cov intermittently failed the 100% statement gate at 99.98% on a clean tree. The one miss was markdown-content.impl.tsx:37, the pl-8 return in orderedIndent - the indent band for a 10-99 item ordered list. Nothing in the markdown-content suite renders a list that size, so the statement was covered only when some other suite happened to render one, and under parallel scheduling that render is not guaranteed. The indent test already pinned the 1-9, 100+ and 1000+ bands; the two-digit case is pinned now too, deterministically rather than by accident. The branch is live - a 10-99 item list is reachable - so it is covered, not removed. (#1264)

[0.0.327] - 2026-08-28

Changed

• One HTTP client per module for web search and model listings, rather than one per call. These are the two per-call httpx.AsyncClient sites the #952 audit left outside its channel-adapter scope: the HTTP-based search providers (Brave, Exa) and the model-catalog listing fetch. Each opened a fresh client per call, so a search tool invoked several times in one run - or a catalog refresh asking provider after provider - paid a new TCP and TLS handshake against a host it had just talked to. Both are module-level functions with no adapter lifecycle to hang a client on, so #1262's shape does not fit: the client is built lazily, rebuilt if it was closed, and carries the timeout per request so one client serves every provider. The app lifespan closes both at shutdown, after background work has drained, where it already closes the channel adapters' clients. ddgs and Tavily go through their own SDKs rather than httpx and are untouched. (#1263)

[0.0.326] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• Two app admins deleting each other could leave the deployment with none. The not-self refusal in admin_delete states a lockout invariant - a deployment keeps at least one administrator - and it held only against one request at a time. #1115's SELECT ... FOR UPDATE covers the target row, so admin A deleting B and admin B deleting A locked different rows, touched different personal organizations and never contended: both committed, and count(*) FROM users WHERE is_app_admin was 0, with a direct database write as the only recovery. New user_repo.app_admin_ids_for_update locks the set the decision was always about, and admin_delete takes it before deciding, so the later of two mutual deletes waits, re-reads a set of one once the first commits, and is refused. (#1208)
• Two choices worth naming. ORDER BY id is load-bearing: rows are locked in the order they are returned, so two requests taking the same set take it in the same order and one waits, where an unordered pair each holding half of it is #1134 in a new place. And the lock is taken on every admin deletion, not only when the target is an admin - reading the target's flag first to decide whether to lock puts a window between the read and the lock, and deleting a user is an administrator's action rather than a hot path. (#1208)

Changed

• docs/deployment.md already argued this invariant from the set; it now says what makes it true across two requests.

[0.0.325] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• The parked-run alert routinely told somebody to approve a call the platform will refuse them. approvals:decide belongs to owner, admin and operator, and the default audience for a parked tool call is the run's initiator plus the administrators - a builder starting their own agent from the chat is the ordinary initiator, not an edge case. They got "waiting on your approval", a Review the request button, and then an Activity page with no Approvals tab at all: the refusal arriving as an absent tab rather than a sentence. The audience is now split by the permission rather than trimmed to it - a decider gets the request and its link to the queue, and anybody else gets a new approval_pending mail saying the run is held not failed, that approving it belongs to an owner, admin or operator, and that nothing is asked of them. Trimming instead would have dropped the one person definitely waiting on the run, which is the whole reason initiator is in the default audience. (#1203)
• The second mail carries no link, deliberately: agents:view being a role permission does not make one agent reachable, since agent access is resolved per resource, so a chosen recipient with no grant to a private agent would get a second call to action the platform refuses. (#1203)
• Which roles decide is read off ROLE_PERMS rather than listed beside it, so a role gaining or losing approvals:decide cannot leave the routing behind - the same defect one level up. App admins count as deciders: they hold no membership row and AuthContext.permissions gives them everything. A test pins the derivation, including that builder and member are not in it. (#1203)

Added

• docs/governance.md gains The approval alert is two emails under Alerts.

[0.0.324] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• The admin drawer said "Never signed in" for anybody who had signed out. Both of its session figures came off the same read - the user's active sessions - and a user who signs out, or whose sessions were revoked, has no active row at all, so last_seen_at came back null. That is most accounts most of the time, and it is the opposite of the truth on the one field the drawer exists to answer. Where somebody was last seen is a fact about every session they have ever had, so the read takes the whole history (open_only=False) and the head of it, most-recently-used first, is the answer. (#1256)
• An expired session counted as open. Nothing sweeps a session that simply lapses: the row stays is_active until the next refresh finds it past expires_at and declines it, so a session nobody can use was reported as open. "Open" now means is_active AND expires_at > now(), and it lives in app/repositories/session.py rather than at one call site - which is why the flag is open_only and not active_only: the old name described the column, not the question. The user's own devices list goes through the same two functions, so it stops offering an expired row to revoke. newest_session_at stays scoped to the open ones, because "newest session August" under "0 open sessions" is a sentence about nothing. (#1256)

Changed

• New index on (user_id, last_used_at, id) for the sessions table, so reading the head of an unpruned history is bounded rather than a per-user scan and top-N sort.

[0.0.323] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• is_favourite was false on six conversation responses out of eight. Only list_conversations and set_favourite passed rows through _attach_favourites, so GET /conversations/{id}, the PATCH, the archive response and /shared-with-me serialized ORM objects that never carried the flag - the schema default answered false to a caller who really had starred the thread, and the sidebar un-starred it on the next render. It is stamped in get_conversation instead, the one read every reader-scoped route goes through, so a route cannot forget; list_shared_with_me has its own repository call and its own stamp. A read with no reader - the admin listing, the run path resolving a thread - still asks for nobody's stars and pays no query to say so. (#1254)
• Starring the same thread twice at once raised. set_favourite read the row and inserted when it saw none, so two overlapping POSTs both saw nothing and the second flush() violated the primary key: a 500 on an endpoint that promises idempotent success, and a retried request did it too. Now INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, the shape channel_identity_repo.get_or_create already uses (#17), and the unstar is an unconditional DELETE. (#1254)
• A double click could leave a thread starred with nothing on screen saying so. The POST and the DELETE were separate requests with nothing making the second wait, so the DELETE could be answered first and the POST commit after it. One promise chain per conversation now, so the requests land in click order; the optimistic patch still happens at once, and a refusal rolls the row back only if its click is still the newest. (#1254)

[0.0.322] - 2026-08-28

Added

• Azure, Bedrock and Vertex AI are inside the model-catalog drift guard. _documented_rows reads the two four-column tables, so the three providers with the most involved credential shapes were in no assertion but the id one. Their credential is prose and maps to no field - but which of the three tables a provider sits in is itself a claim about its credential, since the heading says "Credential is not an API key", and that is comparable. Two assertions follow: the three tables partition PROVIDERS, so a provider documented twice or in none of them fails; and which table a row is in matches secret_kind, so moving a row without changing the spec, or the reverse, fails. (#1252)

[0.0.321] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• A long maintenance message ended under the mobile tab bar. DeploymentGate returns MaintenanceScreen instead of rendering PageTransition, which is where every other page takes its bottom clearance from, so the last 56px plus the safe-area inset stayed covered even at maximum scroll - on the one screen a visitor sees when nothing else is available. The clearance moves onto the gate's no-wrapper branch and off MaintenanceScreen: the gate is what knows this is the whole page, where the screen would inherit page padding anywhere else it were rendered. Still the one PAGE_CLEARANCE token, so there is no second copy of the calc to forget env(safe-area-inset-bottom) in. (#1241)
• page-clearance.test.ts walks the pages and so cannot see that branch; the assertion is a render instead - the gate in maintenance, as a non-admin, with the token spread as classes on its root, so a token that loses the inset fails here too. (#1241)

[0.0.320] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• Deleting a user orphaned their personal organization's knowledge base. UserService.delete purged the personal organization through OrganizationService.purge, but built that service with no vector store - and purge only removes org-scoped collections. A personal-scoped base, whose owner_user_id and organization_id are both ON DELETE SET NULL, was therefore never touched: the row was orphaned and its rag_documents rows, uploaded files and rag_<collection> table were retained and unreachable, while the collection name went on blocking reuse through CollectionAccessService.claim. The same missing store also left that organization's org-scoped collections without their physical tables. (#1131)
• UserService takes an optional vector_store and the account teardown uses it, or builds one on the process's shared vector pool when none is injected - so route and CLI paths both clean up and no other UserService route pays for a store it never touches, mirroring get_organization_teardown_service. New _purge_personal_collections deletes each personal base's document rows, unlinks its stored files, deletes the row, and drops the rag_<collection> table only when no other base still references the name - it is not tenant-unique (#913). (#1131)

Added

• knowledge_base_repo.list_personal_by_owner, the predicate that previously lived inline in get_accessible.

[0.0.319] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• An organization teardown dropped vector tables and unlinked stored uploads before the transaction that deleted their rows had committed. OrganizationService.purge did both inside the request, on the vector store's own session, so a final commit that failed rolled the organization, knowledge base and document rows back into existence pointing at vectors and files that were already gone - residual 1 of #1116's review. The relational deletes still run in the request transaction; the storage paths and the collections whose tables are no longer referenced are collected and handed to spawn_after_commit, so a failed commit discards the cleanup unrun and leaves nothing dangling. #1116's ordering - document rows before identifiers, a table dropped only once unreferenced - is unchanged. (#1137)
• The cleanup is a module function taking the paths, the collections and the vector store rather than a method, so the queued coroutine holds primitives and the process-lived store and never the request session, which is gone by the time it runs. (#1137)

Changed

• Residuals 2-4 of #1137 - a NULL-knowledge_base_id document sharing a collection name, a deleted tenant's vectors kept in a shared table, and the TOCTOU on the reference check - all depend on tenant-unique collection names (#913) and are recorded on the purge docstring instead.

[0.0.318] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• Two users who co-own each other's shared organizations could deadlock by deleting their own accounts at the same moment. UserService.delete took FOR UPDATE on its own user row - the #1115 reconcile lock - and then, reassigning a solely-created shared organization to an heir, took FOR KEY SHARE on the heir's row through the foreign key. Each request held its own row and waited for the other's, so Postgres broke the cycle by aborting one with 40P01: a 500 rather than a result. UserService._lock_for_delete now discovers the heirs a delete will reassign to and locks every user row it needs - self and every heir - in ascending id order, before the reconcile. Two concurrent self-deletes queue on the lower id, so one completes and the other, now sole owner of its organization, gets the existing clean domain refusal. (#1134)
• The self FOR UPDATE still precedes the reconcile's authoritative reads and is held through the DELETE, so #1115's guarantee is unchanged: a concurrent child insert waits, and the reconcile sees every child. (#1134)

[0.0.317] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• The email that says a run is parked now sends the reader to the queue. approvals_url was {frontend}/agents/{agent.id} - the Builder page, which holds one sentence of prose about tool calls reaching a queue and no queue at all. So the one alert whose whole purpose is somebody has to decide, now landed a search away from the decision, behind a button reading "Review the request", while the run aged towards ApprovalService.expire_stale. It addresses /runs?tab=approvals now - Activity's Approvals tab, the only surface carrying Approve and Reject, and a surface with no URL at all until #934. (#935)
• It deliberately does not name the run with ?run=, though the notification holds it: the decide controls are on the queue row, and below lg a focused run replaces the list - so naming the run would hide the buttons from the reader most likely to be on a phone. Budget mail still opens the agent, which is correct: the cap it reports is edited there. (#935)

Added

• docs/governance.md gains An alert links to where the decision is - where approvals mail points, why it does not name the run, and why budget mail differs.

[0.0.316] - 2026-08-28

Fixed

• Which of Activity's three tabs is open is now in the address bar. Tabs was uncontrolled, so there was no URL for the approvals queue at all - which is why the dashboard card's "See all" opened the run history, where nothing can be decided. ?tab=approvals and ?tab=spend are written; runs is the default and, like every other unset narrowing on this page, writes nothing. parseRunsTab joins parseRunFilters, and runsHref takes a tab. (#934)
• A tab named by a link is resolved against what the reader may open. approvals is gated on approvals:decide, so a link carrying it that reaches somebody without the permission opens the run history rather than a strip whose selected value has no trigger and no content - a blank page under a live set of tabs. An unrecognised name falls back the same way. (#934)
• A focused run is cleared when the tab changes, and ?run= goes with it. It already was, incidentally and untested, since #537; left behind, a reload reopened a detail panel on a tab that never had one - and below lg the panel replaces the list, so the strip was live while every tab's content stayed hidden and clicking Approvals appeared to do nothing. (#934)
• The approvals widget's seeAll points at the queue rather than the history - the same wrong destination as the parked-run email, enabled by the same missing parameter. (#934)

[0.0.315] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Every REST helper in the Mattermost adapter opened its own HTTP client, and Slack's attachment download did too, so each call paid a fresh TCP connection and TLS handshake against a host it had just talked to. A streamed channel turn is not one call - the live reply pushes an edit roughly every second, plus typing, the opening, the final edit and a download per attachment - so a minute-long answer spent seconds of wall clock re-establishing connections it already had, and the bot host saw the socket churn of a client that never keeps one open. One client per adapter now, built in __init__ and closed at shutdown: Mattermost's ten call sites borrow it through a nullcontext so none of them closes it and the pool stays warm, and no call site changed. (#952)
• ChannelAdapter grows a no-op close, and the lifespan calls it on every adapter after polling has stopped and background work has drained - so a turn still finishing an edit is never cut off from its client. The two non-channel per-call clients the issue also lists have no adapter lifecycle to hang a reused client on, and are filed separately. (#952)

[0.0.314] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• The vault list kept the pre-write rows after a store or rotate, roughly one run in eight, so a new row never appeared and the spec timed out. The create itself worked - the artifact showed the keys stored with an empty error alert, so the write succeeded and the render was stale. Same dedup race as #154: the mutation invalidated the list and relied on the refetch, and the vault page issues its list read on load, so a read that began before the write committed resolved with the pre-write body and marked the query fresh. The secrets hook's one invalidate helper cancels the list query before invalidating. (#130, #154)
• Three page.reload() workarounds are retired with it - the row appears on its own now, which is the verification that it no longer flakes. On the issue's two acceptance criteria: submitDialog already asserts the write's response status and prints its body on a non-2xx, so a refused store fails at its source before the row is awaited; and the create never failed - it answered 201, and the list render was the stale half. (#130)

[0.0.313] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A mutation's invalidation could be answered with pre-write data, which is what made sharing.spec.ts and skills.spec.ts flake. A mutation's onSuccess invalidated and relied on the refetch - but invalidateQueries dedupes its refetch onto a fetch already in flight, and both the sharing panel and the skills gallery fan out several reads on mount. A read that began before the mutation committed resolved with the pre-write body, marked the query fresh, and the panel kept the old value until a reload. It hit the second mutation in a sequence and never the first, which is exactly the shape the issue describes. Each hook's one invalidate helper cancels the query before invalidating now, so the invalidation dispatches a genuinely new post-commit fetch rather than awaiting the stale one it meant to replace. (#154)
• Worth being clear about what this was not: the read is ordered after the commit and reaches Postgres, and no-store has been in effect since #405 - the client simply dropped the fresh answer. (#154, #405, #230)

[0.0.312] - 2026-08-27

Added

• The admin user drawer answers the question it is opened for. It showed four facts - the id, the email already in the table, the display name and a join date - and offered four buttons, three of them rendered identically. Where this person has access was entirely absent, though it is the answer the drawer exists to give: an account with no membership anywhere is a different decision from one that owns two organizations. It now carries the organizations and the role in each, linked; when they were last here, with last_seen_at null rather than blank for an account that has never signed in, because created and never used and dormant since March are different decisions; and how many sessions are open with when the newest began. All from one route rather than fields on the user, because it is a view over three tables that a user is read in a dozen places without. (#942)
• The actions are weighted by consequence. All four used to be the same outline button in one row - the two most consequential looking exactly like the least, and two of them firing on a single click. Impersonate is the everyday one and stays plain; suspend is confirmed, saying they are signed out immediately; promote and demote are confirmed, naming what it grants - every permission in every organization on the deployment, including ones they are not a member of; delete stays last and apart. Reactivate is deliberately not confirmed: it is the recoverable direction, and a question about undoing a refusal is a question about nothing. (#942)
• The conversations are links now - opening one is the thing an admin would do with that list and the one thing it did not offer - and the two new blocks keep the three states the conversations list already got right, with the failures saying different sentences: a 502 on the memberships and an account in no organization are not the same thing. Revoking a session is deliberately out of scope: it needs a route with its own audit entry, which is a different thread. (#942, #941, #943)
• The last-seen figure does not yet hold its own claim and is filed: both figures are read with active_only=True, so a user who has signed out has no active session rows and reads as "Never signed in" - the very case the field exists to separate from created and never used. (#1256)

[0.0.311] - 2026-08-27

Added

• A conversation can be favourited, into a band at the top of the sidebar. A thread somebody returns to every day sat in the same list as the one-question thread from three weeks ago, and the only way back was search or scrolling. The favourite is the reader's: a row per user and conversation rather than a boolean on the thread, because a thread can be shared and a channel thread has participants rather than an owner - so a column would let one person's star decide where it sits for everybody who can see it. Two people looking at the same shared thread see two sidebars. (#929)
• Starring is authorized as a read, deliberately: a star changes nothing about the thread, it moves it in the starrer's own sidebar, so somebody a conversation was shared with may star it exactly as its owner may - a write check there would refuse the reader the feature exists for. And the band is an ORDER BY rather than a grouping of the page: the sidebar is paged, so a favourite sorted into page two by recency would sit under fifty threads that are not one, and grouping after the page arrives cannot fix that. Archiving keeps the star and drops the band, because a band inside the archive would be a second place to look for what archiving just moved. (#929)
• The one place the client patches rather than invalidating, with the boundary stated: whether this reader starred it is a fact about the row the client just decided, so patching makes the click instant while the reordering still comes from the server - and a refusal puts the star back, or the row keeps a star the server never recorded. (#929)
• Five things the feature does not yet hold, filed rather than left implied: the auth context is dropped on the way to the conversation read, so a caller who may see an ownerless trigger run log is refused the star on one they can open; is_favourite is emitted false on every read but the two that attach it; the read-then-insert is not idempotent under a concurrent or retried POST; a double-click can leave a thread starred; and the optimistic rollback crosses an account change. (#1254)

[0.0.310] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• PROVIDERS is named as the source of truth, for the one thing model inference cannot know - the credential shape - with the other five lists derived from it. Constructing the client stays Pydantic AI's, deliberately not restated. docs/models.md gains a table saying which list answers which question, plus the two crossings that are lookups able to answer nothing, and a drift test keeps it true: every key in either catalog file must name a provider PROVIDERS has, so must every image-catalog entry, and every provider must appear on the page. (#923)
• model_fallbacks.json is curated_models.json. It has nothing to do with a profile's fallback chain - a different feature entirely - and the name was the first thing a reader met. A curated list is still worth keeping: it is the answer when the provider cannot be asked, not an answer for a provider that publishes nothing. (#923)
• source is three answers rather than two. Seven providers publish no listing this platform can read and have no curated entry, so they answered curated about a shortlist that does not exist. They answer unlisted now, end to end through the schema and the picker's type. Nothing on screen changes - the dropdown already said the right thing - the API contract was the part that was wrong. (#923)
• ollama and litellm both publish an OpenAI-shaped listing at the endpoint the profile already stores and are the two worth wiring, but that needs a listing which can be told a base URL rather than a fixed one - a real change, not a catalog entry. Written into the page rather than guessed at, and no endpoint URLs were invented for the others to make a table look complete. (#923)
• The drift test that keeps this true compares less than the claim needs in four ways - the page searched for a token rather than compared to a table, only the id checked though the credential shape is what makes PROVIDERS authoritative, one table excluded and unchecked anywhere else, and the image catalog checked on its provider but not its prefix - so it is filed rather than left implied. (#1252)

[0.0.309] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Twenty-seven toasts read .message off a caught error instead of resolving it through the catalog. Since #603 a refusal a BFF route mints carries a { code } and no sentence - the handler sits outside [locale] and has no translator - and getErrorMessage is the only reader that resolves one against the errors namespace. A site reading .message showed the code humanized into an English sentence under every locale: Backend unavailable where the catalog says Backend service unavailable, and the Polish copy never at all. Backend-envelope refusals were unaffected, since their message passes through as written; what mis-rendered was the proxy's own 401, a backend that is down, and the upload and session failures. (#655, #603)
• The guard reads every source file for the pattern rather than testing the sites that were migrated, because the failure is a missing call and a test of the migrated sites cannot fail when a twenty-eighth is added beside them. It immediately found six the issue had not listed - the multi-line shape prettier produces. One site keeps its shape on purpose: use-onboarding shows an ApiError's message and a fallback for anything else, because "Failed to fetch" is not something to put in front of somebody. (#655)

[0.0.308] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A resumed run's own prior spend was counted twice, so it was refused with headroom to spare. A resumed run keeps its row, so by the time it continues finish_run has committed what it spent - and two things then read that same number: the budget baseline sums agent_runs.cost_usd, and the ledger is re-seeded with it. Both are right on their own. The seeding has to happen, or finishing the continuation overwrites the cost with only what the continuation cost and the per-run budget resets every time somebody approves something - exactly the run a budget is for. The baseline has to sum the column, because that is where a month's spend is. Together, an agent capped at $10 that spent $6 and parked came back to 6 + 6 = 12 on its first model request and was refused with $4 left, while the alert told its owner it had reached a cap it was at 60% of. The organization-wide cap double-counted identically. The baseline now excludes the run asking. (#15)
• Not only on resume, and deliberately so: a baseline is what other runs have already spent, and what this one spends is the ledger's. On a fresh run the row is there too, at zero, so the exclusion changes nothing there and needs no branch - one rule instead of a resume-shaped exception. It is off by default, because a figure a person reads is a different question and a report that hid the run somebody was looking at would be wrong. (#15)

[0.0.307] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• The docs claimed a per-binding spending limit that does not exist. docs/channels.md listed it among what an operator sets on a binding, "on top of the agent's own and the organization's", and the runner's docstring said the exposure's caps are enforced. agent_exposures has no cap column and BudgetScope has exactly two members. The exposure supplies the prompt, the channel tools, its environment and its session scope, and is stamped on the run row - which is what the docstring says now. An operator reading that page believed a public Slack bot was independently capped. (#29)
• The cited migration revisions do not dangle, they resolve to the wrong file. 65 revisions were collapsed into 0001_baseline and the numbering restarted, so a citation lands on a real migration about something else: 0038 was cited eight times for the vault and is the run manifest, 0066 nine times for users.role and is nothing at all, and six more besides. Each is replaced by what the reader needs - "before the chain was squashed", "inside 0001_baseline" - or by a revision that is still there. CLAUDE.md and the alembic-migration skill now say the numbering restarted and that a citation names a full file name or nothing. docs/plans/ is deliberately untouched: a plan records what was true when it was written. (#29)
• The issue's other two claims have since become true and are left as they stand: rate limiting exists on the public and auth surfaces, and the terminal commit is explicit on every surface rather than only web chat. (#29, #39, #1025)
• Also fixed with it: main had been red on lint-frontend since the admin Overview was deleted. #921 added a caption for the organizations page and #922 removed the page that read it, each green before the other landed - so the key reached main with no reader and the i18n guard failed the whole job on the next branch to merge main in. Deleted rather than given a reader, because the caption belonged to a page that no longer exists. (#921, #922)

[0.0.306] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• Three sections of docs/testing.md described the generator's suite rather than this one, and each told a reader to do something that cannot work here: a tests/unit/ that does not exist, a db_session fixture that is called something else, a client returning Starlette's TestClient where the rules single out that it is not, and auth_client/test_user fixtures the conftest explains the absence of. The worst was a sync test calling an async client - which returns a coroutine and asserts on it, so it passes while testing nothing. The page taught the two patterns the rules exist to prevent, and nothing noticed because no code is generated from it. (#212)
• The sections now carry the four layers and the actual tree, a new "anyio, not pytest-asyncio" section because a missing pytestmark is the failure that looks like a pass, the five fixtures that exist, and three examples each taken from a test in the repository. Every name was checked against the conftests, deps.py and the repository it cites. Running Tests, Frontend Tests and Test Database were written for this repository and are left alone. (#212)

[0.0.305] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Which sign-in button somebody clicked decided where they ended up. A visitor at /login?returnTo=/agents/a-1 who used the password form resumed the deep link; one who clicked a provider button landed on the dashboard - the drift #121 removed on the roles axis, still present on the provider axis. Nothing carried the path: the browser leaves this origin for the provider and comes back to /auth/callback, and neither hop had room for it, so the callback decided the destination with nothing. It is carried in sessionStorage rather than the OAuth state, because the whole trip starts and ends in the same tab on this origin - a value written beside the provider link is there to be read when the browser returns, and no server has to hold it. A flow that ends somewhere else finds nothing and lands on the dashboard, which is where it landed before. (#135, #121)
• The value is consumed as it is read, so a deep link somebody abandoned is not resumed by the next sign-in from that tab, and a click with nothing to remember clears rather than skips, for the same reason. Nothing in the carrier validates the path: postSignInDestination stays the one place that decides whether a return path is safe to honour, and a second copy of that rule would be a second answer to it. OAuthButtons also loses a next prop nothing passed and the backend never read. (#135)
• /auth/magic-link has the same defect and cannot take the same fix - the link is followed from an email, so a per-tab store is empty by construction - and is filed rather than folded in. (#135)

[0.0.304] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• /admin lands on Users, and the Overview is gone. The page held six figures and three links, and every one of them was already on screen somewhere the reader had been. The figures came from the same endpoint the platform dashboard widget reads, on a dashboard that has been arrangeable since #213 - so the page was a fixed second copy of a card the reader can already place where they want it, and two copies of six numbers disagree the first time one is edited. The three links were three of the five tabs the section's own strip renders directly above them, so a third of the page was navigation to where the reader already was. /admin is the section index and redirects, exactly as /settings redirects to Profile: a bookmark still works, and the sidebar entry still lights up, because isRouteActive matches the section rather than the page. (#922, #213)

[0.0.303] - 2026-08-27

Added

• The deployment's tenant list can be searched, sorted, filtered and paged. /admin/organizations is the only surface that answers what tenants exist, and it offered no way to find one: fifty rows, one fixed order, no search, no filter, and nothing said about the rest. The users tab beside it has had all four since #284; this page came out of that sweep with the shell and none of the controls, because the route behind it answered none. search covers name, slug and the owner's address - through contains_ci, so 100% finds the tenant called that rather than all of them (#372) - alongside sort_by, sort_dir and a personal/team/all filter. (#921)
• All of it applies before OFFSET/LIMIT, with total counting what was narrowed to rather than the deployment, and a value outside its type is a 422 rather than a silent fallback: an empty page reads as "this deployment has no tenants", and an ORDER BY assembled from a query string is an injection surface. The order breaks ties on the id, so paging a column where rows share a value lists each row once. The query moved out of the service into the repository, where a service's queries belong. (#921)

Fixed

• The dashboard's top-organizations card and this page shared a query key while asking for different things - five rows against fifty of whatever the page is narrowed to - so whichever mounted first filled the cache and the other rendered its answer. The key carries the request now, and one hook serves both. And contains_ci was typed to mapped columns only, while the owner's address is a column of an outer-joined subquery: widening the alias is what keeps this search going through the one helper that escapes % and _ rather than around it. (#921, #372)

[0.0.302] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• No dashboard page had any room under it, though main declared the padding. The reason is DeploymentGate, which wraps every page in a flex box that does not grow with its content - so a long page overflows it and main's padding edge stays where the shorter box ended, buried mid-content. Measured against the app's own stylesheet on a transcription of the real chain: 0px with the gate wrapper in place, 80px and 64px without it. The room moves onto PageTransition's unconstrained branch, which does grow with its content, and lands after the last element in both engines. The constrained branch keeps none, because chat's composer belongs on the bottom edge and room beneath a fixed control is a gap under it. (#933)
• The mobile figure counts the safe-area inset rather than assuming it away: viewportFit: "cover" makes it 34px on a modern iPhone, and the tab bar is 56px plus that, so a flat 80px left the last ten pixels of every page under the bar. Four surfaces carried their own workaround at three different values - which is why nobody noticed the layout's own declaration was inert - and all four are gone. The regression test reads the pages, not the wrapper: asserting that PageTransition carries the padding would not catch a fifth surface re-adding its own, which is the regression that actually happened. (#933)
• One screen is left behind and filed rather than folded in: DeploymentGate returns the maintenance notice directly and never reaches PageTransition, so it has no clearance - as it had none before, since the declaration it would have inherited was the inert one. (#1241)

[0.0.301] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A frontend spec issued a real HTTP request, so its result depended on what was listening on port 8000. RootLayout awaits readBranding(), which fetches against the backend, and layout.test.tsx mocked the translator, the font and the stylesheet but not that read. With nothing listening the connection is refused and the branding falls back, so the spec passed - which is CI, and why the suite had been green. With a healthy backend it also passed. But against a port that accepts and never answers, the fetch never settles and both cases die on the 15-second deadline - and a crash-looping backend container does exactly that, because Docker publishes the port and its proxy accepts the connection while nothing inside is listening. One more mock, alongside the three already there: 30.5s and two failures becomes 0.63s and two passes. (#1075)
• Not fixed, and noted on the issue: readBranding swallows every failure into the built-in branding plus a warning, so a page rendered with defaults because the backend was unreachable is indistinguishable from one told to use defaults. (#1075)

[0.0.300] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Six of a usage window's scalars were six serial round trips for numbers one SELECT answers. StatsService.usage ran fifteen aggregates one after another, and six of them are scalars over one window with the same WHERE - the count and cost of the window and of the window before it, the distinct-user count, and the two latency percentiles. window_aggregates reads all five in one query and usage calls it once per window, so six scalar round trips become two. The percentiles need no ended_at IS NOT NULL of their own there: an unfinished run's duration is null, and percentile_cont ignores a null exactly as the standalone filter did. (#949)
• The GROUP BY aggregates stay their own queries. Each groups differently, so they cannot fold into one SELECT, and running them concurrently would need a connection each - an AsyncSession is one connection and serialises. (#949)

[0.0.299] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• The BFF proxy read every request and response body fully into memory before forwarding either. MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB is 50 and the knowledge-base path allows it, so a 50 MB document was held whole in the Node process before one byte reached the backend - ten concurrent uploads is 500 MB of heap, and the container's memory limit decides what happens next. In the other direction a workspace file, a document or a run export gave the browser nothing until the last byte had reached the proxy, so time-to-first-byte was the whole transfer and a large export read as a hung page. Both directions stream now, with duplex: "half" for the outbound body as undici requires. Bytes stay bytes, so a multipart boundary and a PDF survive the hop, a 204 still carries a null body, and an error body still reaches the client verbatim. (#951)

[0.0.298] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Every agent run began with one query per bound collection. _collection_names runs inside prepare, so an agent bound to five knowledge bases added five serial round trips to the front of every turn - before the model was called, to read rows very likely already in the session's identity map. get_by_ids reads them in one WHERE id IN (...), and the resolution iterates the returned map. The tenant check and the degradation it exists for - a collection gone or foreign narrows the agent's reach rather than failing the run - are unchanged: they read from a dict instead of awaiting a query each, and an id with no row is simply absent from the map. (#954)
• The finding names six id-resolving loops as one habit; this is the only one on a per-run path. The other five are publish-time or admin-path, where N is small and the cost is invisible, and their line references predate a since-moved file, so they want re-locating rather than a blind change. (#954)

[0.0.297] - 2026-08-27

Added

• The Builder speaks Polish. pl.json held no agents namespace at all - 0 of 563 keys - so the whole Builder rendered in English under /pl, the largest single gap in the catalog. All 563 are translated as one namespace rather than piecemeal, because a namespace is the unit a person reads and seventy Polish strings among four hundred English ones reads worse than a consistently English panel. The product's own nouns stay English and are inflected into Polish grammar - agent, spec, capability, skill, embed, budget, run, prompt, provider, token, vault, workspace, sandbox, MCP - so a Polish reader meets the same words the docs, the API and an exported YAML use; secret follows the convention already in the file and becomes sekret. Counts are ICU plural with Polish's few and many arms rather than ternaries, with any noun the number agrees with inside the plural, and every interpolation and t.rich tag is preserved. (#643)

[0.0.296] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• The two sessions BFF routes hand-rolled the forwarder block - read the cookie or 401, set the bearer, map the error, answer JSON - which is what platformProxy() already does, plus the active-organization header, byte- accurate bodies and the no-store those hand-rolled copies drop (#546, #553, #106). Both are a sessions/[[...path]] mount now, the same shape kb and rag use, and the query handling and id escaping they did by hand are the proxy's passthrough. No endpoint behaviour changed. (#564)
• The remaining clusters are deliberately left, each with a blocker on the issue rather than a mechanical swap: orgs/** keeps a binary avatar route that cannot coexist with an optional catch-all, and the header the proxy adds is a behaviour change wanting an end-to-end check; admin/** carries a frontend admin gate rather than a plain cookie read; and the MCP OAuth callback redirects rather than forwards. (#564)

[0.0.295] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• Four transport blocks were copied across the three channel adapters, so a change to any had to be made at six to ten sites by hand and a fourth channel would copy them all again. split_thread replaces the partition-and-unpack at three Mattermost and three Slack sites, and channel_key calls it too, so "which channel is this" has one implementation. SlackAdapter._web holds the lazy client import and construction that nine sites repeated - including a dynamic import in the Socket Mode path - with the import still deferred, so a deployment running no Slack bot does not pay for the SDK. TelegramAdapter._bot is an async context manager wrapping the bot and the try/finally close that ten methods repeated, each of them a TLS session leaked if the close was forgotten. And the Mattermost client and bearer header, repeated at ten sites each, now have one definition apiece, so the timeout and the auth shape do too. (#565, #547)

[0.0.294] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• Both run surfaces turned a finished result into (status, output, paused) with the same block, copied verbatim - a DeferredToolRequests output builds a PausedRunState and becomes AWAITING_APPROVAL, anything else is the completed answer. That is the delicate half: a new PausedRunState field, or a change to how a park is recorded, had to move in lockstep across two files. It is _classify_output now, beside _outcome, which agent_chat already imports from there. The exception paths stay with each surface, because they genuinely differ - the chat runner re-raises BudgetExceeded and GuardrailBlocked so the waiting visitor is told why, while the batch runner records and moves on - so extracting those would have been a behaviour change. (#567)

[0.0.293] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A unit word anywhere in a string exempted the whole sentence from the i18n sweep. NOT_A_SENTENCE's unit alternative had .* on both sides, so "Use rem instead of pixels for spacing", "Change the deg value before saving" and "This px setting is wrong" all left the sweep untranslated - the same defect as #656 and #678, and the widest of the three. It also never did its stated job: a CSS measurement is written 12px, and a word boundary before px needs one between 2 and p, so "Set the width to 12px" was reported anyway. The alternative caught the standalone token it was never written for and missed the measurement it was. And it was dead in any case, because a phrase genuinely made of units is already answered by isFormatter, which asks that every word be a unit or an acronym rather than that one of them be. Deleted, with the docstring now recording why there is no unit alternative so it is not re-added. (#741, #656, #678)

[0.0.292] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• parked_calls compared statuses against raw strings where every sibling in the file uses RunStatus and ApprovalStatus. A raw literal is invisible to a rename: change the enum member and the string silently stops matching, which on this path means a parked run that no longer reads as parked. Both now go through the enum, matching the resume path a few methods down; behaviour is identical, since both are StrEnum. The skill repository's update and update_resource take dict[str, Any] like every other repository's, rather than a bare dict. (#545)
• One item of the bag was misdiagnosed and dropped rather than done: InvitationCreate.email was said to need the max_length=255 its siblings carry, against an over-length address reaching the column. It does not reproduce - EmailStr enforces the RFC total length of 254, which is below the column's 255, so a format-valid address can never exceed it and an over-length one is refused with a clean 422 at the schema. Adding the constraint would have been an untestable one, because no input reaches it. (#545)

[0.0.291] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• The e2e job kept a screenshot of a flake and nothing else. playwright.config.ts set trace and video to on-first-retry while retries is 0 - deliberately, so a real failure cannot go green on a second attempt - and with no retry those never fire. The trace is the one artifact that answers which locator it was waiting on and why, because it carries the DOM timeline, the network log and the console, and it was missing from exactly the runs that needed it. Both are retain-on-failure now, captured on the first and only failure and kept for the failed test alone. The job already uploads the report and the report embeds the trace, so no workflow change was needed. This does not fix the flake - its cause is unknown until a failure is captured, which is what this makes possible. (#162)

[0.0.290] - 2026-08-27

Added

• make lint-precommit reads the whole tree with the hooks that only ever read a diff. yamlfmt, zizmor and the pre-commit-hooks basics saw only the files a commit touched, and no gate ever ran them over everything. That is fine while the rules are fixed and stops being fine the moment Dependabot bumps a rev:: a new zizmor rule makes every workflow in the tree violate it, nothing notices because no commit has touched a workflow, and weeks later an unrelated one-line edit is refused by a finding that has nothing to do with it - the shape of #188, one tool over. make lint-spelling already solved exactly this for codespell; this gives the rest the same treatment. (#203)
• SKIP drops the hooks another target already gates over the tree, plus no-commit-to-branch, which fails by design when CI checks out main - so nothing is gated twice and no fixer rewrites a file mid-check. A fixer that does run reports rather than commits, because pre-commit exits non-zero on a modification, which is the failure CI needs. Wired into lint so make check reaches it, and into CI's lint job, with test_ci_parity.py holding both directions the way it already does for lint-spelling. (#203)

[0.0.289] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A rating cast in chat left the dashboard's summaries stale. rating-buttons hand-rolled two fetch calls with their own headers, response.ok handling and error parsing - the shape frontend.md forbids - so the endpoints were invisible to the query layer and nothing was invalidated until the next mount. Both go through src/lib/message-rating-api.ts and use-message-rating now, whose onSuccess invalidates the ratings and admin-ratings summary roots, and the two duplicated error-parse blocks are one getErrorMessage. The chat's own thumb counts still reconcile locally, because they live in the message store. Three i18n keys the hand-rolled catches used are deleted with them. (#563)

[0.0.288] - 2026-08-27

Changed

• One {date, likes, dislikes} day-point instead of four declarations feeding one chart. RatingsByDay, an inline array inside the conversation summary and the chart's own RatingsPoint all described the same shape, so adding a field to one left the others silently unchanged. RatingsByDay is the single day-point now - the chart prop, its wrapper and the admin summary all reference it - and RatingsPoint is deleted. The admin summary response is renamed to AdminRatingsSummary, so it no longer differs from RatingsSummary by a single trailing s, which is trivially confused on import. Pure type consolidation, no behaviour change. (#559)

[0.0.287] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A bot activated moments before shutdown reopened intake at exit. It leaves a committed, tracked open_inbound_stream task that may not have run yet: the lifespan stops the adapter tasks that exist, then drains - and that task's final step creates a new, untracked polling or socket task after the stop loops have passed. The supervisor carries a shutting-down flag now; open_inbound_stream declines to open when it is set, re-checked after stop_polling so a task suspended there when shutdown begins cannot slip a reopen through either. The lifespan sets it as the first shutdown statement, before the stop loops and the drain, and clears it at startup so a following lifespan - a test, a reload - serves again. The flag is the lifespan's alone, so the in-process drain the RAG sync command issues while the server keeps serving never touches it and a legitimate reopen still opens. (#1119, #1095)

[0.0.286] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• seed --clear never worked on a seeded database. It called a bulk DELETE FROM users WHERE is_app_admin = false, and every seeded account has a personal organization whose created_by_user_id is ON DELETE RESTRICT - so the delete raised ForeignKeyViolation on the first row and the command 500'd. The bulk path bypassed the reconciliation only the single-row delete runs. delete_non_admins lists the non-admins and removes each through delete now, so each personal organization is purged and each owned row reconciled first, on the same path DELETE /users/{id} uses. One transaction, so a refusal - a non-admin who solely owns a shared organization - rolls the whole clear back rather than half-clearing. (#1124, #1117)

[0.0.285] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Deleting one organization dropped another tenant's vectors. collection_name is not tenant-unique (#913), so two organizations can back onto one rag_<name> table, and the teardown dropped it unconditionally. The physical table is dropped only when no other collection still references it, and last - after the relational deletes flush, so a failure among them aborts before any table is gone. (#1116, #9)
• Tracked documents outlived their collection and stayed reachable by name. rag_documents authorizes on collection_name, so a row outliving its knowledge base was listable and downloadable by a later collection permitted the same name. Each collection's document rows and their stored uploads are deleted before its identifiers go, keyed on knowledge_base_id so a shared collection's co-tenant rows are untouched. (#1116)
• The residuals are documented on purge rather than left implied: the drop and the file unlinks still commit outside the request transaction, and three reachability residuals remain - a document with a null knowledge base sharing the name, the deleted tenant's vectors inside a kept shared table, and a TOCTOU on the reference check. All of them are rooted in the collection_name tenant-scoping of #913. (#1137, #913)

[0.0.284] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Deleting a user could leave an organization with no owner at all. UserService._release_owned_rows reconciled only organizations the user created, but ownership moves without the creator FK - after a transfer, or after the creator is reassigned away - so a user can be the sole Owner of an organization they did not create. The created-organizations listing never returns it, so deleting that user cascaded their last owner membership away and left a silent orphan nobody can manage through the owner-gated APIs. Not a 500 like the #9 cases, which is what made it quiet. A second pass over the organizations where the user holds an Owner membership refuses the delete when they are the sole owner - the same refusal the created-organization path already raises - and does nothing when another owner remains. (#1117, #9)

[0.0.283] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A concurrent insert reopened the exact 500 the delete reconciliation closed. Reconcile-then-delete is check-then-act, and with no row lock an org-scoped collection inserted between the purge's collection list and its DELETE organizations is SET NULL-ed into a ck_knowledge_bases_org_scope_has_org violation - and a private secret or personal organization inserted between a user delete's reconcile and its DELETE users lands the same CHECK or RESTRICT blocker. OrganizationService.purge and UserService.delete take SELECT ... FOR UPDATE on the row they are about before enumerating: a concurrent child insert takes FOR KEY SHARE on that parent through its FK, which FOR UPDATE conflicts with, so the insert waits and the reconcile sees every child on a fresh read under READ COMMITTED. (#1115, #9)
• A rare deadlock when two users who co-own each other's shared organizations self-delete simultaneously was found while reviewing this and filed rather than folded in - Postgres aborts one with a 500. (#1134)

[0.0.282] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• The BFF proxy-path guard did not see a composite segment. unencodedSegments matched a ${...} only immediately after a /, so /api/v1/resources/prefix-${id} slipped through - and an id such as x/../../admin/users interpolated bare there normalises into another backend path exactly as a segment-leading one does. So the invariant the sweep exists to hold, that every interpolated path segment is encoded, was not enforced for prefixed segments. No current route has that shape; this is hardening against the next one. A small pathInterpolations parser replaces the inner regex: it scans the path from /api/v1, skipping the host prefix, brace-matches each interpolation so a query ternary's own inner ${...} is consumed with it rather than read as a bare segment, and stops at the query - the first literal ?, or an interpolation that attaches one. A query signal skips that interpolation and keeps scanning rather than stopping, and optional chaining is excluded from the ternary check, so a real segment after a query-looking or optional-chained one is still checked. (#1118, #13, #30)
• Four further holes in the same sweep, found by the reviewer on the branch and closed before merge - each one a way for a security guard to report clean on a route it had never actually read. An apostrophe in a comment blinded it to a whole file: every ' was treated as a string opener, so the scan ran from the apostrophe in prose to the next one and swallowed what lay between, which is why admin/conversations/route.ts - "drawer's", line 11 - had its template skipped entirely. A partly encoded expression passed, so encodeURIComponent(id) + rawSuffix and a look-alike encodeURIComponentAlias(rawId) were both accepted. Any .search access ended the path, so /api/v1/x/${params.search}/${rawId} reported neither interpolation. And a template whose prefix carried no literal following slash - /api/v1${rawPath} - was never read at all. (#1133)

[0.0.281] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• /link confirm could 500 on a message arriving at the same moment. ChannelLinkService.confirm did an unguarded get-then-create on (platform, platform_user_id) - the same check-then-act #17 closed in the router's identity resolution - so a user who sends a message while clicking a confirm could make the confirm's INSERT collide on uq_channel_identity_platform_user. It resolves through channel_identity_repo.get_or_create now: SELECT first, INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, re-SELECT. The upsert deliberately leaves an existing row's user_id untouched, so linking it to the confirming user is an explicit update after it, skipped on the miss path where the inserted row already carries that user. (#1113, #17)

[0.0.280] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• Two list endpoints ran a query per row where the code beside them already batched. The vault listing resolved emails and grant counts in one grouped query each, then asked which agents bind each secret one secret at a time - a thirty-secret vault loaded in thirty-one queries. agents_using_for_secrets answers a whole page in one: it unnests each agent's draft-spec capabilities and matches the bound secret_id against the requested set, grouped back per secret, with a CASE guarding jsonb_array_elements off a spec whose capabilities is not an array - the rows the old containment skipped - and keeping the tenant scope and name ordering. (#953)
• The organization listing ran two queries per organization: one to re-read the caller's membership for its role, one to count members. The role rides the membership join the listing already makes, and member_counts_for counts a whole page in one grouped read. The per-row membership read was redundant anyway - the organization came from that very join. count_members stays for the single organization read. (#953)

[0.0.279] - 2026-08-27

Fixed

• A terminal write could mask the cancellation that ended the run. Both run surfaces end in a finally that records the run and commits it, and any of those raising - a serialization failure, a constraint the delegation savepoints did not catch, a connection dropped mid-turn - replaces the exception that ended the run. When that exception is the CancelledError from a stop, the turn was recorded and surfaced as FAILED and the cancellation never reached the task that asked for it. The whole terminal-persistence sequence runs under one guard now: the in-flight exception is captured before it, and a write or commit that raises while the run is already unwinding is logged while the original exception propagates. A clean run still surfaces a persistence failure, and the guard catches Exception rather than BaseException, so a second cancellation raised by the commit itself still propagates. (#235)
• The issue names the commit, but finish and the record hit the same connection first, so guarding only the commit left the same masking one line earlier - which is why finish already wraps its notify call for exactly this reason. The guard covers all of it. (#235)

[0.0.278] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• The dev reload supervisor killed healthy workers. SupervisedReload replaces a worker whose event loop has stopped turning, and the worker reports liveness through uvicorn's Config.callback_notify - which Server.on_tick calls only once time.time() - last_notified > timeout_notify, so the beat's cadence is gated on the wall clock. The beat stamped time.monotonic() and the supervisor judged with time.monotonic() - beat: a different clock from the one the cadence runs on. On Docker Desktop's VM the wall clock can stall for tens of seconds relative to monotonic while the loop keeps serving, so the cadence froze while the monotonic verdict climbed, and a healthy serving worker was read as wedged and killed - the replacement beating once and being killed again on the next poll, which is the "container Up, nothing serving" the issue also reports. Both ends read time.time() now, so a stalled wall clock stalls the cadence and the reading together. (#1080)
• app/core/watchdog.py, the in-process watchdog on the other two stacks, is left untouched: it beats via loop.call_later and judges with time.monotonic(), both the event loop's own clock, so it is internally consistent and never used uvicorn's notify hook. The trade is stated: a real wedge coinciding with a backward NTP step reads negative and defers the verdict, bounded by POLLS_BEFORE_WEDGED, self-healing, and local-dev only - and since uvicorn gates the cadence on wall time, a wall-clock verdict is the only self-consistent choice. (#1080)

[0.0.277] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• A cancelled save orphaned its file. asyncio.to_thread(path.write_bytes, data) cannot interrupt the running write, so a task cancelled mid-write unwound with the file created after save() had raised - the caller never got storage_path, so it could neither record the file nor delete it. write_bytes_cancel_safe shields the write and, on cancellation, waits it out and removes the file before the cancellation propagates. (#1108, #25)
• Parses shared the executor with bcrypt and DNS. A burst of uploads could occupy every worker on the loop's default pool and queue sign-in and outbound requests behind them. Parsing and the storage byte operations run on a dedicated ThreadPoolExecutor in app/core/blocking.py now, bounded by FILE_IO_MAX_WORKERS (default 8), so a parse storm saturates its own pool and nothing else. The new module is registered in the coverage include, the ty override and PLATFORM_MODULES - new platform code held to the 100% gate rather than the template's downgraded rules. (#1108, #25)
• Two defects in the new pool, found by the reviewer on the branch and fixed before merge, both defeating the guarantee it was added for. The gate released its admission slot when the caller unwound, and an executor cannot interrupt a running job - so a cancelled caller handed its permit on while its own worker stayed occupied, and a wave of cancellations admitted arbitrarily many jobs into the pool's unbounded pending queue. The release rides the future's own completion now. And await asyncio.shield(_discard(...)) shielded the cleanup task but not the frame awaiting it, so a second cancellation raised straight out and left the cleanup to be cancelled with everything else - leaving exactly the orphaned file it exists to prevent. Cancellations arriving while it runs are absorbed until it finishes. (#1108)

[0.0.276] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• A user who had ever invited anybody could not be deleted. Three foreign keys into users.id - OrganizationMember.invited_by_user_id, Invitation.invited_by_user_id and Invitation.accepted_by_user_id - carried no ondelete, so PostgreSQL's NO ACTION made each an absolute bar on deleting the referenced user: DELETE /users/{id} failed with a foreign-key violation surfaced as a 500, which is common in any real deployment. All three are ON DELETE SET NULL now - who invited a member and who accepted an invitation are audit context that should outlive the user, the way the secret and collection attribution FKs already null. Invitation.invited_by_user_id was NOT NULL, so the migration makes it nullable in the same step: set on every create, null only once the inviter is gone. (#1110, #9)
• seed --clear's bulk delete_non_admins still 500s on organizations.created_by_user_id RESTRICT for a user who owns a personal organization - that path bypasses the reconciliation and hits a different FK, so it was filed rather than folded in. (#1124)

[0.0.275] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• The ingestion existence check read the whole collection, once per document. IngestionService.existing_document answered "does this collection already hold this file" by reading every row of the runtime rag_<collection> table through get_documents and grouping in Python - a full read into worker memory for each ingested document, which on a 200k-chunk collection dominates a nightly sync. The lookup belongs to the store now as find_existing_document, which PgVectorStore answers with one indexed statement per key in the same precedence - source_path, then an unaddressed filename, then content_hash - stopping at the first hit. _ensure_collection builds an expression index on each of the three metadata keys alongside the table, so an established collection gains them on its next ingest through the write path's existing call. (#1102, #27)

• The invariants are preserved rather than re-derived: the #548 single-document rule and the #990 unaddressed-filename rule move into a reference implementation on BaseVectorStore that scans, so a store with no index still answers correctly and PgVectorStore overrides it with the indexed path. Index suffixes are kept no longer than the HNSW one, so MAX_COLLECTION_NAME_LENGTH stays 45 and no identifier truncates, and existing_document's signature is unchanged so rag_tasks and the rag-* commands are untouched. The document listing is still a full scan - that is the display path, not the ingest check. (#1102)

• Two things this branch broke on main, fixed with it and each invisible to the branch that caused it - both were green before the other merged. The _first_document annotation referenced AsyncSession after #12 removed that import, so ruff failed the whole lint job; and the index backfill claimed 0055_sandbox_operations as its parent while the conversation plan already had, leaving the migration chain with two heads - alembic upgrade head cannot choose between them, so a deployment could not migrate at all. The backfill is re-parented onto the current head as 0058. (#1102, #12)

[0.0.274] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• The Prefect RAG sync flows did their filesystem work on the worker's event loop - the defect #25 fixed on the request path and left as a lower-severity follow-up. A large tree or file has no suspension point: rglob over a directory, sha256(read_bytes()) per file, stat() and a per-file resolve() each stall the loop. Every per-file blocking call goes through asyncio.to_thread now: the tree walk is one hop over _walk_files rather than a hop per file, the per-file hash is _hash_file shared by the local and connector paths, and stat and resolve are offloaded per file. Values are unchanged - identical walks, hashes, sizes and resolved paths - only the thread moves. The one-off resolve of the sync target path is O(1) per flow and stays on the loop. (#1100, #25)

[0.0.273] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• The document listings had no stable order across pages. get_all and get_for_kb ordered by created_at DESC with no unique secondary key, and a bulk import lands many rag_documents in one microsecond - so over tied timestamps that is not a total order, and a client paging with offset and limit could see a row twice or skip one across a page boundary, because each page is a separate query whose sort of the tied rows is undefined. Both order by created_at DESC, id DESC now, which is what the sibling vectorstore.get_documents already did for this reason (#548). The change is additive: a tiebreaker is consulted only when created_at ties, so rows with distinct timestamps keep their exact prior order. (#1103)
• main was red between 0.0.270 and here, and neither branch could have seen it: #1112's integration tests built a PgVectorStore with no engine and closed it with aclose(), while #12 had already made the engine a required keyword and deleted the method when the store stopped owning a pool. Both were green on their own - #1112's run predated #12's merge - so the break appeared only once both were on main. The tests take the engine from the fixture that owns it now. (#9, #12)

[0.0.272] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• A malformed embed-token claim was a 500 rather than a refusal. _verify_token decoded a visitor token inside a try/except jwt.PyJWTError, but a signed token whose exp or iat is null, [] or {} makes PyJWT's own validation run int() on it - which raises a bare TypeError, not a PyJWTError, so it escaped the handler and became an uncaught 500 with a logged traceback. Not attacker-exploitable: claim validation runs after signature verification, so minting such a token needs the customer's own signing secret, and it fails closed. The catch covers TypeError now and raises EmbedDenied. ValueError is left out deliberately - on the pinned PyJWT only these coercions raise a bare TypeError, and every malformed-segment, base64, JSON or non-numeric case is already a PyJWTError subclass, so catching it would be an unreachable branch. (#1107)

[0.0.271] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• Four check-then-act races, each closed with the row-lock and atomic-write pattern claim_parked_run already uses. (#17)
• An approval could be decided twice. decide read pending, guarded, and wrote with no lock, so a concurrent reject and approve both passed the guard and both wrote - two contradictory audit entries for one decision. get_approval grows a for_update variant, so the second decide blocks, re-reads a decided row and is refused. (#17)
• One person messaging two chats at once got no reply to the second. _resolve_identity was a get-then-create on uq_channel_identity_platform_user, so the second webhook 500'd on the unique violation. get_or_create reads first - no lock and no write on the common path, because the whole message runs in one transaction through the LLM call and an unconditional upsert would serialise a user active in two chats - and only on a miss inserts with ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE and reads back. (#17)
• Two accepts of a one-use invitation both created a member. The read of used_count, the guard against max_uses and the increment were unlocked. get_by_token grows a for_update variant, so the second accept blocks, re-reads the exhausted link and is refused. (#17)
• The budget cap bounds committed spend, not simultaneous runs - a run's cost lands on its row only when it finishes, so concurrent runs read the same baseline and can overshoot. That is an aggregate with no single row to lock, so it is documented in docs/governance.md rather than papered over. (#17)
• The regression tests hold one transaction open with the row locked, or the insert uncommitted, while the second runs - because racing through asyncio.gather alone reproduces none of the four: the pair serialises and the first commits before the second reads. (#17)
• ChannelLinkService.confirm still get-then-creates on the same identity key, a sibling of the race closed here, and was filed rather than folded in. (#1113)

[0.0.270] - 2026-08-26

Three deletes that could only 500, because a cascade drove exactly the write a CHECK forbids.

Fixed

• A leaver's private secret. organization_secrets.owner_user_id is ON DELETE SET NULL under ck_secret_private_needs_owner, so the cascade wrote the one row the constraint refuses and the delete raised inside Postgres. UserService.delete promotes the leaver's private secrets to organization visibility first, so the null is legal and the key stays reachable by the organization. (#9)
• A creator's organizations. organizations.created_by_user_id is RESTRICT and every signup creates a personal organization, so a bare DELETE users never worked for a real account. The personal organization is removed with its owner, a shared one is handed to another owner, and the delete is refused - cleanly, as a BadRequestError rather than a 500 - when there is no other owner. (#9)
• An organization-scoped collection. knowledge_bases.organization_id is SET NULL under ck_knowledge_bases_org_scope_has_org. OrganizationService.delete removes organization-scoped collections explicitly, vector table and all, before the organization row goes; a personal collection merely carrying the organization's id is left to the SET NULL. Dropping the vector table needs the request-scoped store, so the delete route wires it in through a dedicated dependency and every other organization route builds none. (#9)
• Each pair is reconciled in the service, inside the request's own transaction, before the row goes. Three ondelete-less FKs to users.id are deliberately out of scope - they are NO ACTION, so deleting a user who invited somebody still 500s, and that needs a migration. (#9, #1110)

[0.0.269] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• An embed token with no iat was accepted for ever. AgentEmbedService._verify_token checked max-age only if isinstance(iat, int | float) - opportunistically - and PyJWT requires neither iat nor exp, so a correctly signed {"sub": "user-42"} carried no freshness claim at all. One token scraped from a browser's network tab kept the widget answering on the organization's bill indefinitely, which is the exact failure the surrounding code twice names as the dangerous one. A within-window iat is required unconditionally now: no iat, or one older than the 12h ceiling, is refused. (#23)
• exp is deliberately not an alternative freshness claim. Treating it as one would let a customer's ordinary far-future exp override the ceiling, so a copied token could replay until it expired - a milder version of the same leak. exp, when present, is still validated by PyJWT, so it can only shorten the window, never extend it past 12h. Behaviour is unchanged for every token that carries an iat. (#23)
• A pre-existing robustness gap left out of scope and filed: a malformed null or [] exp/iat raises a raw TypeError inside jwt.decode and 500s. Not exploitable - it fails closed. (#1107)

[0.0.268] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• A non-ASCII credential was a 500 with a traceback rather than a refusal. secrets.compare_digest raises TypeError on a non-ASCII str instead of answering False, and three checks compared str with the left operand taken from the caller: deps.verify_api_key on the API-key header, the Mattermost webhook bearer check, and the Slack signature check. So {"token": "é"} to the unauthenticated Mattermost webhook, or a non-ASCII X-Slack-Signature, was a logged 500 - a free log-flooding primitive. Not an auth bypass, since the comparison never matched anyway. All three compare encoded bytes now: still constant-time, and non-ASCII refuses cleanly. (#33)

[0.0.267] - 2026-08-26

Changed

• app/core/sanitize.py is on the coverage gate and the type-checker overrides. It is the SSRF allow and deny every outbound URL a tenant chooses is checked against - a webhook target, an MCP server address - and it was in neither list, which is what #28 asks to extend to the modules implementing the refusals CLAUDE.md names as must-cover. It sat at 95%: the two DNS-failure exits in resolve_pinned_url, a lookup that raises gaierror and one that resolves to no address, had no test. Both are covered now with a mocked getaddrinfo, and the module is added to both lists verbatim and in the same position, beside pinned_http.py - the validator paired with the client that dials what it validated. (#28)
• The rest of #28's tail stays open and is named on the issue: agent_embed.py at 85% needs substantial tests first, and the four channel modules hold open bugs and need a real database to measure. The five-routes layering landed in #232, and audit.py is gated by #20. (#28)

[0.0.266] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• GET /api/v1/rag/documents returned every document a caller could read. It selected every rag_documents row across the caller's readable collections and serialized the whole set in one response - unbounded, so a tenant with 50k documents got a multi-second query and tens of MB held entirely in memory. The sibling get_for_kb already paged; this path simply did not use the pattern. get_all takes skip and limit and a COUNT for the total, returning (rows, total) like its sibling; the service reports the repository's total rather than the page length; and the route carries skip and limit per .claude/rules/api-conventions.md. No frontend caller changes - the console pages the already-paginated get_for_kb. (#27)
• The issue's second half - making ingestion's existing_document O(1) instead of a full rag_<collection> scan - rewrites a hot path with a documented precedence history (#548, #566) and needs a JSONB predicate plus a supporting expression index on the runtime-created vector tables, verified against a real database. A source_path fast path alone is still a sequential scan without the index, and two passes on the common miss, so it was split to #1102 rather than shipped blind. (#27, #1102)

[0.0.265] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• Upload parsing and local file storage were async def over pure blocking work, with no suspension point at all. FileUploadService.parse_content ran pymupdf over every page and openpyxl over every cell, and LocalFileStorage.save/load decoded and wrote or read up to MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE - so one user uploading a large PDF, or an agent turn loading three attached images, froze every other request and every in-flight agent WebSocket stream on that uvicorn worker until the work landed. Every branch of the parse and both byte operations are offloaded with asyncio.to_thread. The codebase already knew the pattern: agents/mcp.py routes DNS through a thread, and rag_document.py switched a write to anyio for exactly this reason - while writing the identical bytes twice, only one of which had been fixed. (#25)
• The now-dead ASYNC230 per-file ruff ignore on file_upload.py is gone: the only blocking open left is pymupdf.open inside a sync helper, so the rule no longer fires. Three thread-identity regression tests assert the parse and the two byte operations each run off the event loop's thread, and each fails if its to_thread is reverted. (#25)
• Scope is the two request-path functions. The worker-side blocking IO the issue also lists is the worker rather than the request path, and is tracked separately. (#25)

[0.0.264] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• A malformed sealed payload put the decrypted credential in the log. unseal_secret promised BadRequestError for an envelope holding something that is not a secret payload, but _STORABLE_ADAPTER.validate_json(...) raises pydantic_core.ValidationError, which is not an AppException - so it reached unhandled_exception_handler and logger.exception. A pydantic ValidationError embeds the offending input in its message, and here that input is the decrypted credential, so the plaintext landed in the log line and, under logfire.instrument_fastapi, on the exception span - breaking the guarantee docs/secrets.md states. It is caught and re-raised as BadRequestError(message="Stored secret is not a usable payload") naming only the recorded kind. (#21)
• Two parts, both load-bearing. The type change is the primary guard: a 4xx AppException is logged at warning with no exc_info, so no traceback is formatted on the HTTP path and it never reaches the logger.exception handler. And from None covers the non-HTTP readers whose traceback is rendered - a Prefect task failure, doctor.py's own formatting - by setting __suppress_context__ and keeping the chained ValidationError, which still holds the plaintext in __context__, out of the formatted traceback. The regression test pins __suppress_context__ rather than __cause__, because __cause__ is None with or without from None and asserting on it would let a future edit reintroduce the leak silently. (#21)
• Reachable from resolve_for_bindings, ModelProfileService and the provider listing key whenever a stored payload no longer validates: a hand-edited row, a rollback to a build whose SecretKind enum lacks a kind a newer build wrote, or a future field tightening. (#21)

[0.0.263] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• drain() waited on one snapshot of _running, so a task that handed off more work while draining - a channel run finishing an agent turn spawns each of its notifications - could leave the freshly spawned task in flight when drain() returned. It waits until _running is quiescent under one overall deadline now, re-snapshotting each pass, so work spawned mid-drain is awaited while a task that keeps spawning work cannot postpone shutdown for ever. (#1095)
• After the timeout it called task.cancel() and returned immediately, so a caller that disposes shared resources next - the Redis client, the database engine - raced a cancelled task still unwinding through its own finally on those very resources. Whatever overran is cancelled and gathered to a terminal state before drain() returns. (#1095)
• One edge is deliberately left: the post-deadline cancel and gather snapshots the overrunning set once, so a cancelled task whose finally spawned fresh work while unwinding would not be awaited. No finally in the codebase spawns background work, and looping that phase would reintroduce the unbounded wait the single shot avoids. (#1095)
• The third gap in the issue - a bot created just before shutdown whose deferred open_inbound_stream reopens intake during teardown - is a shutdown ordering concern rather than a drain() one, and is #1119. (#1095, #1119)

[0.0.262] - 2026-08-26

Changed

• The RAG sync-source wizard kept a second schema-form renderer. ConfigureStep sat next to SchemaForm, the generator the agent Builder and the vault secret forms already share, so field types, help text and secret masking were maintained twice - and had already drifted: SchemaForm had no textarea, ConfigureStep had no enum. The config step renders through SchemaForm now, with a connector's config_schema adapted to the JSON Schema subset it reads; ConfigureStep keeps only its wizard chrome and the wizard's props are unchanged. The "no enum" half of the divergence closes for free, because the config step is SchemaForm. (#568)
• connectorConfigToJsonSchema() in frontend/src/lib/connector-schema.ts is the single place the two field-type vocabularies meet, and its switch over ConnectorFieldType is exhaustive - so a fifth connector field type is a compile error until a JSON Schema mapping is chosen, rather than the silent fall-through to a text box the typed Literal originally replaced. (#568)
• A plain-textarea kind on SchemaForm (x-textarea), distinct from x-multiline's Markdown editor, which is for prose. No capability emits it, so the secret and agent forms are untouched and the branch is inert without the keyword. (#568)
• Two visible changes on the wizard, both SchemaForm's existing behaviour rather than anything new: a field's default shows as its value rather than as grey placeholder text, and a boolean whose default is on draws on. Neither changes what the wizard sends - nothing is stored until a field is edited, so the sent config is identical. (#568)
• Scope is deliberately the renderer, not the backend wire shapes. Converging the two so connectors emit JSON Schema natively, and the adapter and ConnectorConfigField disappear, is the higher-risk half and is #1093. (#568, #1093)

[0.0.261] - 2026-08-26

An audit write that cannot be recorded now takes the action down with it.

Fixed

• record_audit swallowed every exception, which is fail-open on the audit trail - the trail docs/governance.md makes load-bearing for the app-admin bypass story. The swallow did not even buy silence: flush() inside the try left the session needing a rollback, so the request's scope="function" commit raised PendingRollbackError and 500'd anyway, with an opaque error naming the session rather than the audit. The write shares the caller's transaction now, so a failure propagates and rolls the recorded action back rather than letting a privileged mutation land unaudited. db is typed AsyncSession, which it never was, and app/core/audit.py is in both the coverage include and the ty overrides - every service that records an action was already gated; the trail they write to was not. (#20)
• Three unit-test fixtures the swallow was hiding. sync_source, sandbox_connection and skill_proposal built a bare MagicMock() db, where await db.flush() raised TypeError inside record_audit - so the audit write was a silent no-op a green suite never noticed. They build the db the way every other audit-calling test already does. (#20)

Changed

• A failure specific to the audit row - a bad details, an FK on organization_id - now rolls the action back rather than being dropped. That is the atomicity governance.md describes, and the recorded details were reviewed and are all serialisable. (#20)

[0.0.260] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• SecurityHeadersMiddleware was fully written and never registered, so no API response carried a Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy or Permissions-Policy. The bundled nginx sets a weaker subset and no CSP, so a self-hosted deployment not fronted by that exact nginx got nothing at all. The sharpest sign it was an oversight: files.py already opts its framed endpoint down to SAMEORIGIN, against a default that was not there. Registered in create_app with setdefault, so the file download's per-response X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN still wins. (#18)
• Two things the registration made live for the first time, fixed with it: X-XSS-Protection: 0 rather than the deprecated 1; mode=block, per OWASP - the CSP is the real defence - and the doc pages excluded by their real mounted paths, since the schema is under the API prefix rather than at /openapi.json, so the exclusion is not a dead entry and the CSP cannot break Swagger or ReDoc. docs/deploy.md records the app-level headers for an operator running their own proxy. (#18)

[0.0.259] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• Every domain refusal was logged as an application error. _managed_session caught everything with logger.exception(...), so a NotFoundError (404), an AuthorizationError (403) and an AlreadyExistsError (409) each wrote a full stack trace at ERROR - and on a platform whose value is mostly in what it refuses, the refusals were the loudest lines in the log and a real 500 was buried among them. A domain refusal rolls back and re-raises without a traceback now. The ERROR line is kept for the unexpected and, deliberately, for a 5xx AppException such as DatabaseError or ExternalServiceError: that is a server fault whose traceback the exception handler does not log, so suppressing it here would lose it end to end. The gate is not isinstance(exc, AppException) or exc.status_code >= 500, in a single branch so the rollback stays wrapped on every path. The conftest mocks get_db_session, which is why this lifecycle was off the tested path and the noise went unseen. (#19)

[0.0.258] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• Nothing called background.drain(), though its docstring said the lifespan did. So shutting down mid-flight cancelled an ingestion or a sync that background.spawn had handed off, and left a document stuck in processing forever. The lifespan now awaits the drain after intake stops and before the vector store, Redis and the session are disposed - the draining task reads all three, so it has to finish or be cancelled first. tests/test_lifespan_drain.py drives the real main.lifespan with startup's heavy collaborators stubbed, spawns a task inside the serving window and asserts it runs to completion on shutdown. (#11)

[0.0.257] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• Twelve specs mocked next-intl as a translator missing part of t - eleven as a bare (key) => key, and kb-detail-sections as a hand-rolled cache that had grown t.rich but still lacked t.markup and t.has. t carries all three, and a component reading a message with a tag calls t.rich. They were green only because none of their components reads a rich message yet: the #395 guard steers copy toward t.rich, so they will, and then one throws t.rich is not a function inside a component several files from the assertion - which is exactly how #610 was found. A shared keyTranslations(format) in src/test-utils/intl.ts is now the one definition of a key-returning translator, complete with rich, markup and has, and each local mock uses it while keeping its own key shape and, for kb-detail, its per-namespace cache, so no assertion moved. The mock factory is async and imports the helper inside itself, because vi.mock is hoisted above the static imports. intl.test.ts asserts the helper carries all three, so the next mock added by copy-paste cannot lose them silently. (#612, #610)

[0.0.256] - 2026-08-26

Changed

• Backend dependencies: uvicorn 0.52.4, pydantic-ai-harness 0.24.0, llama-cloud 2.14.1, google-api-python-client 2.199.0, boto3 1.43.78, subagents-pydantic-ai 0.2.21, ruff 0.16.4 and ty 0.0.74. Applied on a branch off current main and re-locked rather than merged from Dependabot's, whose branch predated the agent-frameworks group and would have reverted it. (#1153)

[0.0.255] - 2026-08-26

Fixed

• The only pages an unauthenticated visitor loads shipped all 89 brand marks. The sign-in and register pages drew three - Google, GitHub, Microsoft - through BrandIcon, which reads the BRAND_GLYPHS table by dynamic key, and a dynamic record access cannot be tree-shaken. So about 104 KB of source, 25 to 30 KB gzipped, sat on the critical path and grew with every connector nobody signs in with. The generator emits a second module, auth-glyphs.generated.ts, holding just the three identity-provider marks and derived from the same fetched data so the generator stays the single source of glyph data; oauth-buttons draws AUTH_GLYPHS through GlyphIcon directly. A test guards the regression: the auth component must not import BrandIcon or brand-glyphs.generated, and AUTH_GLYPHS must hold exactly the three. (#955)

[0.0.254] - 2026-08-26

Changed

• Agent-framework dependencies: logfire 4.41.0, pydantic-ai-slim 2.33.0 (including its mcp extra), genai-prices 0.1.4 and pydantic-ai-skills 1.4.0.

[0.0.253] - 2026-08-26

Nothing holds a pooled connection across a model call, so the sixteenth request is answered rather than queued.

Fixed

• Three paths held a pooled Postgres connection across work measured in seconds to minutes, so fifteen concurrent anything exhausted the pool (DB_POOL_SIZE=5 plus DB_MAX_OVERFLOW=10) and the sixteenth request of any kind blocked for DB_POOL_TIMEOUT and then raised. (#12)
• The run's transaction spanned the model call. _run and ChatAgentRunner.run commit once before the model is asked anything, with the terminal commit from #231 left in place. The run row is visible from every other session mid-run, the connection goes back to the pool for the duration of the call, and a resumed run's mark_running is durable before the approved call is replayed - so a crash mid-replay can no longer hand the same approval out twice. The budget capability's baseline read moved onto a session of its own; read on the run's shared session it silently re-opened the idle transaction. (#3, #12)
• PgVectorStore built a private pool per instance. The store borrows an injected engine and aclose() is gone. The API, CLI and the knowledge capability share the process engine through one process_vector_store() factory - the #306-shaped four-site repetition collapsed into it - and the worker builds one engine per flow in _ingestion_service, disposed on every path out. The embed widget needed no change: EmbedSession already takes a session factory and opens one per turn (#39). (#12)
• The agent-triggers scheduler reasoned from "an executing run's row is invisible". claim_due's conversation guard blocks on awaiting_approval alone, because a crash-orphaned running row would otherwise wedge the schedule forever, and the fire-recovery branch corroborates a running tail against a fresh session before settling it as its own orphan - a concurrent fire's live run is left alone. (#537, #12)
• The crash-orphan remainder. An hourly stale-run sweep ends anything still running past STALE_RUN_REAPED_AFTER_HOURS (6h default, 0 disables) as failed, with the sweep's own sentence on the row: one conditional UPDATE whose status guard re-evaluates under the row lock, and a live run flipped anyway is flipped back by its own terminal write. No spend is invented, nobody is mailed, and awaiting_approval is never touched. (#1078)

Changed

• The opening commit sits in _run and ChatAgentRunner.run rather than centralized in PreparedRun.execute/iterate, because PreparedRun does not carry the session; both sites are tested and documented. The per-flow worker engine keeps SQLAlchemy's default pool knobs, as the in-store engine did - tying it to DB_POOL_SIZE would couple worker sizing to API tuning silently. And API-process vector work now shares the request pool: with connections no longer held across model calls 15 is comfortable at the measured load, but a heavy-RAG deployment may want a bigger DB_POOL_SIZE. (#12)

[0.0.252] - 2026-08-26

A client-supplied path segment can no longer walk out of the route it was given to.

Fixed

• About a dozen route handlers under src/app/api interpolated a client-supplied path segment straight into the backend URL with no encodeURIComponent. Next decodes %2F into the param and fetch normalises .., so a segment escapes its intended route: an organization id of x%2F..%2F..%2Fadmin%2Fusers reached the backend as /api/v1/admin/users. This is defence in depth rather than live escalation - the backend re-gates admin on CurrentAppAdmin, so nothing currently reachable would not be anyway - but the BFF's own fence was decorative, and any future backend route assuming "only reachable through a handler that checks X" would be exposed the day it lands. (#13, #30)
• Every interpolated segment is encodeURIComponent-wrapped, matching the sibling routes that already did it, and a new sweep in platform-proxy.test.ts fails any route interpolating a bare ${param} into a /api/v1 template - the same reasoning the file already gives for its organization-header sweep, so the next hand-rolled route cannot repeat the omission. The host prefix and query interpolations are not path segments and are left alone; a platformProxy route forwards its path verbatim and has nothing to encode. (#13, #30)

[0.0.251] - 2026-08-26

The vault's master key is explicit everywhere, and rotating it no longer destroys every secret it protects.

Fixed

• The master key was validated only in production. The config refused the default SECRET_KEY only when ENVIRONMENT == "production", while staging is first-class here - so a staging vault booted with every credential sealed under a string published in config.py. A model validator refuses an unset VAULT_MASTER_KEY outside local and development, and the getattr(settings, "VAULT_MASTER_KEY", "") typing escape is gone. (#8)
• Rotation destroyed every secret. _wrapping_key derived every version from the single current setting, so key_version recorded nothing and setting a new master key made every envelope unreadable - rewrap included, because it derived the from-key from the same new value. (#8)
• McpConnectionService.update and update_for_org sealed a replacement token at the current version without re-sealing the row's OAuth envelopes - the same latent defect #552 fixed on channel bots, and destructive the moment versions mean distinct keys. Both seal at the row's recorded version now. (#8, #552)

Added

• VAULT_MASTER_KEYS: dict[int, str], chosen over a VAULT_MASTER_KEY_PREVIOUS because it generalizes the key_version column rather than hardcoding a two-key window. The single VAULT_MASTER_KEY stays as shorthand for version 1, and both set at once is refused as ambiguous. The highest version seals new secrets; an envelope naming a version with no configured key raises ConfigurationError naming the missing entry instead of a generic decrypt error. (#8)
• HKDF-SHA256 replaces the bare sha256(master|scope|v) - one hash over a possibly passphrase-derived value is not a KDF. The switch is versioned by the envelope format (ENVELOPE_VERSION 1 to 2): version-1 envelopes keep opening under the old derivation, everything new is HKDF, and rewrap upgrades the format in place. Without that, the KDF change alone would have been the rotation defect under another name. (#8)
• agenticos cmd vault-rotate [--dry-run] walks every table holding envelopes
• organization_secrets, channel_bots four times, mcp_connections three times with per-row scope so a personal connection re-wraps under its member, plus agent_embeds and agent_triggers. A row's ciphertexts move together with the version column or not at all; failures are named, do not stop the sweep, and exit non-zero so a script cannot drop the old key on a partial rotation. --dry-run performs the full unwrap and rewrap without writing. (#8)

Changed

• seal, seal_fields and seal_secret default to the current key version, so a row created with no envelope records the current version instead of a hardcoded
• doctor's vault check accepts either configuration form. secrets.md carries the rotation procedure now that it is real, and configuration.md, commands.md and backend/.env.example carry the new setting. (#8)
• No key-length validation on a configured master, deliberately. Refusing a short existing key at boot would lock a deployment out of the very rotation it needs to escape it, because the old key has to stay configured to rotate away from it. HKDF also weakens the cost of a low-entropy master, and the docs steer to openssl rand -hex 32. (#8)

[0.0.250] - 2026-08-26

Every tool says what it returns, and one place decides whose mistake a failure was.

Added

• A Returns: on every tool. Seven docstrings had none, so the model could not know that search_channels answers - name (id) - purpose, that a history read is capped at 200 messages with each cut to 500 characters, that list_context is an index rather than bodies, or what run_python does with a final expression's value. A tool whose answer can be a slice has to say so, or the model reasons from the slice as though it were the whole set. list_context also answered an empty string when nothing was attached, which reads to a model as a broken tool; it says so in a sentence now. (#1075)
• One failure taxonomy, written down in .claude/skills/agent-capability/references/tool-text-and-failures.md and a new section of docs/reference/capabilities.md, so the next capability is not a coin flip.

Changed

• steer in app/agents/capabilities/_failures.py is the one place that decides, and it exists rather than a bare raise ModelRetry for a reason worth stating: a retry raised past a tool's budget - one attempt by default, and nothing raises it - does not fail the call, it ends the whole run with UnexpectedModelBehavior. A model that sent the same malformed chart twice took the conversation down with it. On the last attempt steer returns the message instead, so the worst case is the string the tool would have returned anyway. charts, context, knowledge, image_generation and web_research raised unconditionally and now steer.
• run_python was on the wrong side of the taxonomy. A NameError or a syntax error in code the model itself wrote came back as Execution failed: ..., a sentence indistinguishable from a result, when code is precisely the argument it composed. It answers with a RunOutcome naming whose problem it is - MontySyntaxError, MontyRuntimeError, MontyTypingError and MontyConversionError are the program's, and the resource limits report as TimeoutError and MemoryError, fixable the same way by writing something cheaper - while a sandbox that died is not. A model error is no longer logged as an exception: an error log full of NameErrors hides the ones that are this deployment's fault.
• What deliberately stays a returned string: a command that exited non-zero, a search with no hits, a channel the bot cannot see, and any refusal - a retry prompt on a refusal invites the model to look for a way around it. The second row of the taxonomy is the one that looks wrong and is not: a transient failure of what is behind the tool is also a retry, because an error in the shape of a result reads as "nothing found" and the model then answers from memory, confidently, without saying it had to.
• Consumes pydantic-ai-backend 0.2.28. The sandbox catalog shows TOOL_TEXT[id].summary where the Builder used to render 2501 characters of execute beside an approval checkbox, and profile="agent" drops the guidance written for an agent working in a repository - about 240 tokens on every request, for advice a scratch workspace deleted with its conversation cannot use.

Fixed

• A provider's own error text no longer reaches a tool return. web_search built its message with str(exc) from whatever the search SDK raised and generate_image interpolated the provider exception. On the last attempt steer returns that message rather than raising it, and a returned string is stored by app/services/transcript.py and streamed verbatim - deliberately, because a return is the tool's own answer, where a retry prompt is replaced with a notice (#681, #695). So an httpx or SDK message naming the failing endpoint, and for some providers a key in its query string, reached run history for every member who could read the run. The message is now built from the provider name and the exception's class - which still says whether the upstream timed out or refused the credential - and the exception's own text goes to a logger.exception beside the raise. Same rule, and the same reasoning, as app/services/rag/failures.py.

[0.0.249] - 2026-08-26

A week of full account access no longer sits in an access log.

Fixed

• The Google OAuth callback put the access and refresh tokens in a query string. That URL reaches the address bar and session history, the frontend server's access log and any reverse proxy in front of it, and the Referer of the next same-origin request the callback page makes - Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin sends the full URL same-origin. The refresh token is valid for a week, so anybody who could read an access log had a week of full account access. (#14)
• The callback now hands out a single-use, one-minute code and keeps the token pair in Redis. POST /api/v1/oauth/exchange redeems it with GETDEL, so a replayed, an expired and a forged code all redeem to nothing and answer 401. The frontend BFF swaps the code for the pair, verifies the access token against /auth/me, and moves both into HttpOnly cookies - the tokens never touch a URL. That also closes the session-fixation shape, because the BFF no longer accepts a client-supplied token pair. (#14)

Changed

• docs/configuration.md records the token-delivery decision under its OAuth section. (#14)

[0.0.248] - 2026-08-26

The routines onboarding path no longer freezes the page it is teaching.

Fixed

• Accepting the routine creation offer could freeze /routines outright. The offer was gated on the scope-blind, role-level agents:run, while the flow's first target — the page's create buttons — mounts only on the per-agent can_run answer, and the coach waits on a flow target with no timeout. An Owner in an organization with no agents accepted the offer into a page that never came back. Both layers now read the one answer the buttons themselves gate on (qk.agents.anyRunnable()): CreationOffer suppresses the offer from that cache, and every create-routine step carries an OrgState.hasRunnableAgent include fed by the same query, so any residual path yields an inert flow rather than a frozen one. (#594)
• That offer rendered offer.create-routine.title literally. The copy was never written, and a key read through a template literal is invisible to the static catalog checks that would otherwise have failed the build. Added in en and pl. (#594)

Added

• The routines widget says what it is sorted by. The card ordered by next fire and never told anybody; the sub-line now carries next <instant> for a live schedule — and deliberately not for an overdue next_fire_at, which is a fire the heartbeat has yet to claim and is loudest exactly when the worker is down. Polish copy for the whole card, which had been falling back to English. (#594)
• .claude/rules/frontend.md now holds the widget mechanics CLAUDE.md's "ships its seams" rule had been pointing at: the five edits a new dashboard card is, each with the failure it prevents. docs/concepts.md names Routines and the widget, delegating the detail to docs/triggers.md, and docs/first-agent.md walks a reader through the routine flow's Run now ending and the dashboard customize stop. (#594)

Changed

• routines.tsx is inside the frontend coverage gate. The widget directory is gated file-by-file, so the card was invisible to the 100% gate however green its tests ran — which then found the error state's retry unexercised. (#594)

[0.0.247] - 2026-08-22

An agent runs itself, with nobody at the keyboard.

Added

• Routines - a schedule fires on the clock, a trigger fires on an arrival, and both are rows in agent_triggers beside the agent rather than fields in the portable spec, modelled on AgentExposure. A trigger_type discriminator and a shape CHECK keep "what makes this due" to exactly one answer per row. (#44)
• A schedule is an interval with a 60s floor or a crontab expression validated with croniter, and its cadence is edited in place - interval to cron and back - rather than deleted and recreated. next_fire_at is computed on write and advanced under the heartbeat's lock; an unschedulable edit is a 422 naming the field, not a 500 out of the CHECK. (#44)
• An event trigger reaches us pushed or polled, and which one is the source's business. GitHub and the generic API source POST a payload signed HMAC-SHA256 over the exact raw request bytes, against a signing secret sealed through the one vault the way a channel bot's is - rotatable, and never in a response. Gmail is polled: a mailbox you connect, so there is no URL to configure and no secret to keep. Deliveries are deduplicated before firing, because a provider that retries is a provider that fires twice. (#44)
• The heartbeat - check_agent_triggers_flow, once a minute - claims due triggers FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, advances next_fire_at and sets an in-flight marker in the same UPDATE, and dispatches each fire in isolation so one failed run_deployment does not drop the rest of the batch. A fire runs as the trigger's creator with membership re-resolved every time, opens one run-log conversation per trigger, passes no message_history, renews its lease on a long run, and disables the trigger rather than retrying forever when it can no longer run. (#44, #588)
• RunSurface.SCHEDULE makes a fired run first-class in run history beside web, api, slack and embed, so a triggered run is in Runs as well as in its own view. (#44)
• Four surfaces and one list: /routines for the whole organization, the agent's Availability tab, the chat sidebar's Routines section, and a dashboard card ordered soonest-first with how the last fire went - a routine failing every hour is invisible everywhere else on that page. The Routines page has its stop in the onboarding walkthrough and its creation flow. (#44, #594)
• Templates, so neither kind starts from a blank box (GET /trigger-templates): a schedule template pre-fills a prompt and a sane cadence, an event template pre-fills the prompt on its own source's message step. The create flow is a stepped wizard reading a cadence back in plain words rather than in cron. (#44)
• A portal is a connected account, and its state is carried on the catalog: GitHub and Gmail are connected through the organization's own OAuth app, whose client credentials are a vault secret of their own kind rather than a deployment environment variable. (#44, #1068)
• The sandbox keeps a record of what an agent did in it. The activity log was a 200-entry ring buffer in the service's own process, gone on restart; operations are rows now, per session, searchable and filterable by operation and to failures only. The dashboard row's live ticker still reads the buffer, which is the one thing it answers faster. (#1061)

Fixed

• Gmail handed out a webhook URL and a signing secret it never uses. A polled source has no inbound door, so the dialog offered setup for a delivery that cannot arrive, and the email relay webhook it stood in for is gone. (#1068)
• The trigger create dialog was a fixed 90vh with markless template cards and unreadable presets. It takes a token from the one dialog scale, the cards carry their brand marks in brand colours, and the prerequisite is said before the form asks for anything. (#1069)
• A trigger's Environment picker rendered the default as blank, which reads as an environment that is not there rather than as the one you already have. (#1070)
• The API trigger was a ghost button in the toolbar rather than a tile beside the portals, so the one source needing no account looked like a secondary action. (#1071)
• Per-agent gating, everywhere a routine can be made. Create controls are gated on agents:run per agent rather than on the collection floor, each trigger read says whether the caller may manage it, and a refusal on a per-resource route is reported as not-found so agent ids stay unprobeable. can_run is on the agent read for the same reason the client should not be re-deriving it. (#44)
• run_now executed the agent inside the HTTP request - a 504 on a slow run, and a double fire when the client retried it. A manual fire is dispatched like any other. (#658)
• The flow dispatch is imported lazily, so importing the API does not import Prefect. (#44)

Schema

• agent_triggers and its event columns, the trigger name, portal triggers and portal connections, the webhook target, the in-flight fire marker, the Gmail event source, the secret a polled trigger does not need, and the sandbox operations log - migrations 0046 through 0055, applied and rolled back cleanly.

Documentation

• docs/triggers.md - what an event trigger is, pushed versus polled, where routines live in the product and what to call them, how to point a real provider at the webhook, what a delivery must contain, and how to test the whole thing from a laptop. docs/concepts.md, governance.md, permissions.md, secrets.md, mcp.md and sandbox.md carry their side of it. (#44)

[0.0.246] - 2026-08-21

An Admin cannot take from a peer what they are not allowed to remove.

Fixed

• An Admin could demote a peer Admin, having been refused removing them. MemberService.remove refuses one Admin removing another; change_role disagreed about the same peer, because it checked only the new role against the assignment ceiling and never the target's current one. So an Admin who could not remove a peer Admin could demote them to Viewer - stripping the same authority - and then remove them, or simply leave them demoted. The audit read member.role_changed, which is true and not what happened. A requester may now only change the role of a member their own role strictly outranks, which is the relation assignable_roles already means: the Admin-vs-Admin rule is the assignment ceiling rather than a second rule beside it, and because the ceiling is derived from the permission catalog a custom role is bounded the same way rather than against a literal "admin". The Owner target keeps its own "use transfer-ownership" message. (#700)
• The role selector was drawn on rows the server would refuse. The list now answers can_change_role per member - the same two checks change_role makes - so a peer Admin's row shows the role as a label instead of a control whose only result is a 403 toast. It is the server's answer rather than a rule reimplemented in the client, which would drift from the catalog. (#700)
• Both halves of the read-check-write are locked now. change_role and remove each read a membership, refuse or allow on the role they find, and then write that same row - so under READ COMMITTED an Owner promoting the target in between left an Admin demoting or removing a peer Admin. member_repo.get takes for_update, off by default because every listing and permission check calls it. (#700)

Testing

• A frontend case asserted the behaviour this release removes, written on the reading that demoting a peer Admin was a supported action a picker ought to offer. It asserts the label and the absent control now, with the reason kept beside it. Three more failed only because the fixture did not carry can_change_role; it derives the flag through assignableRoles over the same catalog the server uses, so a fixture cannot describe a server this one is not.
• TestMemberRepositoryLock holds what for_update compiles to, in the shape TestAgentRepositoryLock beside it already uses. The parameter had none.

Known

• remove still decides Admin-vs-Admin with a literal rather than the catalog, so half of #700's argument about custom roles is unmade. No live defect - the four built-in roles agree - and filed as #1066.

[0.0.244] - 2026-08-21

One runtime this repository defines, and a workspace anybody can read.

Added

• backend/app/core/catalog/sandbox_runtimes.json is where a runtime is described, and the three compose files are generated from it. SANDBOXD_RUNTIMES was hand-written JSON in each of them, describing the same images the connection dialog offers — four places to edit, three of which had to remember that network_mode is not inherited from anywhere. make sandbox-runtimes writes the line and backend/tests/test_sandbox_runtime_catalog.py fails when a file has drifted from the catalogue, naming the file. (#1039)
• One runtime, workbench, instead of eight. Python 3.12, Node 24.19.0 and LibreOffice, with liteparse, pypdf, python-docx, openpyxl, python-pptx, Pillow, pandas, duckdb, matplotlib, httpx, requests, BeautifulSoup, lxml, markdownify, PyYAML, tabulate and reportlab. prewarm builds every entry as the service starts, so eight aliases was eight pip installs in a start-up nobody watches. (#1039)
• The agent is told what its container holds, in the run's instructions rather than by trying something and reading the error: the package list is derived from the catalogue and the prose beside it says what cannot be — that a large file is extracted to disk and grepped rather than read whole, that OCR costs about nine seconds a page, that soffice converts, and that there is no C compiler. None for a Daytona sandbox or a state workspace, whose image this deployment does not build and so cannot honestly describe. (#1039)
• The Running tab says whose sandbox each one is — the agent's name with the session key under it, the conversation it belongs to as a link, and how long it has before it is reaped, measured against the service's own idle_timeout. Its activity log opens in a near-fullscreen dialog with search, an operation filter built from the log itself, and a failed-only switch. (#1039)
• /workspaces opens on every file rather than on a table of workspaces. "Where is that CSV" and "what did the agent write" are the questions somebody opens the page with. A file a person attached carries a badge and the list filters on it; an image draws a thumbnail, on a host as well as in a stored document. (#1039)
• A workspace's own page is a tree that opens in place, indented, with uploads open by default and search over every folder rather than the one on screen. The file renders beside the tree instead of over it, because reading a workspace means reading several files in turn. (#1039)
• The table counts files and totals their bytes, sortable, and says what it cost: a stored workspace is counted anyway because its files came with the row, and a container's are a round trip to its host, so measure=true is a switch rather than something the page pays for on open. (#1039)
• One scrolling row of attachment chips above the composer, in its own container, with arrows only where there is something to scroll to. (#927)
• A file opens in a modal with a carousel under it, so moving between the files of one turn is a click or an arrow key, from the transcript as well as from the panel. (#1039)

Fixed

• Compose interpolated the runtime's shell variables, so every session 502'd. $arch and ${node_arch} in a setup command are variables to compose, undefined ones, so the service was handed case "" in amd64) … esac and the build failed with no Node build for on every session. Nothing in the chain says the word "compose": the library passes a setup command through verbatim and Docker does not expand $ in a RUN. The generator writes $$. (#1039)
• An attachment landed outside the workspace and nothing reported it. UPLOAD_DIR was /uploads, and a sandbox resolves an absolute path as absolute — so the file landed at the container's filesystem root, the agent's ls did not see it, the browser could not list it, and it died with the container. An agent asked to read one answered that the directory was empty, having summarised the file from the head sample in its own prompt. (#1039)
• _workspace_paths globbed from / rather than from the working directory, so "what did the agent write" was 2,540 paths of /proc and /usr, taken twice a turn. (#1039)
• A workspace listing read one directory. The archive's ls lists one, and it was called once on the root — so a workspace whose files are all under uploads/ reported a single directory entry and nothing else. It walks now, breadth-first, six levels deep and 2,000 entries at most; a directory that will not answer is logged and skipped, and only the root refusing makes the workspace unreadable. (#1039)
• A Polish filename 500'd, and the browser was told the file did not exist. ASGI headers are latin-1, so Content-Disposition: filename="…ł.pdf" raised inside the response — reported to the client as FILE_NOT_FOUND. One helper builds the header as RFC 5987 for every route that serves bytes. (#1039)
• A .txt copy of every PDF, .docx and spreadsheet was written beside it. On a runtime carrying liteparse that is a second copy of the file's contents on disk to save a tool call the agent should be making. It is written only where the workspace cannot read the original itself. (#1039)
• A failed workspace write was reported to the model as "too large". The sentence was reasoned from the stored backend's four-megabyte ceiling, and a container write fails for reasons that have nothing to do with size — so a 782 KB PDF attached while sandboxd was down was described as too large, the model repeated that to the person who attached it, and the two of them spent a conversation on a limit that was never the problem. (#1046)
• And the turn is told once that the workspace itself is unavailable, so a failing ls is not read as a problem with the command: without it one turn tried ls, then a curl of a data: URI, then offered three workarounds, across two turns and 57k tokens. (#1046)
• Skills are written to the workspace again, because a resource is a script the shell runs and collect_changes diffs it into a proposal a person accepts; removing the files broke both, one of them silently. The listings drop skills/ and the spill directory instead — the complaint was right about the listing and wrong about the mechanism. (#1064)
• A channel reply could post somebody's own attachment back at them as the agent's work. The prefixes a reply must not send were written with a leading slash, which a stored workspace's paths have and a container's do not. (#1039)
• A probe sent the vault credential to whatever address was in the box. X-Sandbox-Token on a sandbox host starts containers there, so the automatic ask is limited to the address the backend itself found; every other host is asked when an operator presses the button. (#1039)
• re.sub reads escapes in its replacement string, and the generated compose line was passed as one — so the first setup command needing a sed 's/\1/x/' would have been written into three files as a capture group. (#1039)
• An agent on somebody else's host was told it could read a PDF itself when it could not. Whether the extracted text is written beside an attachment was derived from whether the runtime could be described - and a description falls back to this catalogue's first entry for a run that named no runtime, which is the case where the host chooses. On a custom or pre-upgrade host that left the model twenty lines of prompt and a binary it could not open. The two questions are answered separately now. (#1039)
• And the extracted text was named whether or not it was written. A document with room for a spreadsheet and not for its parse refuses the second write on its own, so the model was told about a file that was not there. What is named is what the workspace answers for. (#1039)
• The sandbox listing linked conversations their reader cannot open, which on an organization-wide page was most of the column: the chat page lists its owner's threads, so the rest landed on an empty sidebar dressed as the conversation. (#1039)
• A container's file tree stopped without saying so. Reading a host is a round trip per folder, so the walk ends at six levels and 2,000 entries - which for a workspace holding a checkout is a tree somebody reads as everything the agent is keeping. The page says when it is not. A folder that will not answer is skipped rather than failing the whole listing, and a folder's file count includes what is nested under it. (#1039)
• The sandbox service this deployment starts could not be tested before it was saved, because that path stores its credential at submission and there was nothing to test with. A probe with no key uses SANDBOXD_TOKEN for the two addresses in this project's own compose file and no others - that token starts containers on whatever host accepts it. (#1039)
• Smaller ones, each with a test: the name field is a value rather than a placeholder; the runtime picker's trigger says what an image is for on one line instead of overflowing it; the explorer fills the page it is on; the segments of one turn no longer have a gap between them; a file's carousel no longer takes the arrow keys away from the Preview/Source tabs; a probe's answer about a host that is no longer in the box is not displayed; and a stored image's base64 body is no longer decoded to discover that its suffix was never an image.

Documentation

• docs/sandbox.md — how a sandbox is built and by whom, that the containers are siblings of the API rather than nested in it, one per session, what a tenant is, how long a workspace survives, what sandbox_runtimes.json holds and how to change it, and what the browser leaves out. SANDBOXD_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_TENANT is
• (#1039)

[0.0.243] - 2026-08-21

The agent avatar is served as an image or not at all.

Fixed

• GET /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/avatar guessed its content-type from the filename on disk - mimetypes.guess_type(path)[0] or "application/octet-stream", straight into a FileResponse. An avatar is stored under whatever suffix the uploader chose and the app serves from an origin whose CSP allows inline script, so a file uploaded as x.html was served as text/html from that origin and executed. Stored XSS, exactly the class 0.0.238 fixed for the user and organization avatars, and the route it deliberately left out of scope. (#1035)
• The route reuses image_media_type_for rather than growing a second copy of the helper: the type is pinned to the file's actual image type, anything that is not an image is refused with a 404, and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff goes out with it - the same shape the user and organization avatar routes already use. mimetypes is dropped from the module. (#1035)

[0.0.242] - 2026-08-21

The migration chain has one head again.

Fixed

• main had two alembic heads, so alembic upgrade head exited 255 and no deployment could move off 0.0.238. 0044_agent_embed_key_version (0.0.239) and 0044_audit_impersonator (0.0.241) both carried down_revision = "0043_rag_document_source_path": each was written against a main that ended at 0043, each was green on its own branch, and the fork existed only in the merged history. The audit migration is 0045_audit_impersonator now and points at the embed one. (#1059)

Added

• A guard that needs no database. backend/tests/test_migration_chain.py asserts the chain has exactly one head, and that no two revisions claim the same parent - the same defect one step earlier, where the message names the two files that collided rather than the two heads they produced. It is a module of its own rather than a case in tests/test_migrations.py, because that one skips where no Postgres answers and a divergence is made by a merge on a laptop hours before CI's database sees it. make db-check is alembic check, which compares the models to the head and never counts them. (#1059)

[0.0.241] - 2026-08-21

An impersonated action names who was really acting.

Fixed

• POST /admin/users/{id}/impersonate minted an access token whose sub is the target account, so every request made with it - every row written, every audit entry triggered - was attributed to the target and to nobody else. An admin who read a customer's conversation and one who deleted their agent left the same trace: the customer's own. "Who accessed my account" had no answer. (#943)

Added

• An act claim. create_access_token(..., act=...) carries the administrator behind the subject, and the impersonate route sets it. It is absent on every ordinary token, so those are byte for byte unchanged. (#943)
• A request-scoped audit context. The auth dependency, over HTTP and WebSocket alike, reads act onto a context variable - the actor behind a request is a property of the request rather than something to thread through every service that records an action. record_audit writes it as impersonator_user_id beside the actor, 0045_audit_impersonator adds the nullable column and its index, and the audit read schema and service expose it. Null on an ordinary request, and nothing is backfilled: whether a past action was impersonated is unknowable after the fact. docs/governance.md says what an impersonated action records. (#943)

Changed

• Deliberately not the whole of #943. A raw token still reaches the clipboard, and an impersonation session is still neither revocable nor endable in product - those two are one larger full-stack flow, with a banner, an End button and revocation, filed as a follow-up. #943 stays open for it, along with the policy question of whether the target is notified. (#943)

[0.0.240] - 2026-08-21

An answered ask_user question survives the conversation.

Fixed

• A mid-turn ask_user question and the person's answer were written down nowhere, so a reopened conversation showed neither the question the agent put nor the answer it acted on. ask_user is a callback rather than a tool, so it never touched the turn timeline the transcript is replayed from. (#502)

Added

• MessagePart gains an ask_user kind carrying the question and the answer, TurnTimeline.add_ask_user records it, and the session hands the running turn's timeline to _ask_one, which appends the pair once the answer is in hand, in the position it happened. A lone ask_user part is stored even as a turn's only part - unlike a tool call or a block of text it has no column to fall back to. No migration: the timeline is already a JSONB column and only the part union widens. (#502)
• The frontend gains the raw and typed part shapes, the replay in conversation-to-chat, a runsOf run, and an AskUserBlock that draws the question and the answer as a step inside the turn rather than as a chat bubble. (#502)

Changed

• Replay only. Live, the question is the composer's own ask_user form and the answer returns through it, so what was missing was a conversation reopened from history. Delegate attribution - saying which delegate asked - is deliberately not here: subagents-pydantic-ai reaches the parent through ctx.deps.ask_user(question, []) with no asker name and SubAgentState carries none, so naming the delegate needs an upstream change to that package first. #502 stays open for it. (#502)

[0.0.239] - 2026-08-21

A multi-column row is sealed under one key version.

Fixed

• "A row has several ciphertext columns sharing one key_version" was hand-rolled at several models, each differently, and the vault offered no primitive for it. The failures are latent - rewrap, master-key rotation, has no production caller yet - but the day it runs, a rotated jwt widget can never be opened again and a channel bot's row disagrees with its own envelopes. vault.seal_fields(values, *, scope, key_version) seals every field at one version and hands that version back to store, so "seal at v2 but record v1" and "no version column at all" cannot be written by hand. (#552)
• agent_embed had no key_version column, and _verify_token unsealed at an implicit v1 - so a rotated widget would answer EmbedDenied to every visitor. It gains secret_key_version (the migration backfills existing rows to 1), seals through seal_fields and unseals at the row's own version. docs/secrets.md now lists the embed among the sealed rows. (#552)
• channel_bot's update re-sealed a changed token at the default v1 and reset the column while its siblings kept the rotated version, leaving the row's version disagreeing with its envelopes (AUD-008). It seals at the row's existing version, beside its siblings, and never resets the column. (#552)
• Left alone deliberately: mcp_connection already seals one field per write at the row's secret_key_version, and organization_secret stores its ciphertext, hint and version through the typed secret_kinds wrappers. Both already record one version per row, so routing them through the multi-field helper would be churn rather than a fix. (#552)

[0.0.238] - 2026-08-21

A stored file is served as what it is, or not served inline at all.

Fixed

• Stored XSS through an avatar or a chat attachment. The bytes behind both were served with a type the backend took from the name on disk, while the upload paths validated the Content-Type the client declared and never the bytes, keeping whatever extension the uploader chose. So x.html whose bytes are <script>…, declared as image/png, was accepted, stored as <hex>_x.html, guessed back as text/html, and passed through the frontend proxy from the app's own origin - where the CSP allows 'unsafe-inline'. X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff does not help, because the type is declared rather than sniffed. The same shape #634 fixed for the hosted-page logo; these three require a session, so the audience is the organization. (#702)
• Pinned at both ends. The frontend proxies share their allowlists in src/lib/proxy-content-type.ts: both avatar proxies refuse anything outside the four image types with a 502 and drop the image/jpeg default over unknown bytes, and the file proxy - which serves PDFs and spreadsheets on purpose - forces a download for anything outside the render-safe set, so text/html and SVG are saved rather than shown. nosniff on all three. (#702)
• And at the backend routes. image_media_type_for lives beside IMAGE_MIME_TYPES in file_storage: the user and organization avatar routes guess the type, 404 a non-image and pass it explicitly with nosniff, and the chat-file route serves a render-safe type inline and forces everything else to download - the declared mime_type is not trusted to decide rendering. (#702)

[0.0.237] - 2026-08-21

Two chat controls that did nothing are gone.

Removed

• The temperature slider and the thinking-effort picker in the chat Settings tab. Both were sent on every turn and read by nothing: agent_session reads model_profile_id and the environment off the frame and no other key, and thinking_effort appears nowhere in the backend at all. Whatever the person chose, the run used the agent's spec. Worse than doing nothing, the controls said they did something - chat-controls' own docstring claimed "both are recorded on the run, so an override stays attributable", and neither was, because neither arrived. The same class as #29 and #561: a stated contract the code does not keep, and a control that lies is worse than one that is absent. (#924)
• The Settings tab was those two controls, so it goes with them - leaving the model picker, which works and no longer needs tabs - along with the use-chat refs, setters and send-frame lines behind them, and the orphaned chat.controls.* keys (and a stray chat.settingsPersistCurrentChat their removal orphaned). The docstring now says what is true. (#924)

Changed

• Thinking effort stays a capability binding rather than a model setting (spec.py), so overriding it per turn is a larger design than a slider: it is not being quietly dropped, it never worked, and wiring it is its own issue. Temperature is genuinely a model setting and the easy half, but half-wiring one while deleting the other leaves the same one-control-in-a-tab shape. (#924)

[0.0.236] - 2026-08-21

PII is redacted where records are actually emitted.

Fixed

• PiiRedactionFilter was attached to the root logger, where it scrubbed nothing the application logs. A filter on a logger runs only in Logger.handle, for a record logged on that logger; a record from logging.getLogger(__name__) - which is every log line in this codebase - propagates to its ancestors' handlers through Logger.callHandlers and never touches their filters. Email addresses, JWTs, sk- keys and bearer tokens reached Datadog, CloudWatch and Logfire verbatim: the redaction a deployment believed stood between its logs and its aggregator had never been there. The filter is attached to the root logger's handlers now. (#440)
• logging.lastResort carries the filter too, because that is what emits WARNING and above in a process that configured no handler - the CLI, a flow subprocess before logging is set up - and a credential in a logger.exception is exactly such a record. (#440)
• The worker never called setup_logging at all. The process that runs ingestion, syncs and reports - a wrong embedding key, an SMTP failure, a connector 401 - redacted nothing even in theory. setup_logging is idempotent now and is called by the worker (prefect_app.main) and the CLI (cli.commands.main) as well as the API. (#440)

[0.0.235] - 2026-08-21

The auth surface is rate-limited, and bcrypt is off the event loop.

Fixed

• No route in auth.py was rate-limited, and verify_password ran bcrypt on the request event loop - about 170ms with no suspension point in it. Each is survivable; together they are not. /login against any address that holds an account, at 20 requests a second, blocks the loop 171ms at a time with no await, so the worker serves nothing else: not the readiness probe, not an in-flight agent socket. On a single-worker deployment the product is down for as long as the attacker keeps typing. (#947)
• Unlimited brute force. The bcrypt cost was the only brake on it, and the denial-of-service above is what that brake bought the attacker. (#947)
• A user-enumeration timing oracle. authenticate skipped bcrypt for an unknown address and ran it for a known one, so the two refused in visibly different times. An unknown address is now verified against a real hash computed once at import, and the two refusals take the same time. (#947)
• An email amplifier. /password-reset/request and /magic-link/request sent mail on every call, unlimited. (#947)

Changed

• The Redis-backed limiter this repository already had in services/rate_limit.py, shared across workers, is wired to the auth surface: auth_limit() and deps.enforce_auth_limit are called at the top of every auth route, before any bcrypt or database work. Counted per IP always, and per submitted address wherever the body carries one - which is why it is called from the handler rather than as a Depends, since the per-address half needs the parsed body. RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE defaults to 10 and is documented in docs/configuration.md. (#947)
• Every bcrypt call - the verify in authenticate and the three get_password_hash sites - runs in a thread through asyncio.to_thread. (#947)
• GET /me is deliberately not rate-limited here: a per-IP limit on an authenticated no-op punishes an office behind one NAT, and per-user limiting of an already authenticated cheap read is a separate decision. (#947)

[0.0.234] - 2026-08-21

An app admin cannot suspend or delete their own account.

Fixed

• /admin/users let an app admin open their own row and suspend, demote or delete themselves, unguarded at both layers and two of the three one click away with no confirmation. is_active is enforced on the next request, so a self-suspend signs you out of a deployment you administer, and a self-delete takes the account and its conversations with it - on the single-admin install make platform-bootstrap produces, a stray click ends administration until somebody reaches a terminal. (#941)
• The guard lives in UserService, where both admin surfaces meet: admin_update refuses a self-suspend and admin_delete a self-delete, before the repository is touched. PATCH and DELETE on both /admin/users/{id} and the twin /users/{id} route - which had the same hole - carry the acting admin's id through them. (#941)
• Only is_active is guarded on update, because is_app_admin is not a UserUpdate field: the one global privilege is granted by CLI and cleared by nothing over the API. That is also what answers the last-admin question in code rather than in a policy - the app-admin set shrinks only by deletion, and deleting the last one is deleting yourself, which is refused. Written up in docs/deployment.md. (#941)
• The admin drawer no longer renders Suspend, Demote or Impersonate on your own row. Delete stays visible and is refused by the API - "why can I not delete myself" is a question worth answering on screen. (#941)

[0.0.233] - 2026-08-21

A conversation is shared inside its organization or not at all.

Fixed

• POST /conversations/{id}/share resolved the target user deployment-wide and never checked they belong to the conversation's organization. The row was created and the dialog listed the outsider under "Shared with" - while the read path refuses on the tenant before it ever consults the share, so the target got a 404 and the owner a lie. Not a leak, since the tenant gate holds, but a contract that lies. share_conversation now checks the target is a member of the conversation's organization, by id and by email alike. (#930)
• A non-member is refused as though they did not exist, with the same NotFoundError the not-found case raises: naming them "a member of another organization" would turn the share form into a cross-tenant probe for which addresses hold an account elsewhere on the deployment. Membership is read with member_repo.get rather than get_active - the question is tenancy, and whether a member can currently sign in is the read path's call. (#930)
• The owner's "Shared with" listing drops rows already in that state, in one query: a target who is a current member is kept, and so is a public-link share, which has no target. Cheaper than a migration, and self-correcting. (#930)

[0.0.232] - 2026-08-21

The active-sessions card holds while the next page loads.

Fixed

• Paging the Active sessions card on /settings/profile blanked it and threw the scroll to the top. The query keyed on the page number with no placeholderData, so each page change was a new key: data went undefined, isPending flipped true, and the loading && sessions.length === 0 branch drew two skeletons in place of five rows. The card collapsed from roughly 340px to 120px, everything below it jumped, and a card below the fold took the scroll with it. placeholderData: keepPreviousData holds the current rows while the next page loads, so the skeleton branch means first load again - the treatment use-agents, use-runs, use-skills and use-context already had, and this was the one paged list without it. (#944)
• The held list is dimmed and marked aria-busy while stale, as UsageBody does, and the pager is disabled while the fetch is in flight - so the hold is visible, and audible to a screen reader, rather than silently wrong. (#944)

Changed

• The card's hand-rolled pager is now the shared PaginationBar that admin/users, run history and version history already use; it was the fourth implementation of one control. Single-page behaviour differs - the chevrons render disabled rather than the pager disappearing - so the orphaned dashboard.previousPage and dashboard.nextPage keys are removed from both catalogs. (#944)

[0.0.231] - 2026-08-20

The organization in the URL is the tenant.

Fixed

• /orgs/{id}/members acted on the organization in its path and judged permissions from the active one. X-Organization-Id travels on every request and names the active organization, while the organizations list opens any org's members page through a link and switching is a separate button that navigates to the dashboard - so the ordinary route to another organization's members page was the one that left the active organization behind, and the page then judged Acme's members by the caller's role in Globex. ActiveOrgGuard adopts the organization a path names, before the page asks anything. (#1032)
• Not only the role picker: canManage decides whether any role control, invite button or spending field renders at all, and it read the same wrong answer long before the picker did. (#1032)
• Switching organization from a page that names one now takes the route with it - Globex picked on Acme's members page lands on Globex's members page. Adoption happens once per path, so a deliberate switch is not written back; the two together are what keep the primary switcher working on those pages while the URL still decides the tenant. (#1032)
• An organization id in a URL is adopted lower-cased. The server serialises them canonically and the active organization is found by identity, so an upper-case spelling would be held as the selection, match nothing in the list - the switcher showing the first organization while requests carried another - and be unrecoverable, since the refusal check compares the same two strings. (#1032)

Changed

• OrgSwitcher navigates through @/lib/locale-navigation rather than next/navigation, so its pushes keep the locale prefix instead of sending a Polish reader to the English /orgs. (#1032)

[0.0.230] - 2026-08-20

A role picker offers what the caller may actually assign.

Fixed

• Every role picker offered every role in the catalog bar owner, whoever was asking. Both invite dialogs and the members table, with the service refusing what the caller could not assign - so an Admin was offered Admin and got a 403 after typing the email address. assignableRoles is the client's copy of app.core.permissions.assignable_roles, over the permissions GET /roles/catalog already returns: a role is offered only when the caller's own strictly outranks it. Pre-existing, and 0.0.229 widened who it happened to
• with the server's ceiling derived from what a role holds, every custom role composed with members:manage met the same offer-then-refuse. (#1028)
• A picker seeded with a role it did not offer. Both dialogs held Member as their initial value and never reconciled it with the list; Member is kept where it is on offer - which for every built-in role that may invite at all, it is - and otherwise the least privileged role that is. (#1028)
• A peer Admin's row keeps its picker, with that role in the list and disabled. change_role judges the role being handed out rather than the one being replaced, so an Admin may demote a peer Admin - and the row needs the current role present or the trigger renders blank, because the chosen item's text is what a trigger shows. (#1028)
• A role catalog that cannot be read says so, in both dialogs and above the members table. Offering nothing and being unable to answer are the same pixels and a different fact, and the second one is permanent. (#1028)

[0.0.229] - 2026-08-20

The invitation ceiling is what the requester holds, not whether they are Admin.

Fixed

• A custom role composed with members:manage could invite a new Admin. InvitationService capped who may be invited by comparing the requester's role against the literal string admin, so the ceiling applied to a built-in Admin and to nobody else - and the catalog is explicitly built to let a Phase 2 role hold that permission. Both call sites, the email invite and the invite link, now read assignable_roles(requester.role): the same catalog-derived relation change_role uses, where a role may be offered only when the requester's own strictly outranks it. This is the invitation half of what #672 removed from change_role. (#696)
• Behaviour for the built-in roles is unchanged - assignable_roles("admin") is exactly the set the literal check allowed, and an Owner still invites Admins. An Owner may no longer invite an Owner, which the invite schemas already refused and which is what "nobody at all assigns owner" means: ownership moves through transfer_ownership, which demotes the outgoing owner in the same breath. (#696)

[0.0.228] - 2026-08-20

The MCP connection dialog owns its own form.

Changed

• McpConnectionDialog was a controlled shell. McpServerList held its five form fields as state and drilled a value and a setter each into it - thirteen props - seeding them by hand when a draft opened. The dialog owns those fields now, in an inner form keyed on the draft, so switching servers remounts it with freshly seeded state instead of carrying the previous server's name and token across. The list keeps which server is being edited and reads the values back on submit; handleSubmit stays with the list, because it drives the connection mutations, the tool refresh and the OAuth redirect, none of which are the dialog's. Prop surface: 13 to 5. Behaviour unchanged, and the integration suite that drives the dialog through the DOM asserts the same API payloads untouched. (#569)

[0.0.227] - 2026-08-20

An attachment the router cannot read is named rather than dropped.

Fixed

• A file no parser could read contributed nothing to the prompt, so the model answered as though nothing had arrived - which reads as it denying a file the transcript plainly shows. The reference now names the file and says its text could not be extracted and that the agent has no workspace to open it from, which is the same principle the too-large-image case already followed. (#746)
• A routing failure was silent too. It still does not fail the turn - the person asked a question, and answering without the file beats not answering - but the model is told the file arrived and could not be processed. The error's own text stays in the log line beside the raise, never in the prompt. (#746)

[0.0.226] - 2026-08-20

A malformed file id on the socket is a refusal, not a crash in the log.

Fixed

• A file id that is not a UUID crashed the turn handler. list_attached_files called UUID(fid) on ids that arrive in an untyped socket payload, so a malformed one raised ValueError into the handler's infrastructure net and resurfaced a step later as a generic failed turn, logged as a server error. It is client input, so it is refused as validation naming file_ids - the same loud refusal link_files_to_message already gave. (#749)

[0.0.225] - 2026-08-20

The chat says which model the conversation runs on.

Added

• published_model on a listed agent - the profile id, provider, model id and label of the model its published version runs on. Read off the frozen spec's profile rather than the draft's, which may name a model the agent does not run; null for a draft agent and for a profile that has been deleted, because a picker prefilled from a gap would name a model the profile no longer is. Filled by the listing only, the same bargain budget_monthly_usd and context_window_tokens take. (#926)
• The two lookups behind it - version to published profile, profile to row - are the ones _context_windows already made, and they are now loaded once and fed to both, so the summary costs no extra query. (#926)

Fixed

• The chat's Model tab opened without saying which model the conversation runs on - the one thing the panel is named after. It keyed its "currently running" line on the override, which is null until somebody sets one, so every conversation before its first override rendered blank and asked the reader to choose against a baseline it never showed. The summary now reads the agent's published model when there is no override and the override's profile when there is, labelled Agent's model or Just this chat. (#926)
• A caller without connections:manage got a refusal in place of the whole panel. Creating a model profile needs that permission; reading which model an agent runs on is agents:view, which opening the conversation already implies - and the person who may not change it is the one most likely to want to know. The summary renders above the gate now and only the fields that write are withheld. (#926)

[0.0.224] - 2026-08-20

Only the thumb whose request is in flight spins.

Fixed

• Rating an answer spun both thumbs. The spinner was keyed on isLoading && currentRating !== <the other value>, and an unrated message has currentRating === null - true for both thumbs at once, which is the normal case rather than an edge one. It is keyed on which button's request is in flight now, so the other thumb stays a thumb. (#928)

[0.0.223] - 2026-08-20

An object store's connector is a client, not a copy of the listing loop.

Changed

• S3Connector is an ObjectStoreConnector subclass, with no behaviour change: a stored source lists and downloads exactly what it did before. #938 made Azure Blob and GCS conditional on this shape existing first, and the condition is now met - each of those is a client, a SCHEME and a CONNECTOR_TYPE rather than a second copy of the listing. The shared class holds the pagination, the <scheme>://<container>/<key> address the sync path matches a row on, the skip for a key ending in / (a console's "folder", which would ingest as a document with no bytes and no name), and the destination, which is the base class's answer and the property a new store most easily loses. (#988)
• A subclass says which CONFIG_SCHEMA field names its container - bucket for S3 and GCS, container for Azure - because a form should say what the store's own console says. Both of its hooks are blocking, run on a worker thread, because all three SDKs are synchronous. (#988)
• S3Connector.validate_config is gone: an override that called super() and added nothing. (#988)

Performance

• An object listing is converted as it arrives. The refactor first built a complete list of the shared listing type and then allocated the complete RemoteFile list beside it, where the connector before it kept only the second - on a bucket of a million keys, a previously working sync running out of memory. The listing yields, and the conversion happens inside the same worker thread, so one entry exists at a time beside the list being built. Found by the automated review on the branch. (#988)

[0.0.222] - 2026-08-20

The sync wizard says who will be able to read what a source ingests.

Added

• The step that decides a source's collection now names the audience. Access is decided at the collection and there is no per-document isolation inside one, so everything the credential can reach becomes readable by everyone who can read that collection - a Confluence token issued for a whole instance, pointed at an org collection, publishes the instance to every member holding collections:view. The decision is the operator's, deliberately; what was wrong is that it was made silently. One sentence per scope: personal is its owner, org is everyone who can view the collection, app is anybody in the deployment. (#982)
• The credential is named alongside the audience, because the pair is the decision: a credential's own permissions are a ceiling nothing here can raise, while config narrows the reach and cannot be relied on to keep it narrow. A connector that authenticates with nothing has none to name and the sentence does not invent one, and neither does one whose reader holds no secrets:view. (#982)
• Cloning says it too, which is the reachable half of "repointing re-asks": a clone references the same vault secret and names a different collection, so the audience changes while nothing about the credential does. Repointing an existing source has no screen to ask on - PATCH on collection_name is reachable through the API and the CLI only, where the audit entry added in 0.0.221 is what records it. (#982)

Fixed

• The knowledge-base page no longer reads the vault on every load. The wizard mounts whether or not it is open, so a credential lookup in its own body fired /secrets and /secrets/kinds on each page load - including for members holding no secrets:view, who get a refusal and a retry of it. The lookup lives in the notice, which renders inside the dialog. (#982)

[0.0.221] - 2026-08-20

Who bound a credential to a collection is recorded.

Fixed

• Creating, cloning, repointing and deleting a sync source left no audit entry. A source binds a credential to a collection, and access to what it ingests is decided at the collection - so the row is the platform's authorization decision for everything that credential can reach, and nothing recorded who made it. sync_source.created, .updated and .deleted name the actor, the connector, the collection and the id of the secret. (#983)
• A clone is recorded as a creation naming the row it came from. It points a credential somebody already scoped at a different collection, so the audience changes while nothing about the credential does - the decision in this set that is easiest to miss. (#983)
• An update names the fields it changed, never their values, one of them being config - a place a credential has been posted before (#937). An update that moves the source to another collection also records the one it left, because a rename and a change of audience are otherwise the same entry. (#983)

Changed

• A null audit actor now means one of two things, and the action says which: the approval expiry sweep, and an operator command at the deployment's shell (rag-source-add, rag-source-remove), which have nobody at a keyboard to name. Reading ctx.subject_id there - as every HTTP path does - would have turned two working commands into an AuthorizationError. (#983)
• Three sentences said the audit actor column is NOT NULL (docs/permissions.md, docs/governance.md, AuthContext.subject_id). It is nullable, and has been since the expiry sweep needed it; the reason subject_id raises is that an authenticated path has a person, not that the database would refuse. (#983)

[0.0.220] - 2026-08-20

A status parameter with one value stops pretending to be a choice.

Changed

• _update_status in the ingestion flow is _fail_document, and takes no status. It branched on two values and all four callers passed "error"; the elif status == "done" was a pass whose comment explained why nothing takes it - reaching DONE needs the vector document's id, which only _run_ingestion holds, so it calls complete_ingestion itself. The name now says what the function does: record the first failure and refuse to overwrite it (#423). vulture could not see the dead branch, because the parameter was read. (#956)
• The guard compares DocumentStatus.ERROR, not the string. Two spellings of one value set is how #148 happened - a fourth status nothing had ever written, filtered on by the listing, so every knowledge base reported indexed_count: 0. (#956)

Added

• A test for the guard's other half: a row that has not failed yet does take the failure. It was covered only incidentally, through _run_ingestion. (#956)

[0.0.219] - 2026-08-20

A tracking row says which file it tracks, so a failed attempt stops piling up.

Fixed

• A file that failed to parse on one sync and succeeded on the next left both rows. complete_ingestion's retirement matches on vector_document_id and a failed parse writes none, so the succeeding run had nothing to name and every repeated failure added another row that counted toward the collection's document_count for good. rag_documents gained a source_path (0043) - gdrive://<id>, s3://bucket/key, or an absolute path for a local or CLI sync
• and a new attempt retires the previous failed one by that address. (#996)
• Not by filename, which is the trap and the collision #990 removed on the vector side reached from the other direction: a/readme.md and b/readme.md in one bucket share a basename, so a name match deletes the other file's row. (#996)
• Not a PROCESSING row either. "Has no vector id" is also true of an attempt still running, and nothing serialises two manual triggers on one source - the second would delete the first's live row, after which the first finishes, replaces the vectors and finds no row to complete. Retirement matches status == ERROR. (#996)
• A failed supersede is no longer reported as a failed ingest. ingest_file inserts the new document before deleting the one it replaces, so a delete that raised returned an error while the vectors sat in the store - an ERROR row with no vector id, which the next attempt then retired and orphaned them. The insert succeeding is the answer; the lingering old document is logged. (#996)
• The CLI sync records its address too. rag-ingest called both create_document and ingest_file without the resolved path it had already computed, so its rows got NULL and a file failing there repeatedly kept inflating the count. (#996)

Changed

• An upload stores no address and retires nothing. Its only name is a basename, and two people can upload different report.pdfs meaning both to exist, since replace defaults to false. Retiring by that name would delete the first one's failed row - its diagnosis, its retry and its stored file - for a caller who asked for no such thing. (#996)
• source_path is Text with a hash index rather than String(1024): an S3 key alone reaches 1024 bytes before the scheme and bucket are added and a filesystem path reaches 4096, and a btree index refuses a key over about 2700 bytes at insert time. Equality is the only way the column is read. (#996)

[0.0.218] - 2026-08-20

Every ingest path writes its tracking row before the file is indexed.

Fixed

• The local-directory sync opens its document row before the ingest, and writes one whether or not the ingest succeeded. It created the row afterwards and only on success, so a row whose write failed - a database blip, a name longer than the 255-character column - left the vector document stored and untracked, and the next new_only run then matched its unchanged hash and skipped the file before reaching the write: searchable, invisible and undeletable for good. This was the last path still doing it; the connector sync stopped in #992. (#997)
• A locally-synced file that failed to parse keeps its own reason. failed was incremented in the sync log and nothing anywhere said which file or why, so a run reporting four of forty failures named none of the four. (#997)
• A locally-synced document's row says which parser read it. The rows carried no ingestion_config at all, so parser read null for every one of them while the setting that chose it sat resolved a few lines above. (#997)

Changed

• updated is counted off replaced_document_id rather than by searching the ingest result's own message for the word "replaced" - the string dependency #990's review removed from the connector flow. Equivalent today, since ingest_file writes that word exactly when it replaced something; one of the two is a fact and the other is a sentence. (#997)

[0.0.217] - 2026-08-20

What a connector sync ingests is visible, and deleting it deletes it.

Fixed

• A connector sync records a rag_documents row. It created none, so a Drive folder synced into a knowledge base reported "ingested: 40" and left the Documents tab empty, the collection's own document_count at zero, and the documents unreachable by delete - one ingested from a folder could be removed only by dropping the whole collection. A failure was a number in the sync log and a reason nowhere, so "which four of the forty failed, and why" had no answer. (#992)
• A delete removes the vectors, whichever route asked. RAGDocumentService.delete_document took ingestion_service: Any = None and removed vectors only when a caller passed one - /rag/documents/{doc_id} did, /kb/{kb_id}/documents/{doc_id} did not. So deleting from the Documents tab removed the row and left the content searchable, and for a synced document that was permanent: the next new_only run matched its unchanged hash and skipped it. The argument is required and typed now, so a third route cannot repeat it. Reachable today for an uploaded document. (#992)
• The row is opened before the file is indexed, on the upload and the connector sync. Written afterwards and failing - a database blip, a remote name longer than the column - it left the vector document stored and untracked, and the next new_only run then skipped the file before reaching the write. The local-directory sync still writes its row afterwards ([#997]). (#992)
• An app-scoped collection belongs to no organization, so kb.organization_id == organization_id skipped it: a source pointed at one was parsed with the deployment defaults rather than that collection's own settings, and filed its documents under no knowledge base. The caller's own row still wins over a deployment-wide one of the same name, and another tenant's matches neither. (#992)
• The row records which models read the document. image_description_model and embedding_model were both omitted, so the documents page showed a synced file as parsed by nothing and embedded by nothing. (#992)

Changed

• A synced document keeps no original: a synced file's bytes live in the system it came from, and mirroring every one onto this deployment's disk to make a retry button work is a cost per corpus rather than per failure. has_file is false for these and re-running the sync is the retry - which since #990 skips everything unchanged and re-fetches exactly what has no document, so four failures out of forty cost four transfers. (#992)
• The knowledge base behind a collection is resolved once per sync rather than per file: _config_for_collection was already finding that row to read its parser settings, so one lookup now answers both questions. (#992)

[0.0.216] - 2026-08-20

A scheduled sync stops duplicating everything it has already ingested.

Fixed

• sync_mode is implemented for a connector sync. It reached exactly one argument - ingest_file's replace - and ingest_file never skips anything, so a scheduled Google Drive or S3 source re-embedded every file every night; and on the default new_only it passed replace=False, which skips the lookup, leaves the old document in place and inserts a second copy. A week of nightly syncs was seven copies of every chunk, ranked against each other in every search and each one paid for on the organization's own embedding key. skipped sat beside the loop, initialised and never incremented, which is a sync log truthfully reporting skipped=0 every night. The logic is sync_local_flow's, which had it right all along: one sync_mode column feeds both flows and a mode meaning one thing for a server directory and another for a Drive folder is the defect whatever either does alone. (#990)
• A basename no longer claims a document that names its own address. existing_document falls back from source_path to filename, so a bucket holding a/readme.md beside b/readme.md had the second key find the first key's document - equal contents skipped the second file, unequal contents deleted the first, and either way a first sync could not keep both. The fallback is narrowed rather than removed, because it is what stops a file uploaded through the browser and later synced from its own folder being duplicated: an upload stores its filename as its source_path, so the two agree and it stays reachable by name. Same collision fixed for two local files of one name in different directories. (#990)
• A replacement inserts before it deletes. insert_document is where the embeddings are computed, so a provider refusing between the two statements left the collection holding neither document - permanently, since a failed ingest is returned rather than raised and nothing retries it. This order fails the recoverable way instead. (#990)
• A replaced file is counted as an update. The connector loop reported every success as a first ingestion and passed no updated to complete_sync, so the sync history read zero updates forever - unnoticed, because the mode that replaces was unreachable. Read off replaced_document_id rather than off the result's own sentence. (#990)

Changed

• Where a sync decides differs between the two flows, because remote bytes cost something: update_only skips a file it has never seen before the download, while an unchanged file is recognised after one and before the embedding. A stored document with no content_hash is re-ingested rather than assumed current - skipping a file that may have changed is the answer nothing later corrects. (#990)

[0.0.215] - 2026-08-20

Which sync connectors come after Google Drive and S3, and who ends up able to read what one ingests.

Documentation

• A source's reach, and who decides it. A sync source ingests into exactly one collection, access is decided at the collection, and there is no per-document isolation inside one - so everything a source reads becomes readable by everyone who can read that collection. The two halves of that reach are not equally reliable: config narrows it but is a row field anyone with collections:edit can widen, while the credential's own permissions are a ceiling nothing in the product can raise. Hence the rule - scope the credential, not just the config. (#938)
• Mirroring each source's ACLs and filtering at retrieval is decided against, with the reasons written down so it is not proposed again as an obvious win: there is no identity map between an Entra or Atlassian principal and an organization_members row, a permission changed in the source is invisible until the next sync so a mirrored ACL is stale authorization, and a crawler has no ACL at all. (#938)
• The connector list is cut and ordered: #990 first, because every connector below names a change signal and the sync path consults none; then a web crawler (#984), SharePoint and OneDrive (#985), Confluence (#986), a git repository's documentation (#987), and Azure Blob and GCS only once S3Connector is an object store rather than an S3 one (#988). Notion is decided against for now - MCP covers Notion-as-a-tool - and Slack and email archives stay off, because a conversation retrieves badly and the channel integrations already put an agent in Slack. (#938)
• What a new connector owes is stated alongside: a change signal named in the docstring, a credential scoped where the source is created, and a file count somebody has thought about while reading a collection's listing is still a full scan (#27). (#938)

Fixed

• The page no longer states the local sync's behaviour as the rule for both. sync_mode's hash comparison and skip counters exist in sync_local_flow and nowhere else; a connector sync implements none of it, which is #990 - filed severity high, and found reviewing this change. (#938)
• create_source's docstring stopped claiming its secret fields are Fernet-encrypted, which has been untrue since #937 deleted app/core/crypto.py. (#938)

[0.0.214] - 2026-08-20

The sandbox and connector service contracts are typed.

Changed

• A sandbox service returns the schema its route declares. Every route named a response_model and the service handed back a dict[str, Any] for FastAPI to validate into it, so the service→route contract was a mapping the type checker could not read and a renamed key was a 500 rather than a red ty run. runtime_catalog, local_service, store_local_credential, probe_policy, policy, sessions, session_events and session_usage all answer models now. _read keeps dict[str, Any] and is the only one left in the module, with a docstring saying why: it is sandboxd's answer, not ours. (#562)
• A connector's CONFIG_SCHEMA is dict[str, ConnectorConfigField] - the model that described it at the API edge is now its own type, so a misspelled key is a type error where it is written. type is a Literal of the four widgets the wizard draws, mirrored in rag-api.ts; its fall-through is a text input, so a connector inventing a fifth got a field the form collects wrongly with nothing reporting it. label is required, since it is what the form draws. (#562)
• The four sandbox_workspace.py helpers that read a stored workspace say FileData - the backend library's own type, which StateBackend.__init__ has always been annotated with. _get_s3_client gained the return type it never had. (#562)

Fixed

• usage_report.py reads sampled.memory_bytes, not sampled.get("memory_bytes"). Those two keys are the whole of what a usage footer shows for a container, and they were unchecked in the one place a rename reads as a missing number rather than an error. (#562)
• A session's tenant label is dropped where the filter reads it, rather than by every caller remembering to. It is another organization's id when the session is theirs; the listing schema has always said it is absent, and now one place makes that true. (#562)

Documentation

• docs/howto/add-rag-source.md is removed. It was docs/howto/add-sync-connector.md a second time, adjacent to it in the nav, and stale in the same pre-#937 way: a credential inside CONFIG_SCHEMA, list_files(self, config) with no credential parameter, and a closing tip that per-source credentials are stored per sync source in the database. It also told the reader to edit the generator's post_gen_project.py. (#562)
• The connector walkthrough teaches the credential model it has had since #937: SECRET_KIND, a credential argument, no fallback, and a validate_config that checks the shape of what was typed because it does not see the credential. Its CLI and API examples name flags and fields that exist. docs/patterns.md and two app/rag/connectors/ paths in docs/architecture.md and docs/howto/configure-sync-sources.md went the same way. (#562)

[0.0.213] - 2026-08-20

Both RAG pages get tabs, and the tab is in the URL.

Changed

• Integrations is /rag's third tab. ReusableIntegrations sat under the base grid - the right relationship, since the collections are fed from it, and the wrong placement: on an organization with a dozen bases it was below a grid three rows deep, and reachable only from the Knowledge bases tab, which makes a page-level concern something you find by first choosing one of two tabs. (#939)
• A knowledge base has three tabs - Documents, How documents are read, Sync sources. Each section carried a comment justifying its place under the one above, and each argument was about reading order on a first visit, which is not where somebody returns to: adjusting a parser meant scrolling past every document. The stats strip and the override banner stay above the tabs, because they describe the collection rather than any one section. (#939)
• Both pages carry ?tab=, read through the SSR-aware useUrlState rather than a useState initializer touching window - which renders one value on the server and another in the browser, so the default tab flashed before the named one arrived. A link can name a section and a reload keeps it. (#939)
• The onboarding walk selects a tab before spotlighting what is inside it. Four steps gained activate; without it a stop waits four seconds for an element that never mounts. (#939)

Fixed

• Each tab shows only its own section. The base list rendered for every value that was not search, so choosing Integrations appended the panel below the grid rather than replacing it - the placement the tab exists to escape. (#939)
• A tab's panel lives inside its Tabs root, on both RAG pages. A TabsTrigger points at its panel with aria-controls, and a root that closed after the trigger list left those references dangling and the visible section with no role="tabpanel". Pre-existing on /rag; fixed there too. (#939)

[0.0.212] - 2026-08-20

The RAG dialogs: a real editor for a model prompt, one width scale, and a mark on each parser.

Changed

• The image-description prompt is a MarkdownEditor. It is a model prompt, several sentences long, and it was a bare three-row textarea - while the product already has the control for that, the one the Builder uses for an agent's instructions, an exposure prompt and a capability's generated form. The editor gained maxLength so the swap did not quietly drop the hard cap: a field whose length the API refuses should not let somebody write past it and find out on submit. IngestionSettings is embedded whole in the create dialog, so both dialogs get it. (#940)
• The four RAG dialogs agree on a width scale. The same IngestionSettings was given 768px in two of them and 512px in the one that also carries four fields above it - not a judgement call but a disagreement, since nobody had decided and each had picked. src/lib/dialog-widths.ts holds the three sizes with the rule on each, so the create dialog is no longer the narrowest thing holding the widest form. (#940)
• Each PDF parser choice draws a mark. Three lines of text where every other picker in the product draws one. Only LlamaParse is a product, so it takes LlamaIndex's own mark - a row in scripts/gen-brand-icons.ts, generated, never a hand-authored path - and PyMuPDF and liteparse take a lucide icon rather than one row getting special treatment and two getting blanks. (#940)

[0.0.211] - 2026-08-20

The last second mechanism for secrets at rest is gone.

Upgrading

A sync source's credential is no longer a config field. Migration 0042 handles it, and it is not silent:

• A source holding an encrypted credential has it removed from config and is named in the migration's output. Nothing readable is lost - the value was a Fernet token over SECRET_KEY, and the release that could read it is the one being replaced - and leaving it would leave a credential at rest under a deployment-wide key, which is the whole point of the change. Each named source then has no credential and refuses to sync until one is attached.
• Add the credential to the organization's Vault - a gcp_service_account for Drive, an aws_credentials pair for S3, both now offered under a new Document source group - and point each source at it.
• A source with no organization stops the upgrade. sync_sources.organization_id is NOT NULL now, and anything rag-source-add created before #707 has none. Set it or delete the row, then upgrade.
• API callers posting service_account_json, access_key_id or secret_access_key under config get a 400 naming the field. rag-source-add takes --secret-id.

Changed

• A sync source references a vault secret by id. sync_sources.config held the credential, encrypted by app/core/crypto.py: one deployment-wide Fernet key over every tenant's secret, which is the weakness the vault exists to remove and the one place CLAUDE.md's "there is no second mechanism" was untrue. That module is deleted. config now says only how to find the documents, and each connector declares the kind of credential it takes. A credential is added once and reused - five collections fed from one Drive folder used to mean the same JSON pasted five times and rotated in five places - and it appears on the Vault page like everything else. (#937)
• The sync wizard asks for a credential as its own step, offering the organization's matching secrets and linking to the Vault when there are none. It distinguishes a vault that holds nothing from one that could not be read. (#937)
• app/worker/background/rag.py is deleted. Its three in-process handlers had no caller in app/ at all, and the connector interface change made them uncompilable. IngestionService.from_settings went with them. (#959)

Fixed

• Binding a sync credential checks that the binder can see it. A secret can be private to a member, and a sync runs for everyone who can reach the collection - so binding one is lending it. A Builder with connections:manage but shared-only secret visibility could post the id of another member's private credential and have the worker unseal it. The row now goes through resolve_access(..., Perm.SECRETS_VIEW, resource_type=SECRET), refused in the same words as an id that does not exist so the refusal cannot enumerate the vault - the same fix #918 made for embedding keys. (#937)
• A nullable sync-source column can be cleared. The repository skipped every None, so {"secret_id": null} answered 200 and left the old credential attached, and a source that recovered kept its previous last_error. (#937)

[0.0.210] - 2026-08-20

rag-source-add accepted any collection name, including another tenant's.

Fixed

• rag-source-add refuses a collection it cannot legally own. The command wrote a caller-supplied collection name straight into a sync_sources row without asking whether it was a legal identifier, whether a knowledge base of that name existed, or whose it was - while the HTTP route for the same thing asks all three, for the reason its docstring gives: "a sync writes into the collection, so pointing one at another tenant's is an injection, not a read". The name's shape is now judged in create_source, so the route and the CLI share one rule and a name no table can be called is refused where it enters rather than failing later in a worker. Ownership is answered in the command, which is the only place that knows who is asking. (#707)
• The rows the command creates have an organization. create_source was called without one and the column is nullable, so every source the CLI ever made was org-less - while the model's docstring opens "Belongs to an organization". The organization now comes from the collection's own knowledge base, which is also step 1 of #937: converging sync_sources.config onto the vault needs an owner to bind a ciphertext to. (#707)
• A personal collection is refused, not just another organization's. A personal knowledge base carries the organization's id too, so "same tenant" is not ownership: writable_kb lets only its owner write to one. Accepted, it would have pointed an organization-owned sync source at a member's private collection, which every member holding connections:manage can see and trigger. An app-scoped base is refused for the mirror reason - it belongs to the deployment and takes an app admin. (#707)
• A refused rag-source-add exits non-zero. error is click.secho and nothing more, so a command that printed a refusal and returned exited 0 and a shell script carried on as though the source had been created. (#707, and #972 for the other 23 call sites across app/commands/)

Changed

• rag-source-add requires --org. A script calling it without one now gets click's usage error instead of creating an org-less row pointed at a collection that may not exist or may be another tenant's. Existing rows are untouched; moving them is #937's business. docs/commands.md and docs/howto/configure-sync-sources.md carry the flag in all three documented invocations. (#707)

[0.0.209] - 2026-08-20

A chat attachment was refused by a 10 MiB limit no operator could see or raise.

Added

• CHAT_MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB, default 10 - what may be attached in chat, and a different setting from the knowledge base's MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB rather than the same one. A knowledge-base document is chunked, embedded and read back through retrieval; an attachment to an agent with no workspace is pasted whole into the prompt, so the same size fails differently on each surface and one ceiling cannot be right for both. The default is what the hardcoded limit already enforced, so nothing changes on upgrade except that it can now be raised. GET /health publishes both ceilings, because a client that reads one cannot know the other. (#498)

Fixed

• The chat upload limit is a setting rather than a literal. Three numbers claimed to be it and they disagreed: MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE (10 MiB in file_storage.py) was what refused, MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB (50) was what /health published and what RAG ingestion used, and the frontend defaulted its own check to
• So a 20MB attachment passed the client check, was read into memory, crossed the wire in full and came back refused by a number that appeared in no configuration file - while frontend/README.md told the operator to keep the client value "at or below the backend's", which was advice they could not follow. (#498)
• The whole-request body ceiling follows the largest upload limit, not the first one. BodySizeLimitMiddleware is global and derived its cap from MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB alone, so a chat limit configured above the knowledge base's would have been unreachable - a 413 before the code that enforces it ran. It now takes the largest of the three, including the embed ceiling, which is the smallest today and would have been the same latent defect for whoever raised it next. (#498)
• A sonner mock in chat-input.test.tsx was never reset, so a toast asserted in one test was still recorded in the next one asserting none. Found because it would have made a new test lie. (#498)

Changed

• The composer's own ceiling is NEXT_PUBLIC_CHAT_MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB, defaulting to 10 and named for its surface. It was MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB defaulting to 50 - and it is the only reader of that value in the frontend, so it was already the chat limit by usage with the wrong number in it. The three compose files, the frontend Dockerfile, .env.example and the vercel-deploy recipe all named the old variable; each now passes the configured value through. An operator setting NEXT_PUBLIC_MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB must rename it, or the composer silently takes the 10MB default. (#498)
• Four pages described the old split - configuration.md, channels.md, architecture.md and file-processing.md - and each now names the setting for the surface it describes. file-processing.md's "Size Limits" sits under a chat heading and led with the knowledge base's number; it leads with the chat one now. (#498)

[0.0.208] - 2026-08-20

Ingesting one changed file read the whole collection four times.

Changed

• One document lookup, one scan, both answers. Three lookups walked the same document listing with three predicates - source_path-then-filename, content hash, and two public methods each projecting one field from the first - and every one of them read the whole collection. So ingesting a changed file in new_only mode read it four times (the sync asked for an id, then a hash, and ingest_file asked for both again) and an unchanged one twice; it is now once for the sync's decision and once inside the ingest. Both sync callers, the worker flow and rag-sync in the CLI, did the identical two-call dance and now do one. (#566)
• The id and the hash come back together, so they cannot disagree. IngestionService.existing_document answers with a frozen StoredDocument carrying both, and find_existing / get_existing_hash are gone rather than kept as wrappers. While the two were computed separately they could name different documents - the id lookup checked every document for a source_path match before falling back to filename while the hash lookup interleaved the two - so a sync compared a live file's hash against a different document's and either re-embedded an unchanged file every night or skipped a changed one as current. That was fixed in #548; a caller that cannot ask for one answer without the other cannot write it again. (#566)
• docs/file-processing.md states the precedence, the read count, and that a store which cannot answer the listing is treated as "no match" - a failed query is not evidence a document is absent, and acting as though one were present would delete it. (#566)

[0.0.207] - 2026-08-20

The two addresses an upload can arrive at answered with different shapes.

Fixed

• Both upload routes serialize RAGIngestResponse identically. POST /rag/collections/{name}/ingest carried response_model_exclude_none=True and POST /kb/{kb_id}/documents did not - same schema, same operation, both feeding the same upload UI. document_id is str | None and is None on every accepted upload, because the vector store's id does not exist until the worker has indexed the file, so one address omitted the key and the other sent it as null: a client normalising the answer got a different shape depending on which it had called. The flag is gone rather than added to the other route - null is the honest answer, the id is pending rather than absent, and it was the only use of response_model_exclude_none in the tree. No client is affected: nothing in the frontend reads document_id from an upload response. (#560)

Changed

• docs/file-processing.md names both upload addresses and says they answer 202 with every field of the schema, "document_id": null included. (#560)

[0.0.206] - 2026-08-20

Storing a long document's chunks cost one database round trip per chunk.

Changed

• A document's chunks are written a batch of rows to a statement, not one statement each. insert_document issued one INSERT per chunk in a Python loop inside one open transaction, so at the default chunk_size of 512 a 200-page PDF was one to three thousand sequential asyncpg round trips: a second or two on a local socket, five to fifteen seconds against a managed Postgres at 3-5ms - spent holding a connection while it waited. The rows now go 200 at a time through an executemany, which asyncpg pipelines. The statement itself is unchanged, ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE included, and it still behaves per row: a re-ingest of an unchanged document updates its rows rather than duplicating them. (#950)
• Each batch's rows are built where its statement runs. Batching the statements alone would have bounded what asyncpg receives while leaving the worker's memory where it was: the embedding is rendered as text in these rows, tens of kilobytes each at 3072 dimensions, so materialising a three-thousand-chunk document first meant better than 100MB of live strings on top of the float vectors already in hand - an OOM kill rather than a slow ingest. 200 rather than one statement per document is the same reason. (#950)
• docs/file-processing.md says how many round trips storing a document costs and why the batch is bounded, in the chunking section where chunk_size is set. (#950)

[0.0.205] - 2026-08-20

Ingesting a large batch of documents exhausted the worker's database connections, and the failure that followed could not be recorded.

Fixed

• Every vector store the ingestion worker builds is disposed with the work that built it. PgVectorStore.__init__ creates a pooled SQLAlchemy engine, and the three flows in app/worker/tasks/rag_tasks.py each built one and disposed none. One flow runs per uploaded document, so two hundred uploads meant two hundred pooled engines abandoned in one worker process, each holding its checked-in connections until the process exited - and somewhere short of a hundred documents the worker reached max_connections, after which every query raised, including the ones that would have marked a document failed. The symptom was an upload stuck at processing with a connection error in a log nobody reads, indistinguishable from four other failure modes. Two further paths went with it: _run_sync built its store before validating the path, so the cheapest refusal - "path not found" - leaked a pool, and _ingestion_service_for built the store before the processor, so a collection asking for a parser this build cannot provide left a pool no finally could reach. (#948)
• A store built for one request is closed when the request ends. get_vectorstore reads the store the lifespan built and, when there is none, builds one - and there is none whenever that construction failed, because the lifespan logs "Vector store will not be available" and carries on serving. A degraded deployment therefore answered every knowledge-base request by building a pooled engine and abandoning it, at request rate. The lifespan's own store is passed through untouched: it belongs to the process. (#948)
• The knowledge capability's store is released at shutdown, and the channel consumers stop before either store is disposed. The capability holds a process-wide store built on the first search an agent runs, reachable from no request, so the lifespan's aclose never saw it. Disposing it while the Telegram, Slack and Mattermost polling loops were still turning raced a search in flight and let the next one rebuild a pool nothing was left to close, so the three stop loops now run first. (#948)

Changed

• docs/file-processing.md states the rule for all three stores - the worker's per flow, the request's, and the capability's per process - and says what to look for when ingestion starts failing part-way through a large batch. Pooling within one flow is kept deliberately: a document's chunks are written over that connection, and a flow runs in one event loop. (#948)

[0.0.204] - 2026-08-20

Every knowledge base in the product reported nothing indexed, however many documents had finished ingesting.

Fixed

• A collection's indexed count filters on the status the pipeline writes. counts_by_collection counted rows whose status was "completed", and nothing has ever written that value: an upload creates a row processing and the pipeline moves it to done or error, which is what the model default, docs/file-processing.md and the frontend's status map all say. The FILTER clause therefore could not match a row, so indexed_count was 0 on every knowledge base and a collection where everything succeeded read as entirely unindexed. The literal is now an enum: DocumentStatus sits beside the column in app/db/models/rag_document.py - the shape RunStatus, AgentStatus and InvitationStatus already take - and the writer (RAGDocumentService) and the reader name the same member rather than two strings free to drift. rag_document_repo.create and update_status take DocumentStatus instead of str, so the next typo is a type error rather than a count that silently reports nothing. (#148)

Changed

• docs/file-processing.md says the three status values are the DocumentStatus members and that the indexed count filters on done, so a reader of that table knows where the vocabulary lives.

[0.0.203] - 2026-08-19

A Member could pay for a collection's embeddings with another member's private key by supplying its id.

Fixed

• Binding an embedding key checks that the chooser can see it. KnowledgeBaseService._check_embedding_secret looked the chosen key up scoped only to the organization and never ran the caller's own secret-view check, so a Member with collections:edit who supplied the UUID of another member's private vault key bound a key secrets:view would have refused them — and the collection's embeddings then billed it, for everyone who can write the collection. The picker only ever offered keys the chooser can see, which is not a check: the API takes an id and an id is guessable. The fetched row now goes through resolve_access(..., Perm.SECRETS_VIEW, resource_type=SECRET), exactly as the agent secret bindings already did, and a key the caller cannot view is refused as one the vault does not hold — so the refusal cannot enumerate somebody else's private secrets. Creation is the only path that binds one: KnowledgeBaseUpdate carries no embedding_secret_id. (#918)

Changed

• docs/file-processing.md says binding needs secrets:view, and why — binding a key is lending it. The page listed the two refusals creation already made, another organization's key and the wrong purpose, so a reader acting on it would have expected collections:edit alone to be enough. (#918)

[0.0.202] - 2026-08-19

One test-only release: a catch the frontend suite reported as covered had never run.

Fixed

• The onboarding resume stash is tested against the storage the code reaches. Node 22+ ships its own sessionStorage — enabled on v26.3.0 — which shadows jsdom's, so vi.spyOn(Storage.prototype, "getItem") patched a different object than takeStashedFlow called: getItem never threw, the test passed through the raw === null early return, and the catch at resume.ts:45 never ran. It read as covered in CI and as uncovered under make test-frontend-cov on a newer Node. vitest.setup.ts now normalizes sessionStorage the way it already did localStorage (one StorageMock, installed on both globalThis and window), and both throw-path tests spy the instance and assert an outcome only the catch produces — a stashed flow that comes back null, a write that left nothing stored — so a spy that misses fails loudly instead of silently uncovering the branch. No product code changed. (#919)

[0.0.201] - 2026-08-19

An agent is configured in one place, a deployment can brand and close itself, and a run says what it actually handed its model. Twenty findings from the review round on the same pull request are in here too — the most serious of them a one-use invitation link that admitted accounts without bound.

Added

• The Toolbox is where an agent is configured. Context files, collections and skills are picked inside the capability that reads them, on the panel's own first tab, which the panel opens on; the Knowledge and Skills tabs are gone and Skills is a capability with a switch like every other. Settings and Tools are two tabs, so a six-field form and a tool description that is a paragraph stop sharing one scroll, and the workspace's and delegation's own controls moved inside the card that names them. The "Charts is on" card is gone: its switch is on the panel's title row, where it renders whether or not the capability is granted. (#914)
• Image generation asks for a provider and a model, both from the server: whether a provider can draw is supported_native_tools() on the SDK's model class, and which models it offers is app/core/catalog/image_models.json, with a sentence per model. A model released this morning is one catalog entry. (#914)
• A deployment has its own identity, access policy and notices, edited from /admin/settings by whoever holds is_app_admin — one row guarded by a unique constraint on a column constrained to true, so a second identity is an IntegrityError rather than a deployment that quietly has two. Name, tagline, description, logo and favicon reach the sidebar, the sign-in header, the browser tab, the OpenGraph card, the PWA manifest, the iOS touch icon and every email the deployment sends; signup_mode (open / invite_only / closed) and an email-domain allow-list decide who may register; an announcement and a maintenance window that actually closes the API. docs/deployment.md is the page. Migration 0037.
• Two ceilings a deployment can set: organizations per account and agents per organization, both null by default, and null is no limit rather than "not configured". Every transition into the counted state is checked, not only a create, and the count is taken under a transaction-scoped advisory lock — read and acted on without one, two requests both pass it and both write. Migration 0039.
• A run records what it handed its model. None of it is derivable afterwards: the prompt is the spec's instructions plus the platform's, plus a channel binding's, plus the bound skills, plus whichever reminder fired, and the tools are the registry plus the organization's MCP servers minus whatever tool search hid. RecordingModel wraps the model the agent was built with and writes down each request as it passes; GET /runs/{id}/manifest reads it back under the transcript's authorization, and a second tab on the run drawer renders it with the requests as bars. A table rather than a column on agent_runs, provider passthrough never recorded, and the write guarded and in a SAVEPOINT. Migration 0038.
• A run is read beside the list rather than over it, in two full-height panes, with the thread folded by run and only the run being read open. Stepping between runs is a cache hit and leaves the timeline standing, and the arrow keys do what the buttons do.
• A turn's attachments are on the run timeline, openable. MessageRead has carried files since attachments existed; the timeline rebuilt its argument field by field and lost them, along with the per-turn model, token split, cost and context size. "The agent answered badly" and "the agent was handed a scan with no text layer" are the same transcript until somebody can look at the file. They open through the shared FileViewer, addressed through the run — GET /runs/{run_id}/files/{file_id}, authorized as the transcript is — because /files/{id} is scoped to the uploader and a run review is not. (#914)
• Publishing mints a version; deploying it is a separate decision. An environment says whether a publish moves it: pinned waits to be promoted onto and tracks_latest follows, which is what a dev somebody is iterating in wants. Existing environments become pinned, so an author fixing a prompt no longer changes what the live Slack bot answers with in the same action. Migration 0040.
• The version history pages and reads as a timeline, MCP servers have a tab of their own, and a context file is created and edited the way a skill is.
• A registration can prove itself with an invitation token. A shareable link with neither an address nor a domain is a real, documented shape and an address-based query cannot see one, so closing sign-up silently un-invited everybody holding one. UserCreate takes an invitation_token, and holding it is the proof; registering with one does not accept the invitation, which still needs a session. The console carries it across the redirect that lost it, and across the provider round trip in the session. A link with a max_uses reserves capacity for the registering address, because acceptance happens later. (#916, #914) Migration 0041.

Fixed

• A new conversation showed no agent until a reload. The listing was fetched at the one moment the server is guaranteed to answer "nobody answered here yet", and nothing asked again. (#909)
• Every wrong-method request answered 500 instead of 405, on every route, so an unauthenticated caller could make the server log a traceback on any path. OpenTelemetry's FastAPI instrumentation reads .path unguarded in its Match.PARTIAL branch — which is "path matches, method does not" — and the latest published version has the same line, so app/core/otel_compat.py supplies the fallback upstream missed and a test fails when they fix it. With it, HTTPException stopped answering {"detail": …}: one StarletteHTTPException registration, forwarding the exception's headers, because Allow is what makes a 405 useful. (#917)
• A streaming turn drew as four turns — the grouping written for exactly that keyed on the stored runId, which a turn still streaming does not have.
• The double scrollbar was the document's, and it could not scroll. An absolutely positioned descendant with no positioned ancestor was inflating it; position: relative on main contains them.
• The dark theme was darker than its numbers. OKLCH lightness is perceptual, so a 14% page renders #07090c — black on black, with a 1.05:1 step between a page and its cards. Every contrast claim in globals.css was re-measured.
• Every avatar drew 12px initials whatever its size, because the fallback carried its own font-size and beat the one it inherited.
• A settings write was not readable in the request that made it. Uploading a logo answered logo_version: null for a logo it was already serving the bytes of: the identity map returned the instance set_image had already loaded.
• A one-use invitation link admitted unlimited accounts. used_count counts acceptances and acceptance needs a session, so on an invite_only deployment every registration read a ceiling nothing had yet moved. A use is reserved for the registering address before the account exists, atomically; accepting moves the address into the count, so somebody who registered through a one-use link can still join. (#914)
• The provider button refused exactly the invitations that need a token. invite_only accepted somebody through the password form and refused the same person through Google beside it. (#914)
• Three writes ran ahead of the transaction that authorised them: the maintenance verdict pushed to Redis before the commit, so a failed disable reopened the deployment for up to the cache TTL, and a replaced or cleared image's bytes deleted before it, so a rollback left the row pointing at a file that was gone. (#914)
• A logo replaced twice in one second kept the first for a year — the cache-busting token was the row's timestamp truncated to a second, and the address carries immutable. (#914)
• A maintenance window never reached an already-open tab, in either direction: the branding context is resolved once by the root server layout, so a non-admin was left on a dashboard answering 503 to everything with nothing saying why, and closing the window left a tab on the maintenance screen. The notice endpoint carries the verdict now. (#914)
• The announcement banner could take the dashboard down. localStorage throws where site data is blocked, and it is read inside useSyncExternalStore — during render, for every signed-in user. (#914)
• A run reviewer could see a colleague's attachments and open none of them, and a streamed request that failed left no entry in the run manifest — on the path where a provider refusal usually surfaces. The manifest's advertised 512 KB ceiling was not one either: the last trimming stage returned without measuring. (#914)
• Every version picker offered the newest fifty of however many there are, so an agent published more than fifty times could not be repinned to an older version, and a row clicked on a later page of the history selected an id the comparison dropdown did not hold. (#914)
• Arrow keys on the run detail's tab strip stepped between runs, because the window listener never asked whether the focused control had already answered the key. (#914)
• A stored image spec stopped being constructible. ImageGenerationConfig.model used to be one prefixed string, so a version published before this release failed at construction rather than at publish. (#914)
• Vertex AI was offered for drawing and could not be configured — its model class draws, but the capability seals an API key where Vertex wants a service account. Being able to draw and being configurable are two questions. (#914)
• An untouched image binding showed two blank pickers for a configuration that would draw with OpenAI's first model, and a dropped page.html became a Markdown file called page. (#914)
• A read-only Builder could work the panel's capability switch — the one control disabled had to leave live, because that prop meant both "the capability is off" and "you may not edit". (#914)

Changed

• closed says what it does. There is deliberately no administrator-creates-an-account path — an account needs a password its owner chose, so adding somebody means opening registration to them, which is what invite_only is. The setting text, the refusal and the page say so rather than promising a flow that does not exist. (#914)
• The admin conversation browser is retired, and the cross-tenant read with it.
• The model fallbacks are data, and their context windows are the library's.
• A chat attachment's bytes are served from one place (_chat_file_bytes.py), so what a browser may display does not depend on which route authorized the read. (#914)

[0.0.200] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• A connector's refusal names the field it is about. The protocol was tuple[bool, str | None] — a flag and a sentence — so a per-field refusal raised inside a connector could not survive the return, and the wizard's configure step took no error prop at all. Both halves are done: the protocol carries the field, the service roots it against the posted document, and the step marks the input the server named and returns to it, since submission happens two steps later and a mark on an invisible field says nothing. (#897)
• A refusal is marked or announced, not both. The wizard's mutations no longer toast what the form is already showing beside the input it belongs to. (#897)
• An abandoned submission cannot steer the wizard that replaced it. Dismiss the dialog while a create is pending, reopen it, and the old refusal used to send the new session back to a step whose connector had been reset — a blank dialog caused by a form the reader had already left. Each opening is its own session now; a superseded answer is said and touches nothing else. Blocking dismissal while submitting was the alternative and would have trapped a reader behind a hung request. (#897)
• Both write paths refuse the same way. create_source carried its own copy of the validate-and-raise; it goes through the same helper as clone and update, so the two cannot drift apart again. (#897)
• A refused model id is no longer posted back. details is serialized into the response body and written to the log line beside it, so refusing a bare OpenRouter id sent the caller's own submission into the deployment's logs. It names the model field now and the id is gone. (#898)
• Two provider refusals name the input they are about. "This provider is keyless so it needs an endpoint" and "this provider needs a key" both answered with the provider, which is neither base_url nor secret_id — so the sentence arrived with nothing marked. (#898)
• A stale key refusal is cleared when the key changes. Both routes to a new key only set the value, so the sentence survived under a key the reader had already replaced — a refusal that accuses the current value is worse than none. (#898)
• The mark and its reason are associated. The model combobox announced "invalid" to a screen reader and never why; it goes through the same FormField the endpoint already used, so the bespoke invalid prop that would have been a second convention is gone. (#898)

[0.0.199] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• The storage-root check is a barrier the query actually applies. 0.0.184 rewrote it into the realpath + startswith idiom py/path-injection models and closed one of the three alerts it claimed; #14 and #15, both sinks in LocalFileStorage.load, survived on main for thirteen releases. The idiom was right and the shape was wrong: the query clears a normalised path only where the startswith call alone decides the branch, and the check was written if candidate != base and not candidate.startswith(prefix). Falling through A and B proves neither conjunct, so the guard never applied. The root is answered in its own branch above, leaving startswith as the whole condition of its own — same refusals, same message, same tests. Established by running CodeQL 2.26.3 with codeql/python-queries over this tree rather than by predicting it: two results before, none after. (#903)
• What 0.0.184 claimed about those alerts is corrected in its own entry, so a reader who goes looking there finds what happened rather than the claim. (#903)

Added

• A test that fails if the containment check stops being one condition. It reads _resolve_safe_path's AST and asserts the startswith call is the whole test of its branch — the property 0.0.184 lost, which every behavioural test in the file passed straight through. It pins the shape; only CodeQL answers the verdict, and the pull request's own scan is where that is read. (#903)

[0.0.198] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• Eighteen refusals that name a field now mark it. They answered with a singular details={"field": "<name>"}, and the frontend reads the plural shape and FastAPI's own detail and nothing else — so a mistyped model endpoint, a blocked MCP server URL and a spec YAML that would not parse each delivered a sentence to a toast and left every input unmarked. The same defect 0.0.195 fixed for details["errors"], in the third shape it deliberately did not touch. refused_field takes the sentence once, so the envelope's copy and the field's cannot drift apart. (#891)
• A sandbox probe's 404 stopped blaming the address. It is the one failure the two callers of _get_json do not share — a session that ended, versus a service with no such endpoint — so naming base_url for both would have put "Sandbox session not found" under the operator's Address box: confidently wrong where it had been merely vague. (#891)

Changed

• The rules that teach how to write a refusal name the helper. .claude/rules/exceptions-security.md and docs/patterns.md still taught {"field": "base_url"} as the way to name a field a refusal is about, and never mentioned app/core/field_errors.py — so this change would have removed the shape from the code and left the instruction to recreate it, which is exactly how assistant.py and UserRole outlived their own deletion. (#891)

[0.0.197] - 2026-08-18

The e2e job stopped stalling for twenty-five minutes on an apt mirror.

Fixed

• Nothing was cancelling those jobs. GitHub records a job it ends on its own timeout-minutes as cancelled rather than as a failure, and a cancelled required check is not a pass the way a skipped one is — so the merge stayed blocked on a diff that was fine. Across 300 runs, 15 jobs ended that way, and the jobs API names the same step in fourteen of them: Install Playwright browsers. --with-deps shells out to apt-get, the runner's mirror answers Ign for every index, and apt stops dead on the fallback — 22 minutes of silence. The flag bought nothing: on a healthy run every library Chromium links against is already the newest version, and the 21 MB it does install is fonts no spec renders. It is gone, and the full suite still passes. (#879)
• A stall now fails the step that stalled, by name. Step-level bounds sit under the job's, so a residual hang says which step rather than ending the job at its outer limit with no explanation. test_ci_workflow.py refuses any step that installs system packages, so the flag cannot come back quietly. (#879)

Changed

• make coverage-all runs across worker processes, like test and test-fast already did. It was the one suite still single-process, which is what made 25 minutes reachable on a slow runner: 14m46s of a job for a number that does not gate anything. Measured on the branch's own run, the step went from 4m31s to 2m41s, and Install Playwright browsers from 70s to 1s. (#879)

[0.0.196] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• An MCP server that writes an address nothing can dial is refused, not crashed on. httpx.InvalidURL does not subclass httpx.HTTPError, so it escaped all three catches in the OAuth flow and answered 500 — one layer further out than 0.0.190's fix could reach, because httpx refuses to build the URL before this project's validator is ever called. Discovery treats an unusable candidate as ending that candidate: a server with a broken WWW-Authenticate hint and correct well-known documents still connects. The two sites below it raise a refusal of their own. (#889)
• "Nothing can dial this" and "we will not go there" stay two different claims. The refusal for an unbuildable address is deliberately distinct from the blocked-address one, so a failure never misattributes whose fault it was. The address itself goes to the log: InvalidURL's message quotes the text it could not cast, and on this flow that text is written by the server being refused. (#889)
• create_client_registration_request is guarded at all — it sat outside the try it appeared to be inside. (#889)

[0.0.195] - 2026-08-18

A refusal that names a field marks that field.

Fixed

• A per-field refusal highlights the input it names. The forms mark an offending field from details.fields, and four refusals answered with details.errors instead — so an ingestion override, a spec import and a capability setting each showed a sentence and left every box unmarked. That is the half that says which one to fix, and it was missing from three fixes released earlier today. One module builds the shape now, reading loc and msg only, so what is left out is decided once rather than remembered at four call sites. (#882)
• A capability setting refused at publish reaches the Builder. Saving a draft does not validate a config schema, so publish is the only place a mistyped setting is refused — and the accumulator kept the message and dropped the path. Paths are qualified by capability, and by specialist where one applies, because two capabilities can hold a setting of the same name and the Builder draws a form per specialist over the same set. SchemaForm has accepted an errors prop since it was written; nothing had ever passed it. (#882)
• A field genuinely called body is no longer mistaken for FastAPI's transport marker. The two are told apart by which entry point is asking, not by the string: a spec whose top-level key is body now says so. (#882)
• The same field refused two ways answers with the same path. An upload's ingestion override and a collection's own settings both name ingestion_config.chunk_size, where only the cross-field rule used to line up. (#882)

[0.0.194] - 2026-08-18

MCP OAuth connects to the address it checked, at every hop.

Fixed

• The addresses an MCP OAuth flow reaches are pinned to what passed the check. The authorization server, token endpoint, registration endpoint and every redirect after them come from the remote server's discovery documents, not from an operator — and the validator returned a string, so the name was resolved a second time to connect and whoever controlled it decided what the second answer was. One hostile server was enough, with no operator complicity. Every request now goes to an address that passed, with the original host in the Host header and in TLS SNI, so certificate verification is unchanged. (#860)
• A redirect to a new host is re-checked rather than followed on trust, and the flow walks the hops itself so it can count them. Substitution happens inside the transport on a copy of the request, which is also what keeps a relative Location resolving against the name rather than against the pinned address. (#860)
• Every validated address is tried, not only the first. A name with several public records used to lose the rest, so an unreachable first answer — an IPv6 record in an IPv4-only network — failed the flow where an ordinary client would have moved on. Only a refused connection moves on, because that proves nothing was sent; a failure after the connection is raised, since a token grant may already have been processed. A mixed answer is still refused whole. (#860)
• An outbound proxy still works, and the notes say where the pin ends. HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY and NO_PROXY behave as they did — refusing to run when proxied would have cost a proxy-only deployment MCP OAuth entirely, in exchange for an egress control it already has. What is pinned is the address the proxy is asked to reach; TLS stays end to end either way. (#860)
• A refused hop says so without quoting the URL. The OAuth error is a fixed sentence; the address goes to the log. The catches were narrowed from ValueError to the refusal type this repository raises, so an unrelated library failure is no longer reported as "this server pointed us at a blocked address" — a confident claim about whose fault a failure was. (#860)

[0.0.193] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• The model picker stops telling an organization it has no models when the request failed. It made that claim from an array a refused or failed read degrades to [] — the ambiguity 0.0.186 fixed one element above it, on the page — and it made it in both of the picker's shapes, so an allowAdd panel also dropped its saved-model disclosure silently. A failed read now says so and offers a retry. (#863)
• And it says nothing at all while the answer is still coming. The flag behind the distinction is the query's success, which is equally false before the first answer as after a failure, so the first version of this fix showed a destructive failure panel on every cold render of the Builder — a false alarm on the ordinary path, which is worse than the wrong sentence it replaced. The hook answers with three states now, not two, and 0.0.186's page-level consumer reads the same one, so there is no second vocabulary to drift. (#863)

[0.0.192] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• A network blip no longer fails the dependency audit. pip-audit asks pypi.org once per locked distribution with no retry, so one slow answer ended the run and turned Security Scan — a required check — red on a pull request whose dependencies were fine. Every run that reaches no verdict is retried now, unconditionally: re-running a deterministic failure costs seconds and the same answer, while not re-running a transient one is the false red this fixes. (#855)
• The audit says which of four things happened, in a line a job can read. make audit ends on AUDIT: CLEAN|VULNERABLE|NETWORK|FAILED — detail, mirrored into the job summary. The exit code cannot carry that: GNU Make turns any failed recipe status into its own 2, and GitHub Actions never surfaces a step's exit code anyway — so a code was the wrong place for a verdict, whether or not make was in the way. The script keeps 0/1/75 for a human at a terminal, and docs/commands.md now says which interface delivers which. (#855)
• An audit that did not happen is never green. The verdict comes from the JSON report, which pip-audit writes on both the clean and the vulnerable path and only after every distribution has been queried — so its presence means the audit finished, whatever the process exited with. (#855)

[0.0.191] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• A hand-edited agent spec says which field is wrong. AgentSpec.from_yaml was called inline in the route expression, and a pydantic ValidationError is a ValueError but not a RequestValidationError — so every mistake in an imported spec answered 500 with no field path and left a traceback in the log, on an endpoint whose ordinary case is somebody iterating on YAML by hand. The parse moved into the service that owns the refusal: a rule broken answers 400 with the field path, YAML that will not parse answers 400 with the line and column, and a document that is not a mapping says so. (#873)
• A syntax error reports its position, never the line it read. str() on a marked YAML error includes the offending source, and the document being refused is somebody's spec — instructions, a secret_id. Neither the failing text nor the submitted values come back; a reader error with only a byte offset gets no invented position. (#873)
• Nothing is read or written before the document is judged. The parse runs first, so a refusal depends only on the caller's own text: it opens no transaction and says nothing about which agents exist. (#873)

[0.0.190] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• An ingestion override the pipeline cannot use is refused, not crashed on. An upload whose chunk_overlap is not smaller than its chunk_size was rejected by a validator whose own docstring said "the form is what says so" — and the form got a 500 with details: null, while the log took a traceback for a number somebody typed. Both upload routes answer 400 naming both settings, before the file is stored, and the submitted values are not echoed back. A collection's own settings were already correct: they arrive as a schema field, so FastAPI refuses the same pair with a 422 before the route is entered, which is now pinned by a test rather than asserted in prose. (#874)

[0.0.189] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• A blocked MCP server URL names the refusal instead of answering 500. SSRFBlockedError is a ValueError and nothing mapped it, so an operator pasting an address that resolves to a private host got "an unexpected error occurred" and left a traceback in the log as though the platform had broken. All five call sites — personal and organization, create, update and the OAuth start — answer 400 naming the url field. (#861)
• A URL with an unusable port is refused rather than validated. http://8.8.8.8:not-a-port/x used to come back as checked, to a client that could not dial it — the IP-literal branch swallowed the parse error. (#861)
• The validator stopped calling an MCP address a webhook. Its messages said "Webhook URL blocked" to somebody who had just typed a server URL, and the same text reached the browser-automation publish problem. validate_webhook_url has had no webhook caller for some time. (#861)

Caught in review of the same change, and never released: an intermediate version of the refusal caught ValueError broadly, which would have put the caller's own text — urlsplit parses the port at attribute access, so http://example.com:client_secret=abc123/mcp produces a message carrying that secret — into the 400 body. UrlRefusedError is the base for refusals written here, the catch is narrowed to it, and a parametrised test asserts that invariant so the next bare ValueError fails a test rather than reaching a response. Before any of this the malformed port answered a generic 500, so no released version put that text in a body.

• The frontend suite has deadlines it can actually meet. test-frontend went red on specs that pass in about a second alone, and the diagnosis in the issue was half right: measured over four whole-suite runs, coverage instrumentation is a 1.6x multiplier on an idle machine but 3.6x on a busy one, and the bare run failed under load too — so this was never a coverage defect, and a deadline that differed between the fast loop and the gate could not have reproduced the gate. testTimeout moves to 15s, which is 2.5x the worst duration measured under load and the figure playwright.config.ts already justifies for the same class of problem. (#862)
• The second deadline nobody had noticed. Two of the three failures in each loaded run were Testing Library's own 1s asyncUtilTimeout, not testTimeout — including one of the two specs the issue named, so raising testTimeout alone would have left the reported symptom reproducible. It goes to 5s, deliberately well under testTimeout, so an element that is never coming loses the race and the failure names it rather than blaming the test. (#862)

[0.0.188] - 2026-08-18

An approval nobody was ever asked for is refused rather than assumed.

Upgrading: an agent published with approval: required on a search or fetch its model provider executes stops running on this version, with the same sentence publish would have shown. It is deliberate. Such an agent has been running without the approval its author asked for — ApprovalGate wraps tool execution, and a provider-executed tool never reaches it — so keeping it running means keeping the bypass. Set the capability's method to a locally-run one, or drop the approval requirement, and republish.

Fixed

• A provider-executed search cannot be sold as approval-gated. web_fetch got this refusal in 0.0.182; web_research had the same shape and the same silence, with the queue staying empty while the agent searched unapproved. (#857)
• The refusal now also covers agents published before it existed. Execution loads a frozen AgentVersion and hands its spec straight to build_agent without going near validate_spec, so a publish-time check alone left every already-published agent — including every web_fetch one from 0.0.182 — bypassing indefinitely. build_agent refuses before it assembles anything, the way it already refuses an ungranted scope or a deleted secret. (#857)

Changed

• A capability declares which of its tools the provider may execute, through provider_executed on its registration, and the publish and assembly checks read that. The knowledge was a table of capability internals in the service layer, which had already gone stale once — and that staleness is exactly what #857 was. Tests now assert the declarations name tools and config fields that exist, because both halves are silent when wrong: they refuse nothing. (#857)

[0.0.187] - 2026-08-18

The product teaches itself: a first-run tour, and guided flows that build the first of each thing.

Added

• A passive walkthrough on every dashboard page, replayed by its "?". TOUR_STEPS is a registry keyed on the page, each step gated on the permission its control carries, so a walk never waits on an element a refusal never mounted. Where the completion is stored is the point: PATCH /users/me rather than a localStorage flag, so somebody who signs in on a second machine is not walked through it again. (#53)
• Guided creation flows. At the end of a walk the product offers to build the thing the page is for — an agent, a collection, a skill, an MCP connection — with a coach that spotlights one control at a time and waits for the signal that the step actually happened rather than for a click. The organization's state is frozen when a flow starts, so the steps cannot morph under the reader mid-walk. (#53)
• Three e2e specs for the tour itself, which the feature had shipped without. (#53)

Fixed

• The seeded e2e owner is marked as having finished onboarding. Without it the tour auto-opened over every spec that landed on the dashboard and, with allowClose: false, swallowed the clicks — six specs red for a reason that had nothing to do with what they were testing. (#53)
• A "?" pressed where nothing is walkable closes itself. A page that renders the header but has no steps — or whose steps a permission filters to nothing — froze the anchor with an empty list and no popover, so there was no close button and nothing ever called close(): every later "?" on any page recomputed from the stale anchor and stayed empty, leaving the button dead app-wide until a reload. (#53)
• Skip cannot loop on an answered question. With agents:edit and collections:edit but no agents:publish, the agent flow ends on the knowledge fork; stepping past the end bounced back onto the answered question and re-answered it forever. The step index is resolved against the list the flow actually produces rather than guessed at. (#53)
• Enter and Space no longer walk through the coach's guard. The freeze blocked pointer events only, so Enter in a dialog's name field submitted the form three steps early — the collection was created, the later step baselined its count after the fact, and the signal it waited for could never fire. Both keys are blocked on the guarded control, with Enter keeping its input-wide block. (#53)
• A keyboard user can finish a step. The coach card is a real dialog now — aria-modal, focus moved to it on each step, Escape to leave — and the trap cycles the card and the spotlit control, because a step that waits for a signal renders no Next button and confining Tab to the card alone would make it uncompletable. (#53)
• The coach does not offer to build what the organization already has. While the live state was still null it fell back to "this organization has nothing", so the "no published agent — build one first?" fork could appear for an organization with one and then swap away underneath the reader. (#53)

[0.0.186] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• The Builder says up front when a draft can never get a model. A member with agents:edit but not connections:manage, in an organization that has stored no model profile, could build an agent they cannot publish: the picker's "add" control is gated on a permission they do not hold, and publish is refused without a model. Nothing said so until publish failed, and then it pointed at the permission rather than at what to do. The panel now says it where the missing control would be. (#591)
• A failed profile query is no longer read as an empty organization. The hook degrades a refused /providers/model-profiles to [], and its loading flag goes false when retries are exhausted as well as when an answer arrives — so a 502 told somebody with a dozen models to go and ask an admin for one. The notice waits on the query's own success now, not on the absence of loading. (#591)
• The notice waits for the permission set before claiming the caller cannot add a model. can() answering false while the set is still loading is right for hiding a control and wrong for a sentence that tells somebody what they may not do: false there means "not known yet". (#591)

[0.0.185] - 2026-08-18

Three places where the code said something about itself that was not true.

Fixed

• EMAIL_PROVIDER=resend silently sent nothing. get_email_provider had no case "resend" and the match ended case "log" | _, so a deployment setting the value its own module docstring advertised got the development provider: every invitation, password reset and approval notice was written to a log line and returned accepted=True. Nobody found out, because every call site catches and logs. An unknown value is refused now, with the supported set in details, and ResendProvider — never reachable — is deleted rather than wired up. LOG_PROVIDER_WRITE_TO_DISK is passed through, which it never had been. (#829)
• The OAuth refusals no longer say where the server keeps its files. Two of them quoted the whole URL back, query string included, on a path whose endpoints are reached with credentials. They name the host now, or nothing where there is no host. (#840)
• A claim about who chooses an MCP OAuth URL is corrected in all four places that made it. "Bearable because an operator types the address" holds for a connection URL and a cdp_url, but not for the OAuth flow, where the authorization server, token endpoint, registration endpoint and every redirect hop come from the remote server's discovery documents — one hostile server is enough, with no operator complicity. Pinning the validated address is a transport change and is tracked in #860; what shipped here is the code and the documentation saying what is actually true. (#840)
• The written-to-disk log filename is safe by construction and unique: {timestamp}_{msg_id}.html, with the subject moved to the log line beside the path. Two messages in the same second no longer overwrite each other either. Not a traversal, despite appearances — the timestamp prefix means the first path component is never .. — and the docstring now says so rather than leaving the next reader to re-derive it. (#840)
• The ty relaxations name libraries this project actually has. They were justified by langgraph and deepagents, which never were dependencies, and by langchain, which stopped being one. (#833)

[0.0.184] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• The storage-root check is written so a static analyser can follow it — a Path.parents membership test is correct and invisible to the query, and an alert nobody can close is an alert everybody learns to ignore. (#841) Correction: this said it closed three CodeQL py/path-injection alerts. It closed one. #14 and #15 stayed open on main because the check was written as a conjunction, which is not a shape the query accepts as a barrier; fixed in 0.0.199 (#903).
• A filesystem root can be the storage root again. The rewritten check built its prefix as base + os.sep unconditionally, so with MEDIA_DIR=/ the prefix was // — which nothing under / starts with. load, delete and get_full_path all refused with "Path escapes storage root" while save carried on writing, leaving the store handing back paths it could no longer read. The separator is appended only when the root lacks one, and the comparison stays a startswith on a realpath result rather than moving to commonpath or is_relative_to: both are correct, and neither is a barrier the query models. (#841)

[0.0.183] - 2026-08-18

Chunking is ours, and langsmith is out of the image.

Changed

• The RAG pipeline splits text with its own splitters. Two classes and one method replace the LangChain tree — ten megabytes and eight transitive packages, of which the notable one was not the size: langsmith, LangChain's hosted-observability client, sat in every image built for a platform that standardised on Logfire. It was never configured and never imported by us; it arrived behind a text splitter. RecursiveCharacterSplitter is a port of the library's at 1.1.2, narrowed to the one configuration the pipeline built, and MarkdownHeaderSplitter finds the same sections and then runs the recursive splitter over each. Golden tests pin the chunk boundaries so the port cannot drift. (#158)
• The markdown strategy honours chunk_size again — it had been silently ignoring it. (#158)

Fixed

• A document's chunk count is recorded, where the only stored count was a constant 0 — which is also what made a chunking change unmeasurable, and why it had to land with the splitters rather than after them. (#147)
• Re-ingesting a document no longer counts it twice. A replacement deletes one vector document and inserts one, but every dispatch created a fresh tracking row, so the superseded row outlived its vectors and kept its chunk_count in the collection's total. The replaced row and its stored file are retired now. (#158)
• The over-size warning no longer fires at exactly the limit. A chunk of exactly chunk_size is within it. The comparison that decides the split is untouched — widening that would move every boundary in every collection already ingested, which is what the golden tests exist to prevent. (#158)

[0.0.182] - 2026-08-18

An agent can read the page its search found, and cannot be gated by a gate that would not hold.

Added

• web_fetch — a capability that reads one URL and returns the page as Markdown. web_research returns titles, URLs and snippets and nothing fetched a page, so an agent answered from the snippet and cited a page it had never opened. Its own capability rather than a second tool on web_research, because it composes with every search method — including native, where the builder returns Pydantic AI's own WebSearch and contributes no toolset of ours, so a tool added there would be missing for exactly the agents most likely to want it. "May this agent dereference whatever URL it likes" is also a different grant from "may it search": web:fetch is its own scope. (#51)
• The Builder can edit a list of strings. The generated form fell back to a text input for an array-valued property, so typing a hostname into an allowlist stored a scalar string that Pydantic then refused — leaving the field blank was the only publishable path. Arrays of strings now render as one comma-separated input; arrays of anything else still fall through. (#51)

Fixed

• A fetch the model provider runs cannot be sold as approval-gated. ApprovalGate wraps tool execution, which is the only place a call can be held, so a provider-native fetch never reaches it: under method: native there is no local tool at all, and under auto there is one only on a model with no native fetch. A binding that asked for approval and chose either got a gate that never fired — the queue stayed empty and the agent read pages nobody approved, silently. It is refused at publish now, rather than repaired by forcing the local tool: which of the two an author wants is their decision, and auto is refused alongside native because which one runs is a property of the model profile and changes without republishing. (#51)
• A domain filter matched one spelling of a name that has several. A denylist holding xn--exmple-cua.com did not stop https://exämple.com/, and getaddrinfo resolves the two identically — so the miss was a fetch rather than a failure, and the validator's ASCII-only pattern left no way to write the alias by hand. Entries are stored as the single name DNS would be asked for (lower case, no root label, IDNA-encoded with the same codec getaddrinfo uses), and every equivalent spelling reaches both the native and the local filter. (#51)
• An empty blocked_domains is no longer refused with the allowlist's error. The two fields do not mean the same thing by []: an empty allowlist allows nothing, an empty denylist denies nothing — which is exactly what null says. A spec imported from YAML or posted by an API client spelling "no denied hosts" that way was refused for saying something true. (#51)

[0.0.181] - 2026-08-18

Changed

• jsdom moves to 30.0.1 in the frontend test environment. The bump arrived without a regenerated bun.lock, so test-frontend and e2e both failed at the install step — lockfile had changes, but lockfile is frozen — before either had run a single test, which is why the red read like the major version breaking the suite. With the lock regenerated the suite is green on jsdom 30: 308 files, 4704 tests. (#850)

[0.0.180] - 2026-08-18

Fixed

• Every backendFetch route says no-store. The 44 route files under orgs/**, me/**, admin/**, sessions/** and auth/** answered with no Cache-Control at all, so the members, invitations and integrations lists refetched right after a create, invite or revoke could be served from cache — the same staleness class as #230, on the one surface the shared proxy does not cover. platformProxy already stamps the header on anything the backend left unmarked; a hand-rolled route owes the same, and now cannot forget it: every NextResponse.json goes through bffJson, which stamps no-store and leaves an explicit policy alone. The binary routes that set their own max-age keep it. (#553)

[0.0.179] - 2026-08-18

Changed

• Disconnecting an MCP server asks in the product, not in the browser. window.confirm was the lone holdout after rag, agents, skills and embeds moved to ConfirmDialog; the confirmation is now keyed on the pending connection, and a second click while the DELETE is in flight is a no-op rather than a second request. (#554)
• The two MCP dialogs left the list component. The connect/edit dialog and the tool picker move into their own modules, taking mcp-server-list.tsx from about 985 lines to 765. A pure move — the JSX is unchanged and the parent keeps its state and both handlers — with the shapes all three share extracted to a leaf module so a dialog never imports the component that renders it. (#569)

[0.0.178] - 2026-08-18

The collection page is server state again, not seven useState slots.

Changed

• useKBDetail moved onto React Query. Seven pieces of local state became qk.kb.detail(id), qk.kb.documents(id) (paged with useInfiniteQuery) and three keyed section queries, so an external mutation can invalidate the page and the two keys that were dead are live. The bespoke tenant-clearing block is gone — useTenantCacheReset's removeQueries() already covered it. A cold first-load failure stays distinct from a failed refresh: one is the page's error, the other is the last good answer under a stale banner. (#557)
• The admin query-key factories are typed to their real parameters, the dead admin.users factory is gone, and the { summary: true } discriminator went with the ratings page it distinguished against. (#558)
• The sandbox usage discriminator lives in the key, not at the call site: a listing the service sampled for per-sandbox usage is a more expensive request than one without, and the two must not share a cache entry. (#569)

Fixed

• The members table waits for the permission answer before drawing its action column, rather than drawing it and then discovering the caller may not use it. (#569)
• api/files/[id] encodes its path segment, and patchKB rethrows the way its siblings do. (#569)
• A sync source written into an unread cache now shows up. The three sections sit behind connections:manage, so a refused read leaves nothing cached while the write is still allowed — the write's second arm covers that, and now has the test to say so, along with the tenant guard on the two writes that add a row. (#569)

[0.0.177] - 2026-08-18

Changed

• Thirteen backend dependencies move up — the backend-everything-else group, at the versions the lockfile now holds: uvicorn 0.52.3, pydantic-settings 2.15.0, sqlalchemy 2.0.52, alembic 1.19.1, greenlet 3.5.5, prefect 3.8.3, llama-cloud 2.14.0, liteparse 2.13.0, boto3 1.43.73, pydantic-monty 0.0.21, and ruff 0.16.3, ty 0.0.72 and pre-commit 4.6.2 among the dev tools. Three of those resolve above the floor the group asked for, which is why they are quoted from the lock. The lockfile was resolved against the merged manifest rather than the group's own base, so Pydantic AI stays where 0.0.176 put it instead of being rolled back a release for the second time. (#838)

[0.0.176] - 2026-08-17

Changed

• Pydantic AI's floor moves to 2.30.0, with genai-prices at 0.1.2 — the agent-frameworks dependency group.
• A group bump no longer rolls the lock backwards. The bump resolved pydantic-ai-slim and pydantic-graph to 2.30.0 while main already held 2.31.0, and backend/Dockerfile installs the lockfile verbatim (uv sync --frozen), so the "upgrade" would have shipped an image with an older Pydantic AI than the one before it. Re-resolved to 2.31.0, with genai-prices at 0.1.3, and the note above the floor now names that failure rather than a version it had already outlived. (#837)

[0.0.175] - 2026-08-17

One mechanism draws every third-party mark, and 471 MB leaves the install.

Changed

• Every brand and provider mark comes from one generated glyph set. frontend/scripts/gen-brand-icons.ts fetches each mark from the set that owns it and writes 89 of them as raw path data; components/icons/glyph.tsx is the one thing that turns that data into an <svg>, so BrandIcon and ProviderIcon draw identically rather than agreeing by accident. Adding a mark is a row in the generator's table and a re-run — never an import, never a hand-authored d. Three mechanisms answered this question before, and @lobehub/icons dragged in a second copy of lucide-react besides. Each of the 89 marks was rendered from the removed packages and diffed against its glyph: 89 identical, 0 differ. (#156, #836)
• bun run analyze produces a report again. @next/bundle-analyzer is a webpack plugin and Next 16 builds with Turbopack, so every run printed "no report will be generated" and exited 0. It is next experimental-analyze now. (#156)

Added

• make lint fails on a frontend dependency nothing imports. knip, narrowed to the one question it is never wrong about, moves from bunx knip@5 to a pinned devDependency with its ignores in knip.jsonc, each carrying its reason on the line above. date-fns sat unused for months and was listed in knip's own ignores, so the report that would have found it had been told not to look. (#156)
• The frontend's OpenTelemetry spans can leave the process. The SDK registered on every boot, but no compose file, Dockerfile or CI job passed OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT through, so the spans were built and dropped in-process. The variable is passed through now, and the code says plainly what leaving it unset means. (#156)

Removed

• Four frontend dependencies — 471 MB and 290 packages off every install. react-icons and @lobehub/icons (replaced by the generated set), @next/bundle-analyzer (see above), and date-fns, which nothing imported. nanoid's four call sites all wanted a client-side id, which chat-store.ts already had; both now call clientId() in src/lib/ids.ts, keeping the non-secure-context fallback that an embedded widget on a plain-HTTP internal host depends on. node_modules goes from 1.2 GB / 1012 packages to 729 MB /
• (#156, #836)

[0.0.174] - 2026-08-17

A delegate's provider text no longer reaches the parent's transcript through a status answer.

Fixed

• check_task and wait_tasks name the exception's class, not the provider's message. Both composed their Error:, Retry N: and Outcome: lines from handle.error, which embeds the exception's own text — and a model client's message carries the failing request URL with the key still in its query string on a custom base_url. What those tools return becomes a ToolReturnPart, and a return is stored whole on purpose, so tool_retry_notice (#695) could never reach it: the key landed on a stored tool-call row, rendered in the conversation and in run history to every member who can read the run, and streamed live as tool_result. Fixed upstream in subagents-pydantic-ai 0.2.20, which composes all four lines from TaskHandle.exception; the floor here moves with it. (#819)
• The retry line leaked for delegations that eventually succeed. TaskHandle.finish clears error on completion, so the handle ends clean — but a model that polled check_task mid-retry already has the answer on a transcript row, and nothing goes back to remove it. (#819)

[0.0.173] - 2026-08-17

A dependency nothing imports is now a failing build, not a thing somebody notices by reading all 46 lines.

Added

• deptry runs in make lint, over app, cli and alembic. vulture reads the code and finds what is written but unused; deptry reads the manifest and finds what is declared but unimported. The scope is the point rather than a detail: scanning app alone called tabulate dead when cli/commands.py imports it, and removing it took the e2e seed down before a single product spec ran. A tree that ships and is not scanned is a tree whose imports do not count. (#155)

Removed

• Three distributions nothing imports. fastapi-cache2 and the eleven-line app/core/cache.py that called FastAPICache.init() on every boot — there is no @cache decorator on any route; jinja2, whose email templates are compiled ahead of time and read off disk; and the duplicate, weaker-floored python-multipart and httpx declarations. (#155)
• The try/except ImportError around rank-bm25. It guarded a case that cannot happen — hybrid retrieval fuses BM25 with the vector search and a deployment cannot choose otherwise — so the import moved to module scope. The 24 MB of numpy behind it is the price of that, taken deliberately and now recorded in the manifest. (#155)

Fixed

• anyio was imported and undeclared. app/services/rag_document.py imports it at module scope while the manifest declared it only in the dev group, so the image — built with uv sync --no-dev — was relying on Starlette to pull it in. Found by the new gate on its first run. (#155)
• The manifest says why the ones that read as dead are alive. psycopg2-binary (alembic builds a sync engine from a bare postgresql:// URL, so removing it breaks every migration), itsdangerous (Starlette signs our SessionMiddleware cookies with it), tabulate and pillow — the last two listed as zero-import in the audit and both wrong, with call sites in cli/commands.py and app/services/channels/chart_png.py. (#155)

[0.0.172] - 2026-08-17

All files answers "what is that file", not only "who is holding a copy of it".

Added

• Search and sort on the All files grid. The same useListControls + SearchInput pair the five galleries use, filtering on path, agent name and extension — .csv matches the suffix rather than the string — and ordering by name, size, modified or agent. Size and modified descend, because "what is biggest" and "what changed" are the questions those orders answer. The bound stays on screen while a filter is applied, with a line saying the filter searched only what was read: a client-side filter over a truncated listing searched a sample, and "3 results" with no caveat would claim the search was exhaustive. (#138)
• A tile is the file card every other surface draws. The three-line row is gone; the grid now uses components/files' FileCard, so a CSV looks like the same thing in the composer, the transcript and here — including the suffix and size band (CSV · 2.0 KB) that was the extension-legibility half of the issue. The line under each card carries what only this view knows: the agent holding the file, who else can see it, and the download. (#138)
• A stored text file previews its first lines, and a stored image draws itself. Both come out of the JSONB document the listing already reads, so a grid of thirty tiles is still one request: eight lines capped at 200 characters for text, and a 160×128 data: URI for a raster image. A container-backed workspace answers null for both — its bytes are on a host, and one round trip per file is exactly what this listing refuses. (#827)

Fixed

• A thumbnail's decode is bounded by pixels, not by bytes. A PNG under a kilobyte can declare 8000×8000, and scaling it allocates all 64 megapixels on a request somebody made by opening a page. Pillow's own ceiling does not catch it — it refuses at 89 megapixels — so the declared size is checked against a 16 Mpx limit in the header, before any pixel is read. (#827)
• A thumbnail is drawn as the image is. Transparency survives (converting to RGB does not remove what the alpha channel hid, it paints it — usually black), and a camera's EXIF orientation is applied before the scale, so a portrait photograph is no longer sideways on its tile. (#827)
• A file's React key joins its workspace and path with a separator. Without one, {workspace: "ab", path: "c"} and {workspace: "a", path: "bc"} collided into a single key. (#138)

[0.0.171] - 2026-08-16

Tool search's scale guarantee is pinned by a fixture, not a claim.

Added

• A fixture pins tool_search's schema surface at scale. An AgenticOS-native FunctionModel test at the build_agent seam compares an unbound agent against a tool_search one over deterministic 12-, 100- and 1,000-tool catalogs, capturing the canonical bytes of the model-visible function schemas: 3,480 B / 28,736 B / 287,036 B unbound versus a flat 786 B with the binding — the deferred catalog never grows what the model sees. It then drives the whole closure — search_tools, reveal, execution of the revealed target — and proves the other deferred tools stay absent after the call returns. (#794)

The agent map draws the whole delegation tree, and says what it cannot.

Added

• The agent map renders the delegation tree recursively, from one endpoint. GET /agents/{agent_id}/delegation-tree walks the draft's pins with the same resolution publish uses — one response instead of a page-walk per hop, with per-walk caches so a diamond is one read. Depth is the runtime's own bound (min(inherited, own max_depth)), so the tree shows exactly what a run can reach and marks the rest truncated rather than drawing it reachable. What the walk cannot resolve says so on the node: a delegate the caller may not see answers restricted (indistinguishable from a pin at nothing, so a shared map cannot probe private agents), a cycle is named and never followed, a gone version answers unpinned, a stale pin carries its number, and an archived delegate is named rather than drawn as a working hop — the same refusal the runtime raises when a run reaches it. On the map, first- level delegates keep their measured edges; each subtree hangs off its parent with a drawn connector, focusable and keyed by path; a tree still loading or failed says so in the notice instead of posing as a complete one-hop map. (#276)

The sandboxes page stops stacking two clocks down one scroll.

Changed

• /sandboxes is two tabs: connections, and what is running. The configuration table and the live Running on {host} panel were one scroll on two clocks; now the active tab lives in the URL (?tab=running deep-links, the default keeps the parameter off) and the live query only exists while its tab is on screen — the ten-second poll stops on a page nobody is looking at, pinned by a test that the sessions hook is never even constructed. The running tab names its host and lets an operator switch (closing the activity log on the switch, so one host is never asked for another's session); a failed connections request renders the error, never a false "no container connection registered"; the sessions table sorts, filters and explains an empty match; and the activity log is a labelled DataTable instead of a bare table in a grey box. (#140)

"dev should serve v3" is answered on the environment's own row.

Added

• An environment row pins its own version. Each environment in the History tab carries a select of the agent's published versions, calling the same promote mutation the Versions list's Promote to… menu already used — two directions through one edit. The row also renames (the default environment is refused one, its name being part of the publish contract; the mutation sends the name and nothing else, so a relabel can never silently repoint a pin — and an unchanged name sends nothing at all, so the audit log records no rename nobody made). A pin at a version genuinely gone renders as v9 (removed) — legible, since that stale pin is exactly why the agent is not answering — while a version merely unlisted (the history still loading, or a pin older than the fifty-publish page) renders plain, never with the false verdict. (#134)

A workspace file's header finally says when it changed, not only how big it is.

Added

• Workspace listings carry a file's modified time to the viewer. The shared file viewer's header could always render modified …, but only a knowledge base document ever supplied a time — a workspace file stopped at the size. Rides on pydantic-ai-backend 0.2.26's FileInfo.modified_at (ISO 8601, optional): a stored workspace records one on every write inside its JSONB document, a workspace archive reports st_mtime, and a live container's shell listing honestly answers null — never a guess. WorkspaceFileRead (and FlatFileRead) gain modified_at, the three listing routes pass it through, and the chat panel, the workspace explorer, the flat browser and the chat tool-result card all hand it to the viewer. (#500)

A run's spills no longer pile up on a container workspace that outlives it.

Fixed

• A run's spills are pruned off a container workspace at close. #804 stopped tool_output/ spills outliving the run on a state backend, but a longer-scoped container workspace (conversation/user/agent) still kept every past run's blobs on its filesystem forever. The overflow store now records each handle it writes to a per-run spill log — shared with delegates that share the parent's sandbox — and close deletes exactly those paths through the backend's own execute. Exact handles, not a prefix sweep, so two concurrent runs on a shared workspace cannot take each other's spills mid-flight; the rmdir of a still-shared spill directory fails silently, which is the correct answer, while a refused rm keeps its status and is logged (workspace_spill_prune_failed) rather than raised. Every path is checked against the reserved-prefix invariant — .. refused outright — before it reaches the shell. (#803)

A delegated run's failure is written in the platform's words, never the provider's.

Fixed

• A delegated run's stored error is composed, not copied. A failed delegation wrote agent_runs.error and its closing SubagentFinished frame from the subagents library's own exception text — routinely a provider client's message carrying the failing request URL, key still in its query string on a custom base_url. The settlement now composes the same controlled sentence the parent's row gets (run_failure_summary, moved to app/agents/failures.py so the capability layer can reach it), and the library's text goes to the server log with the original exception beside it. Rides on subagents-pydantic-ai 0.2.19, whose TaskHandle.exception hands the platform the exception instead of a string to parse. The two deliberate exceptions keep their own words whole: pydantic-ai's UsageLimitExceeded (the delegation's own ceiling doing its job) and BudgetExceeded raised inside a delegate by the parent's shared ledger — a ceiling sentence with its numbers is the one failure text the reader acts on. (#699)

[0.0.164] - 2026-08-16

An agent stops forgetting its instructions mid-run, and remembers across turns.

Added

• The system_reminders capability. Re-states steering guidance mid-run to counter instruction fade — a model progressively ignoring the guidance it started with after many tool-use turns. Three declarative reminder kinds, each on its own cadence (interval / first_after / max_fires): fixed reminders[] lines, goal_reanchor (the run's first user request, re-stated), and llm_reminder (a model-written nudge from the recent transcript, metered to the run's ledger, running on the run's own model under its limits minus one reserved request, falling back to the goal-reanchor line on any error). The cadence is durable per conversation — counters live in a new conversations.reminder_state JSONB column, so leaving and reloading a conversation resumes it; only the counters are stored, never the reminder text. A fired reminder is injected as an ephemeral prompt part behind a CachePoint, so it never enters message_history and the cached prefix stays byte-identical turn over turn. (#787)

[0.0.163] - 2026-08-16

An oversized tool return stops eating the run, and nothing spills onto shared disk.

Added

• The tool_output_limits capability. A tool return too large for the model's window is reduced once, when it is produced, instead of being re-sent in full on every later request of the run. Three actions per binding: spill (default, lossless — the full return goes to the agent's own sandbox backend under a tool_output/ prefix and is replaced with a handle + preview the model pages through with read_tool_result), truncate (a cheap clamp with a marker saying what was cut), and summarize (an LLM summary on the run's own model, its spend booked to the run's ledger). Spills land on the tenant's own backend, never shared disk — an agent with no backend gets an in-memory one discarded with the run — and a spill the backend refuses degrades to a truncation, never a silent drop. (#57)

Fixed

• Spills no longer outlive the run on a state backend. A longer-scoped state workspace was persisting tool_output/ spills into its stored document every run, counting them against SANDBOX_STATE_MAX_BYTES until the agent's own writes were refused. The flush now strips the reserved prefix, so every run self-heals what a prior one left. The container-backend half stays open as #803. (#803)

Changed

• The ambient-usage delta is one helper, not two copies. compaction and tool_output_limits each carried an identical snapshot-and-diff for booking a self-run Agent's tokens; both now import usage_counts/usage_delta from budget, so a pricing fix lands in one place.

[0.0.162] - 2026-08-16

An agent can drive a real browser, with the same guards as everything else.

Added

• The browser_use capability. One tool, browse_web, that hands a self-contained natural-language goal to an autonomous browser-use agent driving a real Chromium — mode='playwright' launches a local headless browser, mode='remote' attaches over CDP to an operator-supplied cdp_url. A remote endpoint is SSRF-checked at publish time, off the event loop, for every binding — the first production caller of validate_webhook_url (part of #33). The browser sub-agent runs on the host run's model wrapped in a MeteredModel, so its spend is booked against the run's ledger (#802), and the tool is side_effecting, so every call can sit behind the approval gate. The engine is an optional dependency the capability builds without: until browser-use loosens its pydantic pin (#801), enabling and running it raises a RuntimeError naming the fix rather than failing quietly. (#59)

[0.0.161] - 2026-08-16

An agent can draw an image, with the spend on the ledger like everything else.

Added

• The image_generation capability. One tool, generate_image, that renders an image from a prompt with a dedicated image model (OpenAI Responses or Google), whatever model the agent itself runs on. The provider key is a SecretRequirement, so publishing without one is refused at the form; the tool is side_effecting, so every call can sit behind the approval gate; and the subagent's usage is booked to the run's ledger — an unpriced image model records zero and flags the run's cost partial rather than hiding it. Images land in organization-scoped storage (generated/{org}), served only under the caller's own organization at GET /api/v1/generated/{filename}, rendered inline in chat, and — when the run has a workspace open — also written under /output so a later execute step can build with them. (#58)

[0.0.160] - 2026-08-16

Every person, organization and agent gets a designed default avatar, and a colour to go with it.

Added

• Default avatars, and a colour you can pick. A row with no uploaded picture now falls back to its initials on a colour rather than a blank circle — one shared EntityAvatar across every surface, keyed to the row's id so an entity keeps its colour everywhere it appears. The colour is also choosable: a nullable avatar_color slot (1..10, null = auto) on users, organizations and agents, with a swatch picker on the profile, organization and agent-builder screens. The image is drawn only when the row actually has one, which also closes a per-row 404 several member and user lists were firing. Ten pastel hues live in a tuned --avatar-* token ramp, theme-independent so they read in light and dark alike. (#60)

Fixed

• The secrets "Added by" avatar now matches a person's colour everywhere else. It seeded the fallback hue on the author's email rather than their id, so the same person could wear one colour there and another beside their name in member lists. SecretRead now carries created_by_user_id and the column seeds on it. (#799)

[0.0.159] - 2026-08-16

A new organization starts with a spend ceiling already in place.

Added

• A new organization defaults to a $100 monthly budget. An org with no cap is one runaway agent away from a surprise bill, and a budget only refuses if it exists — so a fresh org now starts at the deployment's DEFAULT_ORG_MONTHLY_BUDGET_USD ($100 out of the box), editable on the org's row like any other cap and enforced by the same guard. The default is applied at creation across every path — team create, the personal org on signup, and bootstrap — and None restores the older opt-in posture for a deployment that would rather start uncapped. Existing organizations are untouched; no migration, because the column already existed. (#785)

[0.0.158] - 2026-08-16

A long run compacts its own history before it hits the model's limit, metered, and every agent shows how full its context window is.

Added

• Compaction capability. Ports the pydantic-ai-harness compaction strategies into the registry: summarize (the default, at 0.9 of the window — the only strategy that keeps what older turns said), tiered, clear_tool_results and sliding_window. The trigger is a fraction of the window resolved per request against the model the request is going to, so the same history passes untouched on a 1M window and is cut on a 128K one before the request leaves. (#49)
• A context-fill gauge on every agent, not only one that compacts — the warning matters most to the agent that will not, because that is the one the provider refuses. Read from the provider's own input_tokens, stored per turn, and divided by the window of the model selected now. (#772, #774)
• model_profiles.context_length — the window a model accepts, recorded from the provider's listing at creation rather than guessed from the price snapshot. (#773)
• messages.cost_is_partial and a server-side conversation cost total; a partial figure is drawn ≥ $x. (#772)

Fixed

• A summary is metered. The strategy writes it through an agent it builds itself, which no budget guard wraps, so the capability books the run's usage across the hook against the ledger. Recorded, not prevented — the guard refuses on the next request. (#16)
• A conversation's history is read from the transcript, not the socket. A reload, a second tab or a dropped connection left the model answering a follow-up as though the thread had started with it. (#771)
• A summary is kept across turns. The thread between turns was rebuilt from the transcript, so a summary died at the turn boundary and the next turn bought another over a longer history; conversations.summary_messages now holds it. (#781)
• A window too small for the agent's own overhead says so rather than buying a summary that cannot get under the instructions and tool schemas on every request for ever. (#776)
• The builder draws a capability's defaults as values and can label what each enum choice does, so a generated form is not a row of empty boxes.

[0.0.157] - 2026-08-16

An organization's standing knowledge is put into a run instead of made to be asked for.

Added

• Context capability. A first-class, org-scoped library of text objects — a glossary, a brand voice, an escalation matrix — each carrying a mode: inject splices the body into the agent's instructions verbatim, link leaves it out of the prompt and reads it on demand through list_context/read_context, so a large or rarely-needed file costs nothing until the model reaches for it. Mirrors the skills subsystem end to end — model, schemas, repo, the shared access/grant machinery, service, routes, spec binding, publish check, runner resolution, and the frontend library + builder picker. (#48)
• AgentSpec.context_ids, bumping SPEC_VERSION to 9. Defaulted, so every stored spec and exported YAML loads unchanged.

Notes

• Injected content is untrusted input. A file's body is user-written and reaches the model verbatim, so it is delimited (<context-file>) and framed as reference material rather than instructions. The fence resists accidental breakout — a body or name that forges a closing tag or an attribute quote can no longer escape it — though an operator with context:edit injecting deliberately is out of scope by design.
• Tenant-scoped, checked at publish. Binding a file hands its body to every run, so it is checked against the publisher's own access; a private file another member owns is refused indistinguishably from a missing id.

[0.0.156] - 2026-08-16

An agent can bind many MCP servers without paying for every tool's schema on every request.

Added

• Tool search capability. Ports Pydantic AI's ToolSearch into the registry as tool_search and pairs it with deferring the connected MCP toolsets, so the model discovers the tool it needs instead of carrying every server's schema on each turn. Config is strategy (auto | keywords | bm25 | regex) and max_results (1–50). The capability and the deferral are two halves of one decision — ToolSearch is inert with nothing deferred, and a deferred tool with no search to find it is unreachable — so binding it is what marks the servers' toolsets for deferred loading; the registry's own tools stay visible. An agent that does not bind it pays nothing. (#50)

Notes

• Deferral changes what the model sees, never a tool's identity. A discovered MCP tool arrives under its real prefixed name, so the approval gate still pairs on it and a binding's rename still reaches it — ToolSearch sits outermost, reading the names a rename already applied.
• No un-metered spend. Local strategies run in Python; native search runs inside the provider's own metered request; the discovery round-trips are ordinary model requests the budget guard already wraps.

[0.0.155] - 2026-08-16

An agent can keep a checklist for itself over a multi-step run.

Added

• Planning capability. Ports the pydantic-ai-harness planning checklist into the registry: write_plan/read_plan plus granular step tools, and under enable_subtasks a dependency-aware mode (add_subtask, set_dependency, get_available_tasks, a blocked status). The current plan is surfaced back each turn as a cache-safe tail reminder behind a CachePoint, so the prompt prefix stays cacheable and the plan never lands in the system prompt. The tools are local checklist edits with no model request behind them, so there is no ambient usage to meter. Registry-only — no SPEC_VERSION bump — and orthogonal to delegation, so an agent may bind both. (#47)

Fixed

• A parked run's plan survives the approval park. The runner owns the store: it seeds one from PausedRunState.plan on resume, injects it through PLANNING_STORE_RESOURCE, and reads it back when the run parks. paused_state is already JSONB, so no migration — a run parked before this stays resumable.
• The system-prompt guidance is this repository's own string. The library's get_instructions() guidance is pinned via guidance= alongside the tool descriptions, so a harness release that rewrites its default can no longer change the agent's system prompt silently. (#778)

[0.0.154] - 2026-08-16

A tripped guardrail is a visible run outcome, not a crash — on every surface.

Added

• Guardrails capability. A single guardrails capability ports the pydantic-ai-harness guards into the registry, inspecting the text at three edges — the user's prompt, the agent's answer, and a tool's result before the model reads it — and either redacting a match or blocking the run. Tool-result screening is the headline: it is the only guard on untrusted content entering the loop, where a prompt-injection payload would otherwise reach the model unread. Redactors cover API keys, tokens, JWTs and PEM blocks, plus email, IBAN (mod-97), card (Luhn) and US-SSN. Config is data, not callables — flat toggles and a keyword string per edge — so it crosses the wire as an agent spec. (#46)
• RunStatus.GUARDRAIL_BLOCKED. A block is a governance outcome, so it gets its own status beside budget_exceeded — the platform working, not a malfunction — visible and filterable in run history, folded into other in the outcomes donut, and kept out of the "Recent failures" widget and the "Problems" preset. agent_runs.status is an unconstrained string, so no migration.

Fixed

• A guardrail block on the streaming web chat is recorded as guardrail_blocked, not failed. GuardrailBlocked was caught only in the non-streaming runner, so on the primary surface a block landed in the generic except Exception — recorded as failed, logged like a crash, and shown to the visitor as a generic "turn failed" instead of the guard's safe reason. The streaming path now mirrors the budget handling in agent_chat.py and agent_session.py. (#779)

[0.0.153] - 2026-08-15

The i18n guard stops reading a leading acronym as permission to skip the sentence behind it.

Fixed

• Prose whose first word is an acronym is reported again. NOT_A_SENTENCE's second alternative was [A-Z]{2,}\s — written to exempt a machine token, it exempted the whole string that token opened, so API keys are stored in the vault left the sweep while Provider keys are stored in the vault did not. A hole the width of a vocabulary, in a product whose copy opens on MCP, API, RAG, KB and JWT. Anchoring the alternative on a single lower-case word keeps the label it was written for — MCP server, AI agents — and lets the prose through. This is the same mistake as #656, one alternative to the left; both are anchored now, and .claude/rules/frontend.md names both rather than only the first. (#678)
• A separator label may lead with an acronym. Anchoring took away cover the acronym branch had been giving by accident: the separator alternative accepts only a title-case token on the left, so URL / Endpoint was exempt through the acronym branch and would have started reporting as copy while Model / Provider did not. Its left token now reads (?:[A-Z][a-z]+|[A-Z]{2,}). Nothing in src/ is written that way, so the sweep was clean either way and this was found by review rather than by the guard.

[0.0.152] - 2026-08-15

The dashboard is arrangeable, and it finally has a visual system to be arranged into.

Added

• A person arranges their own dashboard. Cards reorder, resize, hide, take a colour and group under named section dividers; more come from a gated catalog; the result persists per user per organization, either as a single active arrangement or as any number of named presets to switch between. The arrangement is a third layer over the two the page already had (effective = preference ?? audience default) and the permission gate still runs last, so a preference can reorder or hide a widget but never reveal one the caller may not see. Two tables with their repositories — dashboard_layouts and dashboard_presets, placements as JSONB — and /api/v1/me/dashboard-layout with a /presets shelf beneath it; applying a preset is a PUT of its entries, so there is one write path. (#213)
• The write contract is deliberately asymmetric. A write validates every placement against the widget registry and the closed span/row sets, so a typo is a 422 at the boundary; a read hands back what was stored, so a retired widget id drops at render time rather than 500ing the page.
• A spacing system, in lib/dashboard/system.ts. Band-to-band was 24px against card-to-card's 16px — three levels of structure inside eight pixels of each other, which is why five bands read as one mass. Bands sit at 40px, four times the card gap. Its test asserts the relationships, since a constant equal to its own literal tests nothing.
• Four cards the page could not answer before. Channels — what is registered and whether each bot webhooks or polls, which is the difference between "silent because nobody asked" and "silent because nothing is listening". Knowledge — whether documents that arrived ever finished indexing, since a collection can be perfectly fresh and hold two hundred documents nothing can retrieve. A week by the hour on a new group_by=hour. And sparklines on three KPI tiles, free from runs_by_day answering runs, completed and cost from the one scan it already made.
• The page opens on numbers. A steward's dashboard led with "Needs attention" — five "nothing here" boxes before the first figure in an organization where nothing is wrong. A full-width summary strip leads the steward, operator and builder layouts and costs no request: every figure slices the composed /stats/usage response the cards below already share, and the completed share reads run-outcomes, so it and the Outcomes donut cannot disagree.

Changed

• One figure component. There were three — StatCard on Admin, Metric on the dashboard, a private Figure inside ActivityFigures — so the same number changed typeface between a card and the page its "see all" points at. components/ui/figure.tsx is the one, and the value is sans, semibold, with the font's own figures: tabular-nums and a mono face on a large standalone number are both named anti-patterns, so equal-width digits stay in table rows and axis ticks where columns align.
• Chart ink measured, not argued. --color-chart is brand-500 in both themes at 3.74:1 light and 5.07:1 dark, clear of the 3:1 floor a mark owes its surface; a new --color-track draws a bar's unfilled part in the fill's own hue. brand-900 was tried in dark and is why the pair is measured rather than picked: at 1.41:1 it read as a filled bar, so a provider that spent nothing showed a full-width mark beside $0.00. Dashed gridlines are gone, the area wash is flat at 10% instead of a gradient inventing a second encoding down the y-axis, and a truncated model id has a real hover instead of a native title.
• A widget is the object every other page draws. WidgetFrame is built on Card — same corner, same elevation, the divider under the heading that ListCard carries — and each card explains itself once, through an info icon holding the same sentence the add-widget catalog lists it under. Thirteen widgets had rolled their own figure; five carried their explanation as grey prose under the data.
• A row holds cards of comparable natural height. That rule is what the layouts are rebuilt on, and what had left a four-line list beside a chart two-thirds empty. The heatmap takes a row to itself: anything beside seven-by-twenty-four is either dwarfed or stretched.
• A period change dims rather than blanks. It was a new query key, so ten cards dropped to skeletons at once and the page emptied and reflowed. keepPreviousData holds the last answer while UsageBody dims it and sets aria-busy.

Fixed

• The Spend card put two definitions of cost side by side. The headline read cost.period_usd — model spend alone — while the line under it read /spend → month_to_date_usd, runs plus ingestion, which is the arithmetic a monthly cap is measured with. Nothing said they were different questions, and on any deployment that indexes documents they disagreed, with ingestion_spend real money against the cap and nowhere on the page. CostBlock.period_usd is the whole bill now, with model_usd and ingestion_usd beside it and previous_period_usd following so the change compares like with like. At scope=own the ingestion half is zero rather than a share — a worker indexes a document and the ledger records no user.
• The sections filter vanished the moment somebody saved an arrangement, including one that kept every heading it started with: the filter offered a section only if it carried a titleKey, and flattening the default turns each heading into a divider named by title. isFilterable reads either name, and sectionLabel is the single copy of "the caption a person typed, else the curated key".
• Bar-list labels no longer end in an ellipsis — every row in two cards did — and each info icon is named for its card rather than being one of twenty-seven identical stops.

[0.0.151] - 2026-08-15

Every list in the product is now one table and one card, and Activity is a page you can actually narrow, page and export.

Added

• One table primitive, one list shell. DataTable gained sorting and filtering in two modes — client-side over rows a caller holds whole, and server-side as a request — so a sort header means the same thing everywhere. Which mode a table uses follows where its rows live: a client-side sort of page one, on a list with three pages, is worse than no header at all. ListCard/ListCardEmpty replaced five per-page card copies and four inline empty states, and components/ui/table.tsx went with its last caller. Sort state survives a reload through ?sort_by=/?sort_dir=, validated against the same whitelist the backend route declares. (#139, #282)
• Activity became an observability page. One period window feeding the figures, the table, the version strip, the Spend tab and all three exports; every filter the backend answers (status, surface, a three-state rating, agent, person and — narrowed to an agent — version); pagination with "51–100 of 1,204"; surface brand marks; a run's chat one click away; and the run detail in a drawer whose prev/next walk the run's own conversation. (#760, #761, #762, #764, #765, #766)
• Every organization starts with the shipped skill library. Creation copies each bundled skill in as an ordinary org-visible row, and the listing materializes any the catalog grew since — so the install step, its endpoints and its gallery are gone. (#281)

Changed

• Admin standardised onto both primitives, one pagination control instead of three dialects, organizations on their own tab, and /admin/ratings deleted whole — ratings are read where the runs are. (#283, #284)
• The agent map reads in four directions — surfaces left, model and budget above, tools right, delegation below, each subagent a first-class node beside a policy box naming allow_dynamic. (#518)

Fixed

• A CSV exported beside a narrowed table contained everything. The export passed only agent_id, while both docstrings promised the file was what was on screen. (#763)
• Deciding the last outstanding approval now resumes the run. The queue posted the decision alone, which left runs approved, undisputed and parked forever.
• Runs still going no longer sort as the cheapest or the lightest. Cost and tokens are written at finish and default to zero, so an ascending sort ranked a running row above every finished one; all four orders now put an unfinished run last, as duration always did.
• The run detail's arrows no longer step into delegations the list itself hides — a fan-out's children sat between a run and the thread's next turn.
• Six lists stopped reporting a failed request as an empty collection — vault, MCP, skills, channels, members and the admin users table each drew "nothing here yet" over a refusal, and MCP drew it over a catalog compiled into the backend. (#32's shape)
• Seeding a bundled skill twice costs that row, not the reader's page, and audit entries written by a seeding path now say so rather than asserting the organization's owner made a write they never made.

[0.0.150] - 2026-08-13

The streaming socket was the last surface still writing blank user turns.

Fixed

• A blank streaming turn's user message names its files. 0.0.148 fixed the blank-turn class for every surface that reaches the transcript's record — channels, the embed widget, the HTTP API — but the dashboard's streaming socket writes its own user turn and stored the message verbatim, blank included; only the composer's client-side substitution hid it, so any raw WebSocket client sending {"message": "", "file_ids": [...]} stored an empty bubble. Both write sites now compose the same one-line-per-file body, loaded through the owner-scoped file read from 0.0.149. A typed message is never replaced. (#750)

[0.0.149] - 2026-08-13

A chat turn could attach another user's file by naming its id.

Security

• Linking a file the caller does not own is refused. The link was a blind bulk UPDATE with no owner predicate and no unlinked check, and the ids came straight off the socket payload — so a turn naming another user's file id rendered their filename, MIME and size in the attacker's conversation and silently pulled the file off the victim's own message. Both the read and the UPDATE now carry the owner in their WHERE; a foreign or unknown id answers the same NotFoundError (so an id cannot be probed for existence), an already-linked one is refused rather than moved — for everybody, its owner included — and a malformed id is refused at the boundary instead of resurfacing as a failed turn after the message persisted. (#706)

[0.0.148] - 2026-08-13

A photo sent with no caption read as somebody sending nothing.

Fixed

• A caption-less turn's user message names its files. A channel turn whose attachment produced no prompt text wrote a blank user message, so the thread in /chat jumped straight to the answer with the file card as the only trace of the question. The transcript now composes the empty turn's body from its attachments — Attached image: photo.jpg, one line per file — reusing the vocabulary the model's briefing already uses. A caption is never replaced, and a resume still writes no user turn at all. (#704)

[0.0.147] - 2026-08-13

A failed tool's raw error was stored where every reader of the run can see it.

Security

• A tool's retry text stays out of the transcript row. #681 sanitized the chat tool_result frame; the stored row was the same leak on the run paths that never open a socket — the HTTP API and the channel bots. A retry's content is written by whichever tool raised (web_search builds one from the vendor exception, endpoint and query string included; an MCP tool's is a third party's entirely), and it landed on a tool-call row rendered in run history weeks later. The row now stores the same sentence the frame sends — which tool failed and that the model was asked to retry — and the vendor's own text goes to the server log beside the write, nowhere else. (#695)

[0.0.146] - 2026-08-13

A thread nobody owned was everybody's to delete.

Security

• An unowned room thread is writable only by its participants. A channel thread's owner is its first linked speaker, so a room where nobody linked an account had no owner — and the write check answered yes to any member of the organization: renaming it, archiving it, deleting the transcript, or appending a role: "assistant" turn the model reads back as its own words, including for threads their own list never showed them. The write now stops at the same membership-confirmed participation the read admits; an owned thread still refuses its participants the write. (#701)

[0.0.145] - 2026-08-13

A webhook bot's files had no server to be fetched from.

Fixed

• A Mattermost webhook bot's server is recorded per delivery. Only the polling path ever told the adapter a bot's address, so an attachment on an outgoing-webhook post parsed with an empty handle and the reply said the file could not be downloaded. The receiver now hands the bot row's api_base_url to the adapter after the token check and before the parse — per delivery, so an operator's edit takes effect at once. Not a regression: before #547 the file was dropped silently; #547 made the failure visible, this makes the file reachable. (#692)

[0.0.144] - 2026-08-13

A removed channel member kept the thread.

Security

• /chat now asks the platform whether a reader is still in the channel. A channel thread was shown to anybody whose linked account had ever spoken in it, and never asked again — so somebody removed from a Slack, Telegram or Mattermost channel kept the thread, including everything said after they left. Each adapter now answers a per-account membership question, cached for 60 seconds and failing closed: an unsupported platform, a missing adapter, an unsealable token or an errored call hides the thread rather than showing it. The owner and an explicit share keep access on every path. (#641)

[0.0.143] - 2026-08-13

Three sweeps walked the source tree three different ways.

Changed

• One source-tree walker, shared. fonts.test.ts, loading-state.test.tsx and platform-proxy.test.ts each carried their own recursive read of frontend/src, with their own idea of what to skip — so a directory one of them learned to ignore stayed invisible only to that one. They now share src/test-utils/source-files.ts. (#618)

[0.0.142] - 2026-08-13

Every page declared itself English, Polish ones included.

Fixed

• <html lang="en"> was hard-coded from defaultLocale in the one layout that renders <html>, so a screen reader on /pl/agents announced Polish copy with English pronunciation rules and a crawler read the page as English. It now comes from the active locale. More visible since #604, because before that the UI mostly reverted to English anyway. (#619)

[0.0.141] - 2026-08-13

The baked MCP logos were keyed on a domain nothing ever asked for.

Fixed

• Every logo in mcp-logos.generated.ts was keyed on a brand domain — linear.app, notion.so — while logoDataUri is always asked with the connection URL's host, mcp.linear.app. The intersection was empty, so the MCP badge fell through to Google's live favicon service on every view and the self-contained export phoned home per server instead of rendering offline. (#614)

[0.0.140] - 2026-08-13

Polish diacritics swapped typeface mid-word.

Fixed

• The vendored woff2 files were the latin subsets, and eight of the nine Polish pairs — ą ć ę ł ń ś ź ż — live in latin-ext, so per-glyph fallback rendered them in the system font. Worst on Bricolage Grotesque headings at 700–800, where a word could change typeface halfway through. The latin-ext subset of all three families is vendored beside the latin one, at the same Google Fonts versions, about 119 KB together. (#606)

[0.0.139] - 2026-08-13

timeAgo fell back to an English date once a timestamp was old enough.

Fixed

• The date timeAgo answers with past its relative window was built with a hardcoded locale, so a Polish reader watching a list of runs saw Polish for anything recent and English the moment a row aged out of "2 days ago". It takes the active locale now, like the absolute formatters beside it. (#621)

[0.0.138] - 2026-08-13

An absolute date was formatted in English on every locale.

Fixed

• formatDate and formatDateTime passed a hardcoded "en-US" to toLocaleDateString / toLocaleString, so the month name and the day-month order came from English everywhere — a Polish reader saw Jul 31, 2026 where the runtime would have given 31 lip 2026. None of it is copy a translator can reach, because the strings come from Intl rather than the catalog, so no amount of pl.json would have fixed it. (#621)

[0.0.137] - 2026-08-13

An MCP consent that was refused landed on the servers page looking exactly like one that was accepted.

Fixed

• Nothing read the outcome the OAuth callback redirected with. The provider sends the browser to a route that has no way to answer the person — a JSON body on a page nobody navigated to is a dead end — so every outcome ends as a redirect carrying its result in the query. That contract was written in the route handler and consumed by no page. The MCP servers page now announces it, and the redirect lands there rather than on /settings/integrations, which is itself a redirect. (#657)
• A refusal of ours and a refusal from somewhere else travel separately. The callback takes no session by design — the state token authenticates the exchange — so anybody can put a browser on that address with a refusal of their choosing, and that query is now rendered. Ours goes under mcp_oauth_failure and is looked up in a fixed table, so a stranger cannot spell one and have the product say it in its own voice; anything else is stripped of control characters, capped at 200 characters and shown quoted after a sentence this repository wrote. (#657)

[0.0.136] - 2026-08-13

DOM key constants were sitting in the message catalog and read back through the translator.

Fixed

• e.key === t("enter2") compared a keyboard event against a translation. Enter, Escape, Tab, ArrowUp and ArrowDown were parked in en.json and read back in the chat composer, the command palette, conversation rename, the share dialog, the sources panel and the question prompt. src/i18n.ts merges en.json under every locale, so this worked only while pl.json omitted those keys — the first translator to render one would have broken every shortcut on that screen. They are literals in the source again, and messages/catalog.test.ts refuses a catalog value that is a DOM key constant. Six of them had in the meantime been translated into pl.json, which is the failure arriving; they are deleted. (#549)

[0.0.135] - 2026-08-13

The copy guard read a hyphen in the first word as a label separator, so half a sentence passed the sweep.

Fixed

• "Sign-in failed" passed the i18n guard while "Not authenticated" was refused. NOT_A_SENTENCE exempts a label built from title case around a separator — Model / Provider — and the whitespace on both sides of that separator was optional, so a hyphen inside the first word made the whole sentence a label. The separator now needs the whitespace that makes it one. (#656)

[0.0.134] - 2026-08-13

A refusal from the BFF reached the toast in English, whatever locale the reader was in.

Fixed

• The route handlers under src/app/api/** write a wire payload, not copy, and the toast that renders it was showing that payload verbatim. A refusal now travels as a code the client resolves in the active locale, and getErrorMessage takes the caller's translator — it moved from @/lib/utils to @/lib/api-error in the process, because a function that needs a translator is not a utility. Step details take the same route. (#603)
• The copy guard reads a .ts file by the same rules as a .tsx one, so a hook's toast and a module table of labels are copy too. src/app/api/** is skipped by the offence sweep — a route handler sits outside the [locale] segment and has no translator to reach — and read by the catalog rules, which is what reports a detail that duplicates a message. (#603)

[0.0.133] - 2026-08-13

The banner guard walked every worktree on the machine before deciding to ignore them.

Fixed

• scripts/check_comments.py filtered after walking rather than pruning. Path.rglob("*") descended into .git, .venv, node_modules and every checkout under .claude/worktrees/, and SKIP_DIRS only decided what was reported. On a machine with 68 worktrees that was about 3.9M paths and roughly seven minutes per commit, because pre-commit runs the hook with pass_filenames: false. It is now os.walk with in-place pruning. (#635)

[0.0.132] - 2026-08-13

The spend page said nothing could not be priced, above three breakdowns that had priced nothing.

Fixed

• GET /runs/spend counted its "could not be priced" caveat over top-level rows only. By provider and By key price every row in the window through a subquery that is deliberately not windowed, so a parent that started before the window and delegated inside it put its delegate's spend into the breakdowns while the caveat above them read 0 — a page saying the numbers are complete when they are not. The caveat now counts what the breakdowns count. (#620)

[0.0.131] - 2026-08-13

Two RAG document lookups disagreed about which document they were looking at, and heap order decided.

Fixed

• IngestionService.find_existing and get_existing_hash used different precedence. The first checked every document for a source_path match before falling back to filename; the second interleaved the two in one pass, where a filename hit blocked any later source-path match — so a re-sync could answer with a different document depending on which helper asked. (#548)
• PgVectorStore.get_documents selected with no ORDER BY, so heap order decided which document a lookup answered with, and re-running the same query could give a different one. (#548)

[0.0.130] - 2026-08-13

A scanned PDF ingested with OCR enabled indexed near-empty, silently.

Fixed

• The OCR fallback drove the image describer through asyncio.new_event_loop().run_until_complete(...) from inside a running loop, which produced nothing — and the result was indistinguishable from a PDF that genuinely had no text. PyMuPDFParser._ocr_page and _parse_pdf_file are now async and await the describer on the caller's loop. (#550)

[0.0.129] - 2026-08-13

An MCP OAuth failure put the token endpoint, and whatever its query string held, into a toast in the browser.

Fixed

• Three refusals in the MCP OAuth flow interpolated whatever raised. httpx puts the failing request in its message, and the two requests this flow makes are a client registration and a token grant — so a broken provider reached the member's screen as the endpoint it failed on, rendered as a toast since #657 via McpOAuthCallbackResult(ok=False, error=str(exc)). Each refusal now names the stage it failed at and what the reader can do about it; the client's own text stays in the logger.exception beside the raise. (#686)

[0.0.128] - 2026-08-13

A test that proved spawn_after_commit was needed proved it on a 250ms stopwatch.

Fixed

• test_spawning_inside_the_request_starts_before_the_row_exists waited a fixed _GRACE = 0.25s for the spawned flow to take its reading, and asserted the reading happened inside that window. Under make test — four xdist workers plus coverage instrumentation on one machine — 250ms guarantees nothing, so the test failed once and passed on a clean re-run and in CI. It now waits on a signal from the task itself, which is what it was trying to time. (#680)

Changed

• A release that only bumps the version no longer runs test, test-frontend and e2e. scripts/ci_changed_scope.py reads the diff of backend/pyproject.toml, backend/uv.lock and frontend/package.json rather than their paths, because those files also hold the dependency lists, the coverage include lists and the ruff and ty configuration. An absent patch, a diff of context lines, or one line that is not a version assignment still runs everything. #317 claimed this; it is now true. (#317)

[0.0.127] - 2026-08-13

An invitation nobody clicked stayed pending for ever, and one clicked too late was recorded as withdrawn.

Added

• An hourly invitation-expiry-sweep, the same shape as the approval sweep. InvitationStatus.EXPIRED was unreachable — invitation_repo.expire_stale had no caller — so the pending list kept offering invitations that had timed out. Registered hourly rather than more often, because the TTL is measured in days. (#456)

Fixed

• Accepting a stale invitation marked it revoked, which records a withdrawal somebody made when what actually happened is that it ran out. (#456)

[0.0.126] - 2026-08-13

A shareable invite link could grant ownership, or a role that does not exist.

Fixed

• InviteLinkCreate.role carried no validator while its sibling InvitationCreate refused owner and unknown roles. An Owner could mint a link that grants owner — co-ownership through a pasted URL, the exact thing the email invitation path forbids — or an invented role string that role_has cannot reason about, which then flowed unvalidated onto the accepter's membership row. Both schemas now share one InvitableRole: every role in the catalog except owner, refused at validation. (#551)

[0.0.125] - 2026-08-13

A plain role change could mint a second owner and walk around ownership transfer.

Fixed

• PATCH /orgs/{org_id}/members/{user_id} accepted {"role": "owner"} against any non-owner member. It succeeded, left the organization with two owners, and wrote an audit entry reading member.role_changed rather than saying ownership had moved — so transfer_ownership, the one path that demotes the outgoing owner in the same breath, could be walked around with a PATCH. Both halves are closed, because either alone leaves the hole open somewhere: OrganizationMemberUpdate subtracts owner from the roles it admits, the way InvitationCreate already did, and the service now caps the role being assigned rather than only inspecting the target. (#672)

[0.0.124] - 2026-08-13

A Mattermost bot reached through an outgoing webhook answered every post in a channel it was merely invited to.

Fixed

• The outgoing-webhook path left addressed unset, and the router reads unset as "the platform did not say" and answers. So the transport put the bot back in the position the event stream's rule took it out of: replying to colleagues talking to each other. The body carries no mention list — Mattermost sends the post, not who it notified — so what is read instead is trigger_word, the platform's own record that the post was for this integration. Empty means the webhook fired on its channel filter alone, which delivers every post exactly as the socket does, so it is False for the same reason a posted event with no mentions is. Worth knowing before choosing this transport: @the-bot is not readable here, because nothing in the body says which account the bot is — set the trigger word to the bot's handle if that is how people should reach it. An @agent-slug needs nothing, since the router reads a slug out of the text. (#662)

[0.0.123] - 2026-08-13

The embed session — one visitor's turn on a public URL — was the last surface outside the coverage and type gates.

Changed

• app/services/embed_session.py is held to 100% coverage and to ty. It decides who a visitor's turn runs as, how often they may ask, and what the page is allowed to put in front of the model — every one of which is a refusal a stranger can reach — and an unreachable except BudgetExceeded sat in it for as long as it was ungated, which is the kind of thing the gate exists to name. The module was at 93%: the missing 13 lines and 8 partial branches were the frame guards in handle (a frame that is not a message, an empty one, one past the character cap, a visitor past their rate limit), the two endings that produce no words, and _files. All are covered. (#663)

[0.0.122] - 2026-08-13

A platform's second way in built its own idea of what a message is, and the two disagreed about files.

Fixed

• Each adapter now has exactly one parser. Every platform has two ways in — a webhook and a stream, or long-polling — and the second one built its own normalised message: Telegram's polling loop read text and nothing else, and the Mattermost outgoing webhook read no file_ids at all. So somebody dropping a spreadsheet on a bot had it silently discarded, depending only on which transport that deployment happened to run — and long-polling is what a self-hosted install uses. Both now put the update back into the shape the platform sends and hand it to the same parse_incoming, so what counts as a message is decided once. What each transport is handed still differs, and that is the platform's doing: Telegram's polling loop subscribes to new messages only, so an edit reaches the webhook receiver and never the poller. (#672)

[0.0.121] - 2026-08-13

A message's attachments were downloaded and stored twice, and the run was handed the second copy.

Fixed

• Each path fetched the files for itself. A mention that names nobody of ours falls through to the default assistant, and both halves called _receive_files — so an ordinary message with a spreadsheet on it was downloaded from the platform twice, stored twice, and run with the second set. The first row stayed against the sender with nothing pointing at it, which on chat_files means scoped by user_id alone and collected by nothing. The fetch now happens once, above both paths, and is passed down. (#683)

[0.0.120] - 2026-08-13

Reloading a conversation whose run is parked on an approval showed nothing to say so, at either end.

Added

• GET /runs/{run_id}/parked answers a run's pending calls — the approval row to decide, the tool call id, the tool and its arguments — the same payload the live tool_approval_required frame carries. Gated on approvals:decide. (#601)

Fixed

• The step a run parked on rendered as though it had run. The transcript now stores those calls with status="awaiting_approval" rather than running, taken off the runner's paused state for every non-streaming surface and off turn.parked in web chat. The row does not read "waiting" for ever: a resume settles it with what the call returned, an expiry with the timeout notice, and both paths already existed. (#601)
• The approval panel never came back after a reload, so the only way to finish a parked run was the approvals queue on another page. This had always been true of every non-streaming surface; #509 removed the stored notice that had been covering for both halves, which is what made it visible. (#601)

[0.0.119] - 2026-08-13

A channel turn refused before it ran left the files it had already stored behind, owned by nothing.

Fixed

• The bytes are stored before the agent is resolved, so whatever refuses in its place has to give them back. A turn that never produced a run left chat_files rows nothing points at — and that table carries no organization, so an unlinked row is scoped by user_id alone and no sweep collects it. Both refusal paths now discard what the turn stored: the one that stores first and refuses second, and the one where a handle names no agent of ours. A file that cannot be deleted costs neither the other files nor the reply, because a cleanup that raised would replace a refusal somebody can act on with a bot that answered nothing at all. (#661, #690)

[0.0.118] - 2026-08-13

A crashed turn told the chat panel whatever the provider's SDK had put in its exception.

Fixed

• The error frame carried str(exc) of whatever came out of the run. A provider SDK puts the failing request in its message, so that routinely meant an endpoint, an internal host, or a URL with a key still in its query string — reaching a member's chat panel and their browser console rather than an HTTP body, which is where #342 fixed the same leak. The exception's text now stays in the logger.exception beside the send, and the frame names only what the reader can act on. The class still goes out, because it separates an upstream that timed out from one that refused a credential and a class name has never carried a URL. Our own refusals do not come through here at all — an AppException and a BudgetExceeded are caught above and passed through whole, since their messages are written in this repository. (#659)

[0.0.117] - 2026-08-13

A failed run stored the provider's own error text in a column that run history renders for weeks.

Fixed

• agent_runs.error held str(exc) of whatever came out of the run. It is a stored column on AgentRunRead, rendered in run history to every member who can read it, and what raises there is a model client with httpx underneath — so that routinely meant an endpoint, an internal host, or a URL with a key still in its query string, sitting in a row somebody opens weeks later. The same rule as #342 in an HTTP body, #423 in the ingestion columns and #659 in the chat frame, with the longest life of the four. Our own refusals are kept whole, because an AppException raised inside the run is written in this repository and its message is the most useful thing an operator can be shown. Anything else stores its type, plus the status code when a provider answered one — 401 a credential, 404 a model the profile names and the provider does not have, 429 a rate limit — where a bare class name would make all four ModelHTTPError. A group is unwrapped to its first leaf first, so an MCP toolset or a delegated run does not spend that status code on an ExceptionGroup that diagnoses nothing. (#676)

[0.0.116] - 2026-08-13

A failing tool named a search provider's endpoint, with the key still in the query string, to everyone watching the run.

Fixed

• A tool_result frame carried whatever the tool that raised had put in its ModelRetry. web_search builds one out of the httpx or SDK exception it caught, so a broken key put 401 Unauthorized for url 'https://api.tavily.com/search?…' — an endpoint, a host and whatever the query string held — into the chat panel and the browser console of everyone watching. An MCP tool's retry is a third party's string entirely, which is why the frame is trimmed where it is sent rather than at each raise. The frame still names the tool, because a card that resolves saying which step failed is the difference from one that spins for ever, and the tool's own text goes to the log beside the send. The model reads the retry whole either way — Pydantic AI puts the part into the next request itself. Applied in run_stream.py, so the widget, a hosted page and a channel are covered by the same sentence web chat is. (#681)

[0.0.115] - 2026-08-13

A file link that fails no longer takes the transcript of a paid run with it.

Fixed

• The write linking a channel turn's files to its message shared the transcript's SAVEPOINT, so an exception from it rolled back the user turn, the settled tool calls and the assistant message — for a run that had already spent money, over a file. It now has a savepoint of its own inside that one: it is the only write there touching rows the conversation does not own, and a failure costs the link alone. Web chat has always made this trade for the same write, in persist_user_turn. The savepoint is skipped outright when nothing was attached, because opening and releasing one on every turn in the deployment is a real cost for a list that is almost always empty. (#690)

[0.0.114] - 2026-08-13

The security page described an authorization model that was deleted three months ago.

Fixed

• SECURITY.md documented RoleChecker and UserRole.USER / UserRole.ADMIN as the authorization model. The users.role column went in migration 0066; authority inside an organization is a membership row plus the permission catalog, and has been since. A security page is read by somebody deciding whether to trust a deployment, so being three months stale there costs more than elsewhere. It now describes the three layers and points at docs/permissions.md.
• The hardening checklist named no rate limits at all, which left an operator no way to know the public surfaces have them. It now lists the per-surface limits — the embed widget's per-visitor cap and each channel bot's rate_limit_rpm — and says plainly that the console's own routes are not metered.
• The audit-log entry named a table that does not exist. app_admin_audit_log is app_admin_audit_logs, and organization-level actions carry a trail of their own gated by audit:read, which the page did not mention. (docs/governance.md)

[0.0.113] - 2026-08-13

Every surface — web chat, the embed widget, a channel bot, and the hosted page this adds — now runs the same turn loop, remembers its conversation and is rate limited. The three W2 surface issues were one thread of work, and doing them apart is how the surfaces drifted in the first place.

Added

• A hosted chat page. /e/{publicKey} serves an agent as a page rather than a snippet somebody has to embed: hosted_config holds the copy, the accent and the logo, a visitor keeps their thread across reloads, and a published page can be edited afterwards. Migrations 0022, 0023 and 0025. (#517)
• The embed WebSocket is offered as an integration, not only documented. socket_url_for sits beside snippet_for and rides the same read schema, so the panel publishes both with the Origin rule beside them. It carries no ?token= — in jwt mode a token is minted per visitor, and one printed in a panel is a working credential on a shared screen. (#516)
• A run records which channel identity asked for it. agent_runs.channel_identity_id, migration 0024. (#639)

Fixed

• A thread past 200 messages sent the model its first 200. The window read from the start of the conversation rather than the end, so the longer a thread ran the staler the context it was answered from. count_messages plus skip makes the window the last 200. (#636, #638)
• A group channel refused every sender who had never linked an account. A room now admits an unlinked speaker and the turn runs as the binding's creator; a DM is unchanged, and require_link: true is the opt-out. (#639)
• An update sending null answered 500 on a NOT NULL column. app/db/updates.py lets the column decide instead of a hand-kept list, applied to every *Update and guarded over app/services/** and app/api/**. (#637)
• The cookie banner covered Send on a hosted page. Not rendered on /e/** or /shared/** — neither has an optional cookie to consent to. (#644)
• The widget was the only surface passing no message_history, so it forgot the conversation between turns. It now streams the frames the web chat does, and EmbedSession takes a session factory and opens one per turn, so an idle socket holds no pooled connection. (#39)

Changed

• One copy of "an anonymous surface runs as its publisher". access.publisher_context is read by the embed session and by channels; there were two implementations that had already begun to disagree. (#640)
• A channel thread has participants. /chat shows a room's thread to everybody whose linked account has spoken in it, as a DISTINCT over messages.channel_identity_id. Reading and writing became two questions in the process: speaking in a room is a claim on being shown the thread, never on deleting or renaming it. Migrations 0026 and 0027. That record says who spoke and is never re-checked against the platform, so somebody removed from a channel keeps reading the thread here — deliberately not closed, and #641 says why.

[0.0.112] - 2026-08-12

The copy guard reads the frontend with a TypeScript parser instead of five regexes, and the 137 English strings it can now see are in the catalog.

Changed

• The i18n guard parses instead of grepping, and the copy it found is in the catalog. scripts/check_i18n.py had been patched for a new shape four times (#199, #246, #249, #314) and each fix was correct: the pattern was the problem. Reading a .tsx file as text means deciding per candidate whether you are looking at TypeScript or JSX, so every rule carried a threshold standing in for a parse and the next shape fell between two of them. The last one was one word wide — aria-label={`Remove ${source.name}`} sat below a two-word threshold that existed to keep `audience${key}Hint` out. It is now frontend/scripts/check-i18n.ts, walking JsxText, JsxExpression, StringLiteral and TemplateExpression through ts.createSourceFile: a node the formatter broke over three lines is one node, a type argument list is not JsxText at all, and a comment is invisible rather than blanked. MIXED, COUNT, LEAD, JSX_TEXT, mask_generics, readable, NOT_PROSE and both word-count thresholds are deleted rather than ported; every policy rule carries over. Runs from make lint-frontend (bun run check:i18n) and a new pre-commit hook, with frontend/scripts/check-i18n.test.ts in place of the five backend/tests/test_check_i18n_*.py files. Closes #395 and #141. (#610)
• 131 hardcoded strings answered, and 34 dead keys deleted. What the parser reports on the tree before the sweep, in 66 files: 64 template literals, 62 text nodes, 4 strings and a toast. That is the one-word template literals #395 measured (aria-labels and toasts — Open ${org.name}, ${name} updated.), the multi-line text nodes #141 measured (the 404 page, global-error.tsx, the magic-link step, four legal paragraphs), and eight confirm-dialog titles a bare ? on the machine-read list had been exempting. 128 became messages; three took a reasoned i18n-exempt — two on the error boundary that renders above NextIntlClientProvider, one on a capability's wire format. A sentence split across an element is now one t.rich message rather than a head, a <span> and a tail, which is what made the 34 fragment keys dead — the guard's own unreadKeys named every one. Three decisions worth recording. A number and its unit is a formatter rather than a message — `${bytes} KiB` is the shape, and ctx joined the unit list for the model picker's badge — so the fourteen of those take a rule rather than fourteen exemptions. PROVIDER_DEFAULT holds a key now instead of the words, per the module-table rule. And result: in run-python.tsx keeps an exemption, because parseResult beside it matches the string literally. (#610)

Fixed

• An i18n-exempt now covers the element it opens. It applied to its own line and the next, so the three exemptions in app/not-found.tsx — written above an <h1> whose words are on the third line, because the opening tag carries four Tailwind classes — covered the tag and missed the copy. Nothing noticed while a text node alone on its line matched no rule at all. A reason worth two lines covers the code under the whole comment block, too. (#610)
• The parser reads a .ts file, which is what kept #446 closed. The port landed with the offence sweep narrowed back to *.tsx, because the branch was cut before #446 was fixed. Merging it that way would have taken the .ts sweep out again — every toast.success("…") in src/hooks/** invisible, and nothing stopping the 381 strings #446 migrated from coming back. The sweep reads both suffixes now, by the same rules: a parser has no bracket to anchor on, so nothing needs gating on the suffix. src/app/api/** keeps its skip, still at the sweep rather than in a rule, because a route payload is a string a rule reads perfectly well and what excuses it is where it lives (#603). Six strings the widened sweep found are in the catalog: timeAgo's three relative-time labels as ICU plurals, the stream-error prefix, chunk {number}, and summarizeEmbedding — deleted rather than translated, having had no caller but its own test. (#610)
• A key was checked against the wrong namespace when a file held two translators. missingKeys unioned every namespace in a file, so a key read through one translator counted as present if any other namespace held it. That hid eight keys on the admin conversations page: archived, active, all, allOwners and allAgents were read through a useTranslations("admin") while only pages.admin held them, so all eight rendered as their own key strings on screen in every locale. A call now resolves to the nearest enclosing binding of that name — by scope, because one page binds getTranslations("pages.meta") in generateMetadata and getTranslations("pages.auth") below it, both called t, and keying on the name alone reports 157 live keys as missing. Where the walk finds no binding it falls back to every namespace that name takes. (#610)
• `Bearer ${token}` was reported as copy. An auth header value is the one header shape MACHINE_READ's character class cannot see, holding no punctuation at all, so the whitespace rule read it as a word beside an interpolation. Only latent while the sweep skipped .ts; both call sites are in src/lib. (#610)
• A ternary between two one-word labels in a readable prop was read by nothing. aria-label={busy ? "Saving" : "Save"} passed the attribute rule, which read a bare literal, and readString, which wants a capital and a space before it calls something a sentence — #395's own defect wearing a ternary. A label is capitalised or holds a space, which keeps dir === "asc" ? "desc" : "asc" out. (#610)
• A toast holding a sentence was reported twice, once by each rule that owns it, inflating the count a person works through. The toast rule keeps its argument. (#610)

[0.0.111] - 2026-08-12

The pricing caveat on the cost screen says which breakdown it measures and which it only marks.

Fixed

• One caveat, three breakdowns, and three places claiming it measured all three. "Some runs could not be priced" counts top-level runs — one per run tree, the same rows By agent groups — so it measures that breakdown and only marks By provider and By key, which sum every row's own spend, delegated rows included. One parent with three unpriced delegates therefore reads 1 while three figures below it are a floor. The two schema descriptions, the route comment, the rendering side and docs/governance.md now say that instead of claiming the figure and "its breakdown" cannot disagree. Descriptions, comments and tests only — no behaviour change. (#597)
• The invariant behind it was untested end to end: no breakdown is a floor without a figure on the same page saying so. Two integration tests now pin it — a priced parent with an unpriced delegate reads 1 above a provider split that is the delegate's own spend, and one parent with two unpriced delegates still reads 1, with the delegate's own row counted nowhere. (#597)

Checked and not changed: the marker itself is sound. The reported sequence — an unpriced delegate leaving the count at 0 — is not reachable, because a run tree shares one spend ledger and the top-level row is written from it.

[0.0.110] - 2026-08-12

A turn that stopped for an approval no longer says so in the agent's own voice, in a transcript that keeps it forever.

Fixed

• The approval notice was stored as the agent's words. A chat turn that parked on an approval wrote "This run needs approval before it can go further — it is waiting in the approvals queue." into the assistant message's content. The moment somebody approved, that sentence was false, and it stayed in the transcript attributed to the agent, in the middle of a turn that plainly did go further — visible between two steps that both ran, since a run's segments are drawn as one turn. It was never the model's text; it was UI state written into the one field that keeps things forever. A parked run now records no answer of its own, which is what every surface that does not stream already did — web chat was the one place inventing a sentence. That a run is parked is still said by the two things that stop saying it once the decision is made: the step it stopped on, and the approval panel. (#509)
• A model that explained itself before asking for a gated call had that explanation overwritten. A parked turn now persists what was streamed before it stopped, the same route a turn that failed, was stopped or lost its socket already takes. Usually empty; not always. (#509)

Known, and no longer covered for: a still-parked run says nothing about waiting once the page is reloaded — the stored tool-call row keeps status="running" and renders as a finished step, and the approval panel is only ever raised by a live socket frame. Every non-streaming surface has always looked like this; the notice was accidentally hiding it here. (#601)

[0.0.109] - 2026-08-12

The suite reaches no Prefect server on a laptop either, so what a developer runs is what CI runs.

Fixed

• A test that called a flow needed a Prefect server listening on localhost:4200. Prefect resolves its own settings from backend/.env — its settings model carries env_file=".env" — so the PREFECT_API_URL line make dev needs was also the address a test's flow call tried to reach, and it failed as Failed to reach API at … out of a test that patches every collaborator it has. CI never saw it: with no .env there is no URL, so what a laptop ran was never what CI ran. The URL is now assigned empty before Prefect is imported — deleting it would leave the dotenv source to answer, and an empty assignment outranks that source because Prefect's model carries env_ignore_empty=False — and Prefect reads an empty URL as no URL, running the flow against a temporary server of its own, which is what CI has always done. Unconditionally, so a developer with make dev up gets the same run rather than a different code path. (#536)
• That temporary server wrote into a developer's own Prefect database. Its state is a SQLite file under PREFECT_HOME, which is ~/.prefect unless something says otherwise — the same file a locally run prefect server has open. It now points at a directory of the tests' own, for the same reason the test database name does. (#536)
• And starting it inside Prefect's own 20-second allowance failed on a first run. The server migrates its database before it answers: about 75 seconds cold against a PREFECT_HOME nothing has written, about seven warm. Trading a deterministic failure for a first-run one is not a fix, so the allowance is 90 seconds, and ephemeral mode is named rather than inherited — with it off a flow call does not fail fast, it retries for 75 seconds and then fails. (#536)

[0.0.108] - 2026-08-12

The backend suite runs in a random order, and the first shuffle found a connection-pool defect that had been hiding behind collection order.

Added

• pytest-randomly, and the documentation that described it is now true. Two pages said the shuffle was on by default while the plugin was in neither pyproject.toml nor the lockfile: the suite ran in collection order, the documented -p no:randomly was a silent no-op, and the order-independence those pages called verified had never been exercised by that mechanism. The seed is printed in the header and reaches every xdist worker through workerinput, so -n auto collects one order rather than four. A guard test asserts the declaration, so removing the dependency fails a test rather than silently un-shuffling the suite. (#571)

Fixed

• A closed event loop's connection was left in the app engine's pool. app.db.session.engine is a module-level object, so its pool outlives the test that filled it, while anyio gives every test its own event loop — and a connection created on a loop that has since closed answers cannot perform operation: another operation is in progress for the next statement issued through it, in whichever test checked it out. The two files driving the real get_db_session each disposed the engine on the way out, which covers only the pair of them; anything else sharing the xdist worker could leave a connection there. The engine fixture now disposes on the way in, and the two per-file disposes are gone. Pre-existing — which tests share a worker was already decided at run time by --dist load; the shuffle only changed the adjacencies and made it surface, red on run 6 of 8. (#571)

[0.0.107] - 2026-08-12

Picking Polish now survives the next click.

Fixed

• The language switcher redrew the current page and nothing more. The locale's entire persistence was the /pl URL prefix, and under localePrefix: "as-needed" a path without a prefix is the default locale — so every ordinary <Link href="/agents"> and router.push("/orgs") in the app dropped the prefix and the language with it, and a reload never brought Polish back either. next-intl reads a NEXT_LOCALE cookie itself, but only under localeDetection, which also turns on accept-language sniffing — and this deployment serves English at the root whatever the browser asks for. So nothing wrote the cookie and nothing read it. One routing config now backs both the middleware and the navigation APIs: the switcher writes the cookie with a year's maxAge, making the choice a preference rather than a session, and the middleware redirects an unprefixed path to the picked locale while still ignoring accept-language. A path that names a locale always wins, so a shared /pl/... URL still means what it says. (#285)

[0.0.106] - 2026-08-11

The seam that puts a chart in a Slack reply is covered, so the line holding it there can no longer be deleted with a green suite.

Fixed

• A chart could stop reaching a channel reply without a single test noticing. drawn_chart was covered on its own and the runner's hand-back of the tool calls a turn made was covered on its own; nothing joined them. Every test of ChannelAgentRouter.answer mocks the runner, so the list of calls stays empty and image_png is always None — which means tool_calls=called could be deleted from either call site in channels/mentions.py with a green suite and a 100% coverage gate, and a Slack user would be back to reading "here is the chart" under no chart. Both reply paths now run against a stub runner that fills the list the way the real one does, and assert on the PNG rather than on a mock call; the stub takes the tool calls as a required keyword, so a router that stops passing them fails loudly. (#515)

Two things the issue behind this asserted did not survive checking, recorded here rather than left open: the line it named was already covered by the pull request that exposed it, and CI was never green while the local gate was red — the same 99.98% failure was red there for seven runs, so this was not a make check / CI divergence.

[0.0.105] - 2026-08-11

next build no longer touches the network, so a CDN nobody in this repository controls can no longer fail a frontend build.

Fixed

• Every green frontend build so far was luck of the CDN. next/font/google resolves a family against fonts.gstatic.com at build time, and when gstatic 404s the .woff2 Turbopack surfaces it as Module not found: Can't resolve '@vercel/turbopack-next/internal/font/google/font' and exits non-zero — which is test-frontend's Build step and e2e's Build the frontend step. On 2026-08-10 it took out two pull requests inside one push window (#570, Bricolage, six errors; #544, Inter, twenty-eight) while a third built fine. Bricolage Grotesque, Inter and Geist Mono are now vendored under frontend/src/app/fonts/ and read by next/font/local — the latin subset of each, range-limited to the weights in use, 113 KB across the three, with SIL OFL 1.1 and all three copyright notices beside them. A regression test asserts no module imports the Google helper and that the set of .woff2 on disk is exactly the set layout.tsx declares, compared in both directions. (#572)

• The coverage gate failed at random, on branches with no Python in them. Exactly 99.98%, twice tonight: on a frontend-only change and on a commit that bumped three version strings. The missed line was the continue in catalog.custom_icon, reachable only when glob yields a non-matching mark first — scandir order, which on the runners' ext4 volumes is hash order, not alphabetical. A test that asks for a name matching no mark in a directory holding two now reaches it whatever the order. A red test job at 99.98% on a diff that touched no Python is this, and reading it as the branch's fault cost an hour. (#625)

Known, unchanged: the vendored subsets are latin only — exactly what subsets: ["latin"] asked for before — so Polish diacritics on the pl locale still fall through to the system font.

[0.0.104] - 2026-08-11

A channel message the platform delivers twice is answered once, and the decision is the Redis claim rather than a retry header that cannot know.

Fixed

• A redelivered channel message became a second full agent run. Another model call, another spend record, another answer in the thread. The fast 200 the webhook routes return only prevents the slow-handler retry; a 200 lost on the wire — a proxy drop, a pod rotation — was never received, and the redelivery that follows is valid, signed and brand-new. The first delivery now claims the message with one atomic SET NX against the shared Redis, so the claim holds across API workers, and it lives fifteen minutes — longer than every platform's retry window. Taken in ChannelMessageRouter.route rather than the worker shim, because the three polling paths call the router directly and a claim in the shim would have covered three inbound paths of six; keyed with the chat id, because Telegram numbers messages per chat and Slack's ts is per channel. (#167)
• A run that did not finish swallowed every redelivery for fifteen minutes. The claim is taken on receipt, not on completion, so it is given back when the run under it dies — under BaseException, so a task cancelled while the pod drains counts as one. Harmless on the webhook paths, where the 200 has already gone out, but the pollers re-read what the process died on: aiogram re-fetches an unconfirmed getUpdates batch and Socket Mode redelivers an unacknowledged envelope. (#167)
• Nothing is refused on a retry header alone. A Slack request carrying x-slack-retry-num is logged and then processed like any other. The header says Slack is redelivering; it does not say the first attempt did any work, and reason=http_error means it explicitly did not — the route raised before spawn, so nothing was scheduled and no claim was taken. A transient database error in find_active was enough to lose a message that way: 500, redelivery, 200, and a log line reading like a success. (#167)

The guarantee degrades open, never shut, and always with a log line: a message with no id, an unconfigured module and an unreachable Redis are all processed rather than dropped. A duplicated answer is the rarer, cheaper failure than a dropped question.

[0.0.103] - 2026-08-11

The Builder says when the agent people are talking to is not the one on screen, and Publish says what it will move before it moves it.

Added

• Publish says what it will move before it moves it. The confirmation dialog names the version it creates, the default environment that follows the publish the moment it lands (or, on a first publish, that production is created and the agent goes live), and each pinned environment that stays on the version it is pinned to. (#519)

Fixed

• The Builder tracked "unsaved" and never "unpublished". Once the autosave settled the page read as finished, while every channel, widget and API call was still answering with the published version — toggle a tool off in the Toolbox and nothing on screen said a publish was needed. A header badge now compares the stored draft against the frozen version spec: "Draft differs from v7", with a title spelling out that published surfaces keep answering with v7 until a publish, or "Up to date with v7". Compared as sorted-keys YAML, the same serialization the version diff reads, so key order cannot read as a change nobody made. (#519)
• A publish left the environments panel naming the pin it had just moved. Publish and rollback invalidated qk.agents and not qk.environments, so the History tab contradicted the dialog's own sentence seconds after it was read. Pre-existing; included because the new dialog makes it visible. (#519)

[0.0.102] - 2026-08-11

The copy guard reads a .ts file, and the 381 English strings it had never been pointed at are in the catalog.

Fixed

• check_i18n.py never read a .ts file, so every hook toast was invisible to it. The offence sweep walked frontend/src/**/*.tsx and nothing else, which left 381 offences across 90 files unread since the guard was written: nineteen toast.success("…") in src/hooks/** alone, plus the module tables of labels in lib/tool-catalog.ts, lib/ingestion-config.ts and lib/mcp-servers.ts. Widening the glob was not the fix — in a .ts file ; return is a text node and a > b is a count — so JSX_TEXT, MIXED, COUNT and LEAD are gated on the suffix and the rest now read a string literal wherever it sits. All 381 are migrated: 233 messages added to messages/en.json, and the module tables hold keys with the copy resolved where it renders, pure helpers taking the caller's translator (toolStep, toolCaption, ingestionProblems, mergeWithUserCommands). (#446)
• The import/export line-skip keyed on the keyword rather than the module specifier, which in a .ts file hid every export const LABEL = "…" and every default parameter on an export function — getErrorMessage's "An unexpected error occurred", the sentence behind most failed requests here, and PROVIDER_DEFAULT beside a useTranslations import somebody had already added and never used. (#446)
• The MCP add-server dialog rendered a catalog key as its hint. AUTH_CHOICES held hint: "authTokenHint" and the paragraph below the radio group printed it verbatim, in every locale — neither a hardcoded string nor a missing key, so no guard could see it. Found by the duplication rule once the catalog held the sentence. (#446)
• The test translator was rebuilt on every call, where the real useTranslations is a useMemo over stable inputs. A hook putting t in a useCallback's dependencies then handed a new function to every render, and an effect keyed on that callback re-fired forever: the admin conversations screen loaded in a loop and never left its spinner. vitest.setup.ts caches one translator per namespace. (#446)

Removed

• A superseded MCP catalog and two dead helpers. lib/mcp-catalog.ts held a curated table of fourteen servers with their own descriptions, examples and category headings; nothing rendered it — the catalog the product shows is served by the backend from app/core/catalog/mcp_servers.json, is fifty-nine entries deep, and has its own categories. Its copy was dead English, so it was deleted rather than translated, along with MCP_CATEGORIES' four unrendered headings and summarizeIngestion, which only its own test called. gen-mcp-logos.ts now takes its domains from the backend catalog. (#446)

[0.0.101] - 2026-08-11

Three static guards against the code getting worse, and the slop they target swept out of the tree.

Added

• Guards that enforce standards CLAUDE.md only stated. scripts/check_routes.py keeps an endpoint module to routers — a helper moves to a service or a _-prefixed module, or carries a reasoned # routes-helper marker; scripts/check_comments.py rejects ASCII banner comments; and vulture gates unused variables and parameters in make lint. The noisier function-level scan and the frontend knip live in make dead-code as an advisory report, because a blocking function gate on a registry-driven codebase is false positives all the way down. (#595)

Changed

• Route helpers moved out of the endpoint modules. The runs status parser became RunStatus.parse_csv, on the enum that owns the values and shared by the list and export routes; the sharing loaders moved to _sharing_loaders.py.
• Comment slop removed, ~140 lines across the backend and frontend — section labels, restatements, and mechanism-narration. The load-bearing #issue/footgun/invariant comments and the docstrings stay, and CLAUDE.md and code-style.md now state the bar: the default is no comment.
• Two dead items the previous sweep missed, caught by the new vulture gate: sanitize_filename, orphaned when its only caller was removed in #579, and a dead project_id argument on channel_session.create. Closes #521. (#595)

[0.0.100] - 2026-08-10

Dead weight removed across the backend and frontend, and one dead method turned into a real contract.

Changed

• Stripped unreferenced code across the tree. Repository helpers, service methods, sanitizers and frontend exports with no surviving caller are deleted (each traced first), and four frontend exports narrowed to module-internal. Net −892/+53. Not only deletion: the vector store's dead aclose() becomes an abstract contract the application lifespan shuts down through, so teardown no longer reaches past the interface into .engine behind a # type: ignore. (#579)

[0.0.99] - 2026-08-10

Run history can be filtered by rating, and a down-rated run says so — with the comment readable on the run itself.

Added

• Filter run history by rating, and flag a down-rated run. A rated=down filter on run history, and a down_rated_run_ids marker on list rows — tenant-bound, distinct, and the same rating < 0 definition the filter uses, so a marked row is exactly a row the filter returns. In the run detail, the most recent down rating's comment is read off the transcript (RunTranscriptMessage.rating_comment, from get_down_rating_comments_for_messages, batched newest-first), so "what people said was wrong" is readable where the run is read rather than only in the app-admin export. Permission-gated on runs:view. Completes the run side of #209. (#538)

[0.0.98] - 2026-08-10

Runs, approvals and spend export as CSV — exactly the rows the list would show.

Added

• CSV export for runs, approvals and spend. GET /runs/export, /approvals/export and /spend/export each serialise exactly the rows their list route would return, gated as their list sibling is (runs and spend on runs:view, approvals on approvals:decide) with the Scope.OWN floor enforced in-query. An unbounded export gets the two rules it needs by design: a mandatory date range and a row cap that refuses rather than truncates above it. Columns survive a spreadsheet sum — cost_is_partial on runs, partial_run_count on spend, so a wholly unpriced run exports a real 0 beside cost_is_partial=true, never a bare 0 — and CSV formula injection is neutralised. Each export writes an audit_log entry (window, applied filter names, row count — never the request body or a resolved row). An export menu on the Activity page carries the applied filters, gated on runs:view. Closes #211. (#531)

[0.0.97] - 2026-08-10

Regression coverage that every entry point records a run's transcript.

Changed

• Transcript recording is covered for embed, channel and default-agent runs. backend/tests/test_surface_transcripts.py asserts at the repository boundary that a widget run, a channel mention and the default agent each record their turns — role, content, run id, the model and version that actually ran, and tool-call args and results — and that a broken widget run still records what the visitor asked. Closes #205's requirement that the fix ship with a regression test. (#530)

[0.0.96] - 2026-08-10

The sync-source wizard is decomposed into one component per step — a structural refactor, no behaviour change.

Changed

• Sync-source wizard split into per-step components. The 761-line sync-source-wizard.tsx becomes a ~320-line shell (cross-step flow, the shared form, the header and step indicator, and the connectorsFailed / orgIntegrationsFailed flags it hands down) plus one component per step — sync-source-{connector,configure,schedule,clone}-step.tsx — following the pattern #221 set in components/rag/. A folded-in fix routes the empty-config note through next-intl. Closes #461, #540. (#529)

[0.0.95] - 2026-08-10

The Activity tab's spend view breaks down who spent what.

Added

• Per-person spend on the Activity tab. A SpendByPerson card beneath "By agent" on the Spend tab reads /stats/usage?group_by=user over the tab's date window, gated on runs:view (renders nothing and issues no query without it), with delegated runs excluded. A "+N others" line appears when active_users exceeds the rows shown, so a top-N list never reads as the whole organization. Closes #214. (#578, superseding the stacked #527)

[0.0.94] - 2026-08-10

The Activity tab gains a per-version summary that cannot disagree with the dashboard's completed-share figure.

Added

• A version strip on the Activity tab. When narrowed to one agent, a card per version sits above the run table — runs, completed share, cost per run, p95 and the current-version marker. Its "completed share" and the dashboard's Outcomes donut both compute through one shared helper (src/lib/run-outcomes.ts), with cancelled and budget_exceeded in the denominator on both sides, so the two figures cannot drift. Closes #489. (#526)

[0.0.93] - 2026-08-10

A run's transcript is readable by authorization, not only by whoever owns the run.

Added

• GET /api/v1/runs/{run_id}/transcript — returns a run's messages (paginated) to any colleague in the same organization holding runs:view; a run is read by authorization, not by ownership. A caller from another tenant is refused exactly as a run that does not exist is, so existence never leaks. The response's conversation_id is null when the run has no transcript, distinct from an empty items. AgentRunnerService.get_run_transcript resolves the run org-scoped (404 before the permission is read), then checks runs:view (403). Closes #490. (#525)

[0.0.92] - 2026-08-10

The whole-suite test targets run across worker processes, roughly halving them.

Changed

• make test and the other whole-suite targets run across workers. pytest -n auto --maxprocesses 4 on test, test-fast, test-integration and test-cov; pytest-cov combines the per-worker data so the 100% platform gate is unchanged, and scoped pytest <file> runs stay serial (spawning workers for one file costs more than the file). The cap is four because the unit slice is import-bound — every worker imports the app once — and an uncapped -n auto on a many-core machine runs slower than serial, all of it worker startup. Adds pytest-xdist to the dev group. Refs #520. (#570)

[0.0.91] - 2026-08-10

The integration test suite builds its schema once per process instead of before every test, halving it.

Changed

• Integration tests build the schema once, not before every test. The per-test drop_all + create_all (~0.4s of DDL each, very nearly the whole runtime of a suite whose assertions are microseconds of Postgres work) is replaced by a session-scoped build plus a TRUNCATE ... RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE reset between tests. The integration slice drops from ~125s to ~53s, and the per-process _p<pid> database isolation is untouched, so two runs on one machine stay safe. TRUNCATE, not a rollback: the API-flow tests commit through the real session, so their rows would outlive a rollback. Closes #215. Refs #520. (#535)

[0.0.90] - 2026-08-10

Importing the application stops dragging in two SDKs it never uses on the request path, so every process start and scoped test run is a couple of seconds shorter.

Changed

• import app.main no longer pulls in aiogram and prefect. The Telegram, Slack and Mattermost adapters are imported inside lifespan (which the test client never runs) and the sync flows inside their dispatcher, so a cold app import drops from ~5.5s to ~2.3s — a cost every scoped pytest run and every process start paid for libraries neither the API nor the tests touch. A subprocess guard test keeps them out of sys.modules, and a dead _slack_register alias went with it. Runtime behaviour is unchanged; startup imports them as before. Refs #520. (#544)

[0.0.89] - 2026-08-10

Run history gains the duration controls the dashboard's p95 needs rows behind, and the contributor guidance has its test-loop numbers corrected.

Added

• Sort and filter run history by duration — a sortable Took column, a "slow runs" canned view, and a dashboard p95 deep-link that seeds the sort and the time window. The sort is server-side over the whole narrowed set, not one page; the backend query landed with #202 and is reused unchanged. Closes #210. (#528)

Changed

• Contributor guidance — CLAUDE.md now states the scoped-vs-full test rule outright and its runtime figures are corrected against measurement: CI answers in about twelve minutes rather than seven, and a scoped backend file takes a few seconds rather than "under one" (the wait is importing the app, not the run). The same stale CI figure in docs/testing.md and three moved app/core/catalog/ paths in the docs trigger map went with it. Closes #522. (#534)

[0.0.88] - 2026-08-10

Two grouped dependency updates, nothing else. The lockfile resolves cleanly with both applied (uv lock --check), and CI is green on the combination.

Changed

• Agent-framework dependencies — pydantic-ai-slim to 2.26.0 (including its mcp extra), logfire to 4.40.0, and genai-prices to 0.1.1. (#523)
• The rest of the backend — uvicorn[standard] to 0.52.1, alembic to 1.19.0, pymupdf to 1.28.2, liteparse to 2.11.1, google-auth to 2.56.3, boto3 to 1.43.66, and the ty type checker to 0.0.69. (#524)

[0.0.87] - 2026-08-10

Mattermost is a channel you can register and talk to, and the gaps that stopped any channel from being a complete surface are closed with it. One agent can now answer on Mattermost, Slack and Telegram, be watched writing its reply, read the channel it is answering in, and be told how to write for that surface — without editing the spec every surface shares. Closes eleven issues (#41, #24, #22, #10,

205, #157, #152, #208, #26, #153, #514). The delivery-dedup guard a retried

webhook needs is deliberately not here and stays tracked as #167.

Nine migrations, 0013–0021, add the link-request, exposure-prompt and per-binding tool columns and settle the "one agent per bot" rule. SPEC_VERSION stays at 8: the channel-tools capability is assembled per run from the binding that admitted the message, never stored in a published spec.

Added

• A working Mattermost integration. A bot is registered with its own server URL and an operator-supplied webhook secret, and answers over either an outgoing webhook or an authenticated event stream — the latter the right choice behind a VPN, exposing nothing. Registerable from the exposure panel and from the CLI (agenticos cmd channel-add-bot), for a deployment with no browser pointed at it. api_base_url is validated on scheme and shape so an internal address passes. (#41, #24)
• A reply a chat can watch being written. A placeholder post appears the moment the question arrives, grows in place — throttled to about one edit a second — and shows what the agent is doing while a tool runs, on Mattermost, Slack and Telegram through one seam. An adapter that cannot edit a message still posts one finished answer. (#514)
• A per-channel prompt on the binding. House style for a surface — how to lay a message out, how long to answer, which language — appended to the spec's instructions at run time and never substituted for them, seeded per platform and editable beside the environment and session-scope controls. It lives on the exposure row, so it never enters a client's exported YAML. (#153)
• An agent can read the channel it is answering in — its info and members — through tools granted by the binding, so "may it read what was said here" has a different answer on an internal server and a customer one.
• Account linking and complete channel runs. /link mints a code and @slug runs as the person who typed it; a channel run records its messages and the surface it arrived on, renders a chart as an image, and answers a tool approval in the thread that asked for it. (#10, #205, #208, #157, #152)

Changed

• webhook_secret is sealed at rest through the vault, beside the three secrets that already were; the Mattermost webhook accepts the token Mattermost generates rather than one minted locally, while Telegram keeps minting the one we hand out. (#22)
• A channel webhook hands its work over with spawn_after_commit, so the background run sees the row the request just wrote. (#26)
• One bot serves one agent; a second binding to the same bot is refused.

Fixed

• A failed final live-reply edit re-posts the answer whole instead of blanking it; "needs approval" is said only when a run actually parked; a resumed channel run keeps its exposure prompt and channel tools; and the chart renderer sizes a stacked bar to the stack rather than the tallest bar, treats a non-finite value as a gap, and draws in any colour Pillow accepts.

[0.0.86] - 2026-08-09

A file dragged into the chat lands wherever it is dropped.

Changed

• The whole page is the drop target. Attaching a file by dragging it meant hitting the composer - a strip a few centimetres tall at the bottom of the window - and missing it was not a no-op: the browser's default for a dropped file is to open it, so a drop anywhere else navigated the tab away from the conversation and whatever was half-typed in it. The same preventDefault that lets the page take the file is what stops the browser taking it, so listening on the window fixes both halves at once. While a file is over the page an overlay covers it: the ground blurred, a dashed card in the middle, and the per-file size limit written on it, because a 60MB video refused after the drag is a round trip nobody needed to make.

A drag carrying anything other than files - selected text, a link, one of the app's own draggable rows - is left entirely alone, not even prevented. Nothing is accepted while the composer is disabled (an archived conversation, a run waiting on an approval), and the overlay not appearing is what says so.

Fixed

• The DataTransfer type name was in the message catalog. The check for "this drag carries files" compared against a translated key, so the DOM's own constant Files sat in en.json as copy - and translating it would have stopped drag-and-drop working with nothing on screen to say why.

[0.0.85] - 2026-08-09

Approving a tool call, and everything that was missing on the other side of it. A run that stopped for a person, was let through, and carried on had almost none of that written down — so the second half of a turn was a blank, and the record of it was worse than the screen.

Fixed

• A continuation now says what it did. POST /runs/{id}/resume executes the agent inside the request rather than on the socket a conversation streams, so its tool calls reached nobody: the response carried the answer, the status and the cost, and never the work. Approving a command showed nothing running, then asked for a second approval for a step that had never been drawn, and finished with a reply that accounted for neither. The response now carries the calls, in order, each with what came back (#505).
• A continuation with no answer recorded nothing at all. The transcript wrote the assistant turn only when there was an answer, and a segment that runs a command and then parks on a second one has none — so the command it ran, its arguments and its result were never written. Three commands ran in a sandbox and history accounted for one.
• What an approved call returned is recorded. Its row is written open when the run parks; the resume that finally runs it produces the return without the call it belongs to, so nothing ever closed the row. The one call somebody deliberately reviewed was the one call that opened onto nothing (#506).
• One run is drawn as one turn. A run that parks leaves several assistant messages — each segment written as it happens, rather than folded back into a turn somebody has already read — and each drew its own avatar and agent name. One question read as three agents answering it. Consecutive messages of the same run are now one turn: the avatar and the name once, at the top, and the time and the cost once, under the end.
• The approval panel belongs to its conversation. It followed the reader into another thread and its buttons still worked, so a call could be decided from under a different agent's transcript — settling a step in messages that were no longer loaded, with nothing on screen changing to say it had happened (#507).
• A replayed step no longer animates. A tool call is stored as running until something records its outcome, and an expiry runs nothing — so the step it parked on stayed open and pulsed in the present tense under a conversation that had ended days earlier. The expiry sweep closes those steps now, and a replayed call still marked in flight renders as unfinished: not an error, not a success, the outcome nobody wrote down.

[0.0.84] - 2026-08-09

The chat surface, seven issues deep — plus the two things a conversation could not previously say about itself: what order a turn happened in, and what it is waiting for.

Added

• A turn's order is recorded rather than reconstructed. messages.parts (migration 0012) stores the sequence as it was streamed — reasoning, the text the model wrote, and the tools it called, interleaved as they occurred. A row used to say what a turn contained and never when, so a client replaying one had to invent an order, and the only one it could invent was reasoning, then every tool, then the answer. A turn that introduced three charts, drew them and summarised them lost its introduction on save and showed the summary above the work it described. Null on a turn of one part and on anything written before this, which is a client's signal to fall back rather than render nothing.
• Search, sort and an agent filter on the conversation sidebar, served by the route rather than applied to the thirty threads already fetched. The tab counts are gone rather than moved: they counted what had been fetched, so a deployment holding hundreds read "Active 8 · Archived 2". The collapsed rail carries the recent threads, a search that opens with the cursor in the box, and Archived.
• Spreadsheets can be attached and read. .xlsx and .xlsm join the allowed types, parsed with openpyxl — every sheet named, rows tab-separated — and the extraction is written beside the original in a workspace exactly as a PDF's is. An agent cannot open a workbook: run_python has no filesystem and the sandbox has no spreadsheet library, so accepting one without parsing it would have been worse than the refusal it replaces.

Fixed

• create_chart drew an empty frame. data: list[dict[str, Any]] reaches a model as an array of objects with no declared properties, so the only row the schema promised was valid was {} — which is what arrived, beside a full set of series, colours and axis titles. The numbers are columns now: x_values and one values list per series, with nothing in the signature left unsaid.
• Tool calls rendered as raw JSON. web_search and create_chart were renamed in the backend and three of four frontend files went on matching the old names. One table now, lib/tool-catalog.ts, checked against the capability registry in both directions by a backend test.
• One file viewer and one file card, everywhere. Opening a file meant four different things depending on where it was clicked, and showing one meant three.
• The file viewer was served the model's read of a file, not the file. StateBackend.read numbers every line for an agent citing one; the viewer showed those numbers, so Source could not be copied and an HTML preview rendered them as page content.
• A parked run can be decided from the conversation it stopped in. A resume that reaches a second gated call parks again, and nothing said so — the panel closed on a run still waiting, leaving the approvals queue as the only way to finish it. The resume response carries what is still parked, the panel reopens on the same turn, and an approved step stops saying it is waiting for approval.
• Every message after the first was dropped on a resumed thread. persist_user_turn called two functions without a required keyword, and the TypeError was logged as "failed to persist conversation".
• Charts open wherever they sit in a turn rather than only as the last step; a chart's x-axis title no longer lands on its legend; a long paste attaches as a file instead of filling the composer; run_python folds its code once output arrives; the reasoning block renders Markdown; and the Builder's inline specialists can be discarded without scrolling past six sections to find the control.

[0.0.83] - 2026-08-08

Fixed

• The Activity page's run list and the RUNS figure only moved on a full page reload. useRuns — read by both the RUNS figure and the Run history tab — carried the app-wide query defaults (staleTime five minutes, refetchOnWindowFocus off), so after an agent ran, the Runs tab sat at "No runs yet" and the RUNS count at zero beside a Spend tab that already counted the run, until the page was reloaded. It now spreads DASHBOARD_FRESHNESS like useSpend, useUsageStats and useApprovals, so returning to the tab refetches. The runs were written and GET /runs returned them throughout — this was only a stale client cache. (#499)

[0.0.82] - 2026-08-07

Added

• Activity is rebuilt on our own rows. /runs reads agent_runs, messages and tool_calls, so no panel goes blank on a deployment that never set LOGFIRE_TOKEN. Three tabs — Runs, Approvals, Spend — each owning its own request, loading state, empty state and retry, which is the only arrangement in which "nothing is waiting" and "we could not ask" stay different sentences. The Approvals tab is withheld whole from a caller without approvals:decide rather than shown with its buttons removed: reading the queue takes the same permission as deciding one, so a refused caller was reading a 403 drawn as "Nothing waiting — agents are running without needing you".
• messages.run_id — which run produced a turn, and what a run detail view is built on. Nullable, ON DELETE SET NULL, no backfill: deleting a run must not delete the transcript, and a turn written outside a run has no run to name. Chosen over windowing messages between a run's started_at and ended_at, which is quietly wrong — two runs in one thread interleave, so the first run's window contains the second's turns, and a run that never ended yields an empty window that reads as "nothing was recorded".
• Nine filters on run history, each narrowing the page and the count together: a set of statuses (failed,budget_exceeded is the query somebody actually types), surface, who it ran as, a time window, environment, exposure, version, "slower than", and whether anybody rated it down. Sorting by duration is computed in SQL over the whole narrowed set, because sorting a page of twenty-five sorts the wrong set — that is the gap between "p95 is 14.8s" on the dashboard and those runs.
• Spend by provider and by key, which a per-agent breakdown cannot answer: an invoice arrives from a vendor, and a leaked key is found by what was spent through it.
• The role-aware dashboard (#149): one route, one widget registry, twenty-seven cards. Which cards a caller gets is decided by the permissions they hold, never by their role name.
• Where agents run code (#455): sandbox capacity, sessions and runtime cards in that registry — how much room is left, what is running, and what the host allows, which are the three questions an operator has when an agent dies inside a container.
• One knowledge surface (#221): /rag lists the bases, /rag/[id] is the base itself, and /kb only redirects. Search now defaults to every base the caller can read instead of one collection at a time, and each result carries its document, page, score and which base it came from.
• connections:view, so an operator can watch where sandboxes run without being handed the keys to them. connections:manage did two jobs: reading a host's session list, its activity log and the memory and CPU ceilings its service enforces, and pointing a connection at an address and attaching the vault secret that starts containers there. Only owner, admin and builder held it, so the operator dashboard had no sandbox section at all — despite those reads being exactly the operator's questions ("why did that agent just get a 429"). The reads (GET /sandbox-connections, /runtimes, /{id}/policy, /{id}/sessions, and the session events) now carry connections:view, which operator holds; create, edit, delete, probe, the local-service peek and the credential store stay on connections:manage. Nothing in the catalog implies one permission from another, so the roles that manage connections were given the read alongside it and lose no access.
• Two host-wide session numerators (#495), so all three ceilings on GET /sandbox-connections/{id}/sessions divide against something honest. len(sessions) is scoped to the caller's organization and was being divided by SANDBOXD_MAX_SESSIONS and SANDBOXD_MAX_OPEN_SESSIONS, both host-wide — so an operator under their own ceiling and still refused a session had no way to see the host was full of another tenant's work.

Fixed

• Four surfaces were recording nothing at all. Writing the transcript was each surface's job and they were not equal: web chat recorded everything, a channel bot recorded two lines of text, and the embedded widget, a channel mention, the HTTP API and every resumed run recorded nothing — so an organization was billed for an answer given to a visitor on a client's site with no row saying what was asked or what was said back. It is written from AgentRunnerService._run now, the one place a non-streaming run executes, because a thing every surface has to remember is a thing the next surface will not. The write runs inside a SAVEPOINT: a failed transcript rolls back only itself, and the run row's status, cost and tokens still commit.
• A streaming chat turn that did not finish threw its answer away. A run that failed, hit its budget, was stopped or lost its socket never returns a ChatTurn, so the write on the success path was skipped and everything the model had already streamed was discarded — leaving the run in history pointing at a transcript holding the question and nothing else. That is the run somebody opens.
• A delegate's spend was billed to its parent's vendor. Every run in a tree shares one ledger, so a parent's cost_usd already contains its children's: counting every row billed the money twice, and counting only top-level rows totalled correctly while attributing the delegate's spend to the wrong provider and the wrong key. Each row now carries what it spent itself, which nests and still sums to the bill.
• logfire_trace_id was null on every row ever written. finish() accepted one from the day the column existed and no caller ever passed it, so the write was guarded by a condition that was always false and the field the public API documents as a deep link into the trace was empty. It is read at the point of writing now, on every path out of a run — including the failed ones, which are the runs somebody wants a trace for.
• An embedded run was recorded as web, and a Mattermost mention as api. Nothing errored; the numbers simply landed in the wrong bucket, and every reader of the column inherited it. A widget on somebody else's public site and an employee in the dashboard are not the same thing to anyone asking how this product is used.
• The approvals queue had no stable order to page through. created_at comes from server_default=func.now(), which Postgres answers with the transaction timestamp, and a run parks on all of its outstanding calls at once — so every call a fan-out parked shared an instant exactly, and a page boundary drawn through them let a row come back on two pages or on neither.
• The count of what is waiting stopped at fifty. GET /approvals answers fifty rows at a time and the figure drew items.length, so a queue of a hundred and twenty read 50 and went on reading 50 however long it grew. A count that saturates is worse than a missing one: nothing on screen looks unusual.
• kind never reached a client (#494). SandboxConnectionService.sessions() sets it on both return paths, but SandboxSessionList never declared the field, so response_model stripped it — and a Daytona host holding no sessions by design was byte-for-byte identical to an idle docker host.
• The ratings table drew nothing at all on a failed request. Its error state was folded into empty, and a failure leaves no rows array for the empty branch to fire on — so neither rendered, and an app admin reading a broken endpoint saw a header row over blank space with no reason to think anything was wrong.
• The test suite resolved its Postgres password twice (#491), with two different defaults, so any checkout without a backend/.env failed two tests for a reason that had nothing to do with the code.

Changed

• SPEC_VERSION is 8. observability.organization and observability.project say where an agent's traces can be read, which a write token does not carry. Both optional with a default, so every stored document and every client's exported YAML keeps loading unchanged and there is no migration to write. Both are validated as slugs rather than only length-bounded: they are interpolated into a URL path, and a value with a slash or a query character would escape it.

[0.0.81] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• 145 more keys came out of messages/en.json, and 82 of them had a hand-written Polish translation — done for nobody, because nothing read the English either. Another 43 messages had their words written out in the source beside the key that held them, so the catalogue looked migrated while the literal stayed on screen. That is worse than an unmigrated string: the guard counted it as handled (#425).
• A sentence split across two keys, its tail beginning at a full stop, so neither half reads as copy to anything looking at one key at a time.

Added

• Three rules, all anchored on the catalogue rather than the source, so none has to decide what a text node is — which is how two of them reach .ts files the offence sweep has never opened: a key nothing reads, a message whose words also sit in the source, and a value opening on . , : ;.

[0.0.80] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• 166 values came out of messages/en.json: 18 Tailwind class lists, still being read back through cn(t("…")) so a translator opening pl.json was asked to translate CSS, and 148 fragments of JavaScript source that nothing read at all. The catalogue goes 2849 → 2696 (#348).
• check_i18n.py could not see copy passed through a prop it did not know: READABLE_ATTRS had no noun, so <Pager> took one from six call sites as a plain English word and rendered 3 of 40 skills under pl, where no plural can agree with the count. The word is inside the message now (#362).
• The knowledge-base document table told a Viewer to drag in files they may not upload (#349).
• SharingPanel interpolated an English noun into five sentences and pluralised it with an s (#420).

[0.0.79] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• A failed sync source was drawn exactly like a successful one. SyncStatusBadge tested status === "failed", which the worker never writes — it writes done and error — so every finished and every failed sync fell through to the same grey token (#356).
• The document badge twenty lines above it was wrong the same way, and worse: three of its four keys (completed, pending, failed) are names nothing writes, against the service's processing/done/error. It had been "fixed" onto that wrong vocabulary once already.
• /rag's status icon drew anything it did not recognise as a spinner, so a cancelled sync spun for the life of the page.
• The sync wizard's target-collection picker could not be reached from any of its three call sites, so "Add source" on /rag — where the tab lists the whole organization's sources — filed against whichever collection the sidebar happened to have selected, invisibly (#434).
• Creating a collection on /rag reported every refusal as "Failed to create collection", discarding the server's own message — which is what made 0.0.66's better 400 invisible on the only screen that creates one by name (#436).

Added

• frontend/src/lib/rag-status.ts — one source for the vocabulary, naming the three columns that share it and what writes each.

[0.0.78] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• Seven select triggers repeated a badge that only means something in the list — "deployment default", "not on this host" — where a comparison against the other options has nothing to compare against. They move into SelectItem's trailing slot, which renders outside ItemText and so is not inherited by the closed trigger (#341).
• Create knowledge base could not say the embedding-model list had failed: loading and refused were the same pixels. Refused now has its own branch and names the default the collection will get anyway (#365).
• The runtime field lost its only warning when the badge moved, and connection-dialog saves default_runtime without validating it — so you could probe a host, pick an alias it had just refused, and save with nothing dissenting. An explicit line under the field restores it, and restores it for screen readers too, since Radix names an option by ItemText alone.

[0.0.77] - 2026-08-07

Security

• The chat's model picker created an organization-wide model profile without checking connections:manage, so anybody who could open a conversation was offered the form and refused by the API (#419).
• The chat's approval panel offered editable arguments and Submit to anybody a parked run streamed to, though deciding an approval needs approvals:decide, which neither member nor builder holds. The banner and the arguments stay, read-only; the controls become a sentence (#438).

[0.0.76] - 2026-08-07

Security

• InlineSecret offered a vault write at seven call sites and only one checked secrets:edit, so six of them showed the form and let the API answer 403. The permission is now checked inside the component, because every call site posts the same endpoint — a per-caller gate is one condition written seven times and forgotten six of them (#361).

Fixed

• Two test fixtures answered /me/permissions with a list, which is a TypeError inside usePermissions rather than "no permissions" — so those specs had been passing for the wrong reason.

[0.0.75] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• The admin conversations screen's Owner filter was permanently empty. Its BFF proxy forwarded to a route that has never existed — the path matched /admin/conversations/{conversation_id} instead, which 422'd trying to parse a UUID — and both admin proxies dropped sort_by and sort_dir on the way through (#413).
• The admin users table drew a Role column for a field the API stopped returning in migration 0066, so it had been blank since. It now renders conversation_count, which the backend had been joining for on every page load and nothing read (#414).
• The skills library marked a skill uninstalled that cannot be installed, so Install answered 409 (#415).

Added

• test_bff_forwarded_paths.py reads every /api/v1/… literal out of the route handlers and checks it against the application's own route table, in declaration order, validating each hard-coded segment through the field FastAPI would use. Over 46 forwarded paths it finds exactly one defect — the one above.

[0.0.74] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• A tool call nobody decided parked its run for ever. Approvals still pending after their window are now swept to expired — recorded as a decision nobody made (decided_by_user_id IS NULL) rather than as a denial somebody issued, so the audit trail says what actually happened (#178).

[0.0.73] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• The web chat billed nothing for the embedding calls behind a knowledge search. Metering lived at the call site, so a surface that forgot it under-reported silently: record_ambient_usage found no active ledger and dropped the cost, the run's own total was short, the organization's month never saw it, and nothing raised. The meter moved inside execute and iterate, so every surface that runs an agent is metered by construction rather than by remembering (#16).

[0.0.72] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• The dev and production stacks notice a worker whose event loop has stopped turning (#358). Both were where #336 found them: docker-compose-dev.yml runs a single unsupervised uvicorn, and docker-compose-prod.yml runs uvicorn's Multiprocess, which pings each worker over a pipe answered by a thread — and a thread keeps answering while the loop is blocked, so the one stack with cover had cover against the least likely failure. The worker now judges its own loop from a thread (app/core/watchdog.py) and kills its own process, which turns a wedge into the one failure all three stacks already handle. Neither supervisor was replaced and PID 1 is untouched in all three.
• Ctrl+C returns from a worker that wedged before its first beat (#366). The reload supervisor escalated to SIGKILL on a verdict it could not reach for a worker that had never beaten — one hung on a Postgres that is down, say — so the shutdown waited out Docker's ten-second grace period instead. It now terminates and joins with a bound, and says which of the two it killed.

Changed

• RELOAD_WEDGED_AFTER is now EVENT_LOOP_WEDGED_AFTER. It is no longer only the reload supervisor's: the worker's own watchdog reads the same variable, so one number turns the check off for a debugging session rather than leaving one of the two judges running to kill it.

[0.0.71] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• Ingestion and sync flows were spawned before the transaction that wrote the row they read had committed, so a flow could start, look for its own document row and not find it — an upload answered processing that stayed that way. spawn_after_commit queues the work on the session and _managed_session starts it two statements after commit() (#417).
• rag-source-sync cancelled the sync it had just reported starting: asyncio.run kills pending tasks on the way out (#439).
• POST /rag/documents/{id}/retry queued nothing and cleared the error message, so a retry was a one-way trip into permanent processing. A bare ValueError on a decided refusal is now a 400 rather than a 500 (#441).

[0.0.70] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• A write was answered before its transaction committed, so the next read could miss it. get_db_session commits in the exit code of a Depends-with-yield, and FastAPI unwinds that stack after the response has been written — so a 2xx said the request had been handled, not that the write was readable. One keyword argument, scope="function", moves the commit in front of the response (#353).
• A failed request now rolls back before the error response is built rather than after it, because the exception unwinds the same stack. A caller could be told 404 while the partial write causing it was still open.
• A failed health probe left the session's transaction aborted, which on the new ordering turned an intended 503 into a 500 — on the endpoint an operator reads when something is already wrong (#416).

[0.0.69] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• Admin user and conversation search did not escape LIKE wildcards, so a caller typing % or _ changed what the query meant rather than searching for it: _ matched any single character and % matched everything, which is a wrong-rows bug and a cheap way to make an admin listing scan far more than it should. All three sites now go through one helper on SQLAlchemy's icontains(autoescape=True) (#372).
• Admin listings sorted on nullable columns without ordering nulls, so the emptiest rows led page one (#411).

Removed

• escape_sql_like in core/sanitize.py — dead, and half-right in a way that would have been worse than nothing had anything called it.

[0.0.68] - 2026-08-07

Security

• An app admin's password reset was written to the audit trail in plaintext. The request body was dumped into app_admin_audit_logs.details, so resetting a password recorded it (#412).
• A refusal's details described the server rather than the refusal: an upstream client's exception text on a 503, container filesystem paths on a 500, and a provider base URL echoed back on four validation errors — one of which exists because the URL carries a password. The diagnosis moves to the log; the response names the field that explains the refusal (#342).
• A sandbox address could carry userinfo, which probe_policy echoed into both the response and the log. ServiceAddress was the only one of the three URL validators not refusing credentials.

Fixed

• The capability registry echoed a rejected configuration back to the caller in a 400, unlike the identical call one module over.

[0.0.67] - 2026-08-07

Security

• A failed ingest stored a vendor SDK's exception text in rag_documents.error_message and the dashboard rendered it. An embedding or vector-store client's message can carry an endpoint, a key fragment, a bucket name or an internal host — and stored, that is a durable leak read later by whoever looks at a failed upload, rather than the transient one 0.0.38 closed on the HTTP path. Nine sites now record the stage, the exception type as a symbol, and what to do about it; the text goes to the worker log (#423).

Fixed

• The outermost ingestion handler overwrote the innermost one's message, so a parse failure — the commonest path — reported "could not be ingested" rather than "could not be read". Harmless while all three wrote the same str(exc); not harmless once the innermost knew which stage had failed.

[0.0.66] - 2026-08-07

Security

• POST /kb accepted any collection_name and never claimed it, so a member with collections:edit could point a knowledge base at another organization's vector table and read and write it through every gate that followed. claim had exactly one call site, the /rag route (#367).
• A collection name over 45 characters truncated onto another collection's table. The bound is derived from the longest identifier built from a name — rag_<name>_embedding_idx, not rag_<name> — so a name of 46 to 59 characters truncated only the index name, CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS then found the first collection's index and built nothing, and the second collection searched unindexed at the first one's width (#368).
• Upper case is refused. Postgres folds an unquoted identifier, so Handbook and handbook were two rows, two collections the platform believed distinct, and one physical table holding both tenants' vectors — #368's defect reached by another route. Refused rather than normalised: this branch's argument is that an unusable name is turned away, not silently rewritten into something the caller never typed.

Fixed

• A malformed or reserved collection name answers 400 rather than 500 (#371).
• Dropping a collection whose name the new rules refuse no longer swallows the refusal and orphan the vector table.

[0.0.65] - 2026-08-07

Security

• A Drive file whose name is a path escaped the sync directory. A remote filename is attacker-controlled from this system's point of view — anyone who can share a file into a synced folder chooses it — so the write target is now resolved and confirmed to be inside the directory rather than sanitised by substitution, which makes .., its encodings, homoglyphs and a pre-existing symlink one question instead of a blacklist that is always one entry short (#370).
• A sync source's folder_id was interpolated into the Drive query unescaped. It is now allowlisted where the query is built — the single funnel both the configured folder and every recursed sub-folder pass through, so rows written before the check are covered too — and asked again by every route that stores a config, not only by create (#369).
• Two deployment-wide credential fallbacks removed. A tenant's folder_id or bucket could widen a query running under the operator's identity, which turns one field of a source's own configuration into a reach across organizations. The S3 case was the worse of the two: both settings default to empty, so the fallback resolved to None and boto3 fell through to the container's own credential chain.

Changed

• The write target is now BaseSyncConnector.download_file's decision, with connectors implementing _fetch. A connector added later cannot choose a path, and a test asserts none overrides it.

[0.0.64] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• Every JSON response the platform proxy returns now declares a cache policy. It carried none — no Cache-Control, no ETag, no Last-Modified — on every mutable collection on the surface, and silence is not "do not cache": a 200 with no policy is one the browser may reuse on its own judgement. Every answer here depends on a cookie, a permission set and an organization header, so there is nothing on this surface a shared or heuristic cache may keep. A backend that does name a policy still wins, which is how the catalog icons and the embed bundle keep theirs.

[0.0.63] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• A stacked pull request ran no CI at all, and its checks list was empty rather than red. ci.yml triggered on pull_request: branches: [main, master], which matches on the base, so a branch opened against another branch matched no trigger — and an empty check list reads as "still running" rather than "nobody looked". Four pull requests merged that way in one day, each verified only locally. The trigger no longer filters on the base (#359).
• docs/file-processing.md described a platform-admin RAG model this project replaced: "any authenticated user can search any collection", "only admins can manage them". All three claims were false, and the same paragraph sat under its own heading in docs/architecture.md, which a search for "only admins" misses because that copy reads Only **admins** (#354).

Changed

• Every CI job now carries a timeout-minutes, each several times its measured runtime. Only changes had one, so a hung job ran to the platform default rather than to a number somebody chose (#364).

[0.0.62] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• None of the ten cases around mask_generics in the i18n guard's test file tested it: stub the function to return text and all ten still passed, while the guard then reported three false positives over the real tree. It was load-bearing and untested, so a refactor could have broken it with only a tree-wide make lint to notice. One case now fails without it.

[0.0.61] - 2026-08-07

Security

• h2 bumped past CVE-2026-71554.

[0.0.60] - 2026-08-07

Fixed

• main did not pass make lint-backend. Two ruff findings — RET501 and a RUF100 for a noqa naming a rule this project does not select — arrived with PRs merged during the GitHub Actions outage, when every check sat pending and nobody could see them. Because the pre-commit hook runs ruff check . --fix over the whole tree regardless of what is staged, it kept rewriting those two files into unrelated commits and rolling them back, so every branch cut from main started red on a gate it had not broken (#407).

[0.0.59] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• tests/test_migrations.py ran for the first time. It needed a database called agenticos_migrations_test, a missing one became a module-level skip, and nothing in the repository ever created it — so the only assertions that downgrade() works at all reported "4 skipped" into a green build on every CI run this project has ever had (#234). The module creates that database before its first test and drops it after its last, with the process id in the name so two runs on one machine cannot drop each other's mid-upgrade (#346).
• A remaining skip now means one thing only: no Postgres answered. Under CI it is not a skip at all but a failure, because a declared service container that did not come up is not a laptop without Docker.
• The probe says why the server did not answer. A Postgres that is up and refusing — a wrong password, a database in recovery — used to be reported as a container that never started.

[0.0.58] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• make install did not create backend/.env, the third thing a fresh checkout is missing. Everything running on the host reads it — db-check, db-upgrade, run, and pytest through app.core.config — so without one POSTGRES_PASSWORD is empty and alembic check is refused with fe_sendauth: no password supplied, four minutes into make check. It is copied from the example, once, and an existing file is never overwritten (#299).
• REDIS_PASSWORD carried a live placeholder in the example. Copied into a dev .env it made every request fail against a local redis that has no requirepass, and in a deployed stack it let change-me-in-production be inherited from an example file. It is commented out in both directions now, and the deployed compose files already refuse to start without a real one.
• The empty SANDBOXD_TOKEN= in the example did not match the ^SANDBOXD_TOKEN=. that make dev greps for, so a fresh checkout ended up with the key twice and worked only by last-wins. The assignment is gone; the comment stays.

[0.0.57] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• make install did not install the frontend toolchain, so a fresh checkout could not run make check at all: eslint, prettier, tsc, vitest and next live only in frontend/node_modules, and the first four minutes of check are the backend half, so it said eslint: command not found well after you had walked away (#227).

Changed

• test_ci_parity.py now holds the setup commands to the mirror-image rule: a gating job may prepare its runner however it likes, as long as make install prepares a laptop the same way. The next toolchain CI adds has to land in install or be exempted with a written reason.
• make quickstart no longer claims to install dependencies in docs/commands.md. It is quickstart: dev, and nothing in that chain reaches install — which sent people down exactly the road this release closes.

[0.0.56] - 2026-08-06

Changed

• The last four route handlers that read a repository directly now go through a service, which is what .claude/rules/architecture.md has always asked for: the audit listing, a knowledge base's sync logs, an org integration's sync logs, and the vault key a provider catalog is fetched with (#232).
• AuditService is new. The /audit route held "an entry belongs to exactly one organization" as a keyword argument it filled in itself, which is a scope no service test can see and one the next reader of that entity would have had to know to repeat.
• Both surfaces showing a sync source's history read it through SyncSourceService.list_logs rather than each carrying its own query and its own copy of the same twelve-field mapping.
• The provider-listing key moves out of a private helper in the route and into OrganizationSecretService, so nothing in the HTTP layer unseals a secret.

[0.0.55] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The reserved-names integration test set the vector store's resolver to None, which stopped being valid in 0.0.43 when the resolver became required and its None short-circuit was deleted. _for_collection calls it unconditionally, so the test raised TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not callable on every run with a real database. Shipped in 0.0.45 and fixed here.

[0.0.54] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• A knowledge base's sync history came back short. The route read every log carrying that source id, applied limit in SQL, and only then dropped the rows belonging to another collection — so the page was cut before the thinning. A source repointed at another base (SyncSourceUpdate carries collection_name, and earlier runs keep the name they ran against) made a request for twenty runs answer with fewer, total described the survivors rather than the source, and there was no way to page past the gap. The source is resolved against the base first now (#233).
• A source that is not this base's answers 404 rather than 200 []. Both rendered "no syncs yet", and one of them was a request that should have failed.

[0.0.53] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The double-backtick guard skipped every directory called worktrees, which was the wrong rule twice over: it silently stopped reading a docs/worktrees/ that is only a directory with a name, and it still walked a git worktree placed anywhere else. It now detects a nested checkout — a .git file or directory — and declines to descend into it, which is what the rule always meant (#225).
• The self-exemption matched one absolute path, so every copy of the script under a worktree was reported as three findings on a line nobody had edited. It matches the file's name now, and --fix is safe on a copy for the same reason.

[0.0.52] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• scripts/check_i18n.py skipped any line containing =>, because a type like (() => Promise<void>) | null reads as a text node to a regex — and an inline handler is the most common thing on a JSX line, so the exemption was far wider than the problem. It also matched nothing when a text node spanned two lines, which the formatter does freely. The guard now masks generics rather than skipping the line, and reads interpolation rules over the whole file (#314).
• 55 strings across 30 files that those two blind spots had been hiding, including two menu items sitting between translated siblings, and English compiled into the two model-picker components (#332).

[0.0.51] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• scripts/check_i18n.py walked past two shapes of hardcoded copy: a sentence that begins with a word before its interpolation, and a count built with a lambda rather than an ICU plural. Both render in English under any locale, and make lint reported clean over them (#249).

[0.0.50] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The embedding Model select in Create knowledge base never showed its value — it said "Loading models…" for as long as the dialog was open, while the list below it was populated. Radix writes the new value onto a hidden native select and dispatches change before the items have registered their options, so the value read back was empty and clobbered the state. This is the one choice in the dialog that cannot be revisited, since a collection's embedding width is frozen at creation (#328).
• The agent builder offered the add-model form to anyone who could open it, though submitting needs connections:manage, and the store-a-key form inside it never checked secrets:edit. A control the caller may not use is not rendered (#329).
• Two buttons in the same dialog were both called "Add a key" while writing different secrets. By accessible name they were indistinguishable, so a screen reader heard the same button twice (#331).

[0.0.49] - 2026-08-06

Changed

• Every place a provider or a provider key is chosen now draws the same row — brand mark, name, an optional masked hint. Choosing an embedding key in Create knowledge base offered bare strings while the agent builder three clicks away drew the mark, and the two did not look like the same product. Ten pickers converge on one primitive, including two that had hand-copied the row and one where two different keys rendered as the same line (#304).

Fixed

• A provider mark's <title> was being used as its option's type-to-search key, so every model in Create knowledge base answered to openrouter… rather than to its own name.
• The tick marking a stored key was inherited by the closed select's trigger, where it reads as "selected" rather than "has a key".

[0.0.48] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The Describe images model control in Create knowledge base was the agent builder's picker rendered in its lesser branch: a bare radio list, with no provider/model/key form, no way to say whether the chosen profile can authenticate at all, and — on a deployment with no saved profiles — a dead end offering no way out of itself (#305).

Changed

• ModelProfilePicker's allowAdd meant two things at once: show the form, and offer the bin on every saved row. They are now allowAdd and allowRemove. The knowledge-base dialog gets the first only, so it can create a model and a key but cannot destroy an organization-wide profile that agents point at. The current-model line, which is what says a profile has no key, renders in both shapes.
• The add-model form in that dialog is gated on connections:manage; it posts a model profile, and a control the caller may not use is not rendered.

[0.0.47] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The knowledge-base detail page stated the size of the page the table had loaded, not the size of the collection. A collection holding fifty-seven documents said "20 documents" under its own title, and pressing Load more made the number climb, which reads as ingestion happening rather than the page correcting itself. The document count now reads the collection's total; the vector count says plainly that it counts what is loaded, until everything is (#324).
• Nine strings in the knowledge-base pages rendered in English under any locale — single words below the guard's threshold, text nodes alone on a line, copy behind an &&, and a schedule read as "every 30m". Two of them are counts and are now ICU plurals (#325).
• Drag-and-drop upload compared a translated string against the browser's DataTransfer type. Under Polish that comparison could never match, so dropping a file would have done nothing.

Changed

• A Tailwind class list was being stored in messages/en.json and read through the translator, so a translator opening pl.json was asked to translate CSS.

[0.0.46] - 2026-08-06

Changed

• A knowledge base is deleted from its own page, not from the card in the list. The only control used to be a hover-revealed trash icon sitting on top of a whole-card link — the most destructive action on the resource, one mis-aimed click away from opening it, on the surface that shows least about what is about to be destroyed. It is now in the detail page's actions menu, behind collections:edit, behind a confirmation naming the collection and its real document count, and it is not offered for the default collection, which the server refuses (#303).
• The three window.confirm calls in the knowledge-base pages are proper confirmation dialogs with translated copy. A raw confirm() argument is hardcoded English the i18n guard cannot see.

Fixed

• Both delete dialogs now disable while the request is in flight. A double-click sent a second DELETE and toasted a 404 over a removal that had worked.

[0.0.45] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• A collection could be named after a model table. _table("documents") derives rag_documents, which is the table tracking every organization's ingested documents, so GET /rag/collections/documents/info returned every organization's document count and the delete path issued a DROP TABLE against it. Nothing refused the name, and documents was the default collection name, so the collision sat on the documented first-run path. Both the store and KnowledgeBaseService.create now refuse a name that collides with a declared model table (#345).

Changed

• The default collection name is now default, one constant shared by the four rag-* commands and two schemas, pinned by a test that fails if it is ever set to a model table's name. RAGSettings.collection_name was read nowhere and is deleted.

[0.0.44] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• PgVectorStore.list_collections() reported a collection called documents that does not exist. It matched every table by name prefix, and rag_documents — the model table tracking ingested documents — matched. The listing has held that phantom on every deployment since the table existed, and rag-stats reported the row count of that tracking table as a vector count. Collection membership is now decided by is_runtime_vector_table, the same predicate alembic uses, so the two answer from one source (#339).
• The prefix match also treated _ as a SQL wildcard, so a table named ragXfoo listed as a collection called Xfoo.

[0.0.43] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• Document ingestion ignored the collection's own embedding key and model. The worker built its vector store with no resolver, so the collection's embedding_secret_id — validated and stored when the collection was created — was never read. On a deployment with no OPENROUTER_API_KEY this crashed with advice to set one; where both were set it was worse than a crash, billing the deployment's account while the UI said the organization's key paid. The collection's recorded model was ignored the same way, so a collection could be indexed by one model and searched by another (#306).
• The three ways key resolution can silently fall back to the deployment key — a missing secret row, an unseal failure, the wrong kind — now reach the flow log the operator reads, and the error names the collection and which key it tried.

Changed

• resolver is now required on PgVectorStore rather than defaulting to None. Five call sites passed it and one forgot; the default is what made forgetting silent.

[0.0.42] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• make db-check failed on any database that had ingested a document. Alembic compared the models against the live schema and saw the per-collection vector tables the RAG store creates at runtime, which no migration declares, so it reported drift that no migration could ever resolve (#288).

Added

• app/db/vector_tables.py — is_runtime_vector_table, one predicate for "is this table a runtime vector table rather than a declared model", read from Base.metadata rather than from a name pattern.

[0.0.41] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The local supervisor replaced a worker that had died but ignored one that was alive and not answering — deadlocked on a lock, spinning, or blocked on a socket that never replies. Such a worker has no exit code, so the supervisor saw a healthy child and did nothing while the container served no requests. The worker now stamps a monotonic beat from uvicorn's callback_notify, and a worker silent across two consecutive polls is replaced (#336).

Added

• RELOAD_WEDGED_AFTER — how long a worker may go without running its event loop before it is treated as wedged. Set it to 0 under a debugger.

[0.0.40] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• When the kernel killed the reloader's worker in the local stack — an OOM kill being the realistic way — nothing reaped it and nothing replaced it. PID 1 stayed alive, so the container reported Up, Docker's restart policy never fired, and every request timed out with no log line because the process that would have written it was gone. A supervisor now replaces a worker that dies, the way uvicorn already does on the --workers path (#308).

Added

• backend/cli/reload_supervisor.py, a dedicated entrypoint. It deliberately does not import the application: routing PID 1 through cli.commands cost 464 MB against 28 MB, which is the whole application inside the one process whose job is to survive an OOM kill.

[0.0.39] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• prefect-runner had never once passed a health check and never could. It runs the backend image, which carried a HEALTHCHECK written for the API, and the runner serves no HTTP. A status that is red unconditionally is not a status: a dead runner looked exactly like a live one, and nothing could depend on it becoming healthy. The runner now serves Prefect's own /health on 8080 and is probed against it (#310).
• The API's own probe passed on a 500 — it fetched the health endpoint and ignored the status. It now raises for status, with a 30s start period.

Changed

• The HEALTHCHECK moved out of backend/Dockerfile and into the app and prefect-runner service definitions in all three compose files. An image with two consumers should not assert what only one of them can satisfy.

[0.0.38] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• A domain exception carrying a UUID in its details was delivered as a bodiless 500 instead of the refusal it described. JSONResponse serializes with plain json.dumps, which cannot encode a UUID, so the exception handler raised on the way out — after it had already logged the refusal, which is why the log and the response disagreed. A browser session kept across a database reset hit this on every GET /api/v1/auth/me. All three response-building handlers now encode details through jsonable_encoder (#307).
• The capability registry echoed a rejected configuration back to the caller in a 400, unlike the identical call one module over.

Changed

• .claude/rules/exceptions-security.md showed details={"user_id": str(user_id)}, which contradicted both the code and architecture.md. Domain exceptions pass the value; the encoder handles it. The one exception, money, says why.

[0.0.37] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The ai-review workflow concluded success when it had produced no review at all, and posted "the reviewer did not produce a result" — a sentence that reads like a verdict on the diff. Eleven pull requests merged unreviewed before anyone noticed. A run is now classified reviewed, declined or broken; broken fails the job and the comment says the reviewer failed, carrying what Codex printed. A cancelled run no longer reports the reviewer as dead, and a broken re-run no longer deletes the previous run's inline findings (#311).

The cause of the Codex failure itself is an enforced spend limit on the OpenAI project, recorded on #311. The pull_request trigger stays off until that is lifted.

[0.0.36] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The end-to-end suite's [seed] project asserted the colleague's membership with a single read. When it lost, Playwright skipped everything that depends on the fixture and reported the whole suite red having exercised no product code at all — three times in one day, on unrelated branches. The step now polls the API and, when it does give up, prints what it actually saw (#335).

The underlying cause is filed rather than fixed: this backend answers a write before the transaction commits, so a 2xx says the request was handled and not that the write is readable (#353).

[0.0.35] - 2026-08-06

Nothing in this release changes what the product does. It changes what CI costs, which had reached about 8,900 billed Actions minutes in the first six days of August across 369 runs at 24.1 minutes each (#317).

Changed

• A push to a branch now cancels that branch's run in flight. ci.yml carried no concurrency block at all, while ai-review.yml and docs.yml both did — so every push started a fresh matrix and left the previous one running to completion. 75 of 369 runs were superseded while still in flight, about 1,800 billed minutes, and only 2 runs in that window were ever cancelled. A push to main is exempt, and via github.run_id rather than cancel-in-progress: false: false means queue, and GitHub cancels any previously pending run in a group when a newer one is queued, so a third merge arriving would have cancelled the second and left that commit with no CI at all.
• test, test-frontend and e2e are skipped when the changed paths cannot affect them. A changes job decides, and the decision lives in scripts/ci_changed_scope.py rather than in a glob, so it is testable. It skips a suite only when every changed path is provably irrelevant to it — an unrecognised path runs everything — because the permissive spelling of the same idea would let a new directory silently stop a suite, which is a green build with a gate missing from it rather than a red one. A required status check is satisfied by success, skipped or neutral, which is why this is a job-level condition and not a paths: filter: a filtered-out workflow never posts its checks, and the ruleset would wait forever. See branches.
• Dependencies are cached, at all seven install sites. setup-uv was called five times with no cache, re-resolving and re-downloading all 278 locked packages each time; setup-bun caches the binary and not the packages; and e2e downloaded about 170 MB of Chromium on every run. All three are keyed on the lockfile that pins them.

Fixed

• Four ways the new path gate could have passed on nothing, all found in review of the change that introduced it and all the failure it was built to prevent. A changes job that failed skipped every gated suite without its condition being read, and since a skipped required check is a pass and changes is not itself a required context, one API error would have turned the merge button green over a branch where nothing ran — each gated job now carries !cancelled(). A rename was half-invisible, because pulls/{n}/files reports only the path a file arrived at, so a module moved out of backend/ skipped the backend suite; previous_filename is fed through as well. And the changes job declared pull-requests: read without contents: read, which a job-level block replaces rather than adds to — working only for as long as this repository stays public.

[0.0.34] - 2026-08-06

Changed

• The automated reviewer no longer runs on a pull request (#311). Every ai-review run since 2026-08-05 evening died about twelve seconds into its Codex step with codex exited with code 1 — the shape of an authentication, quota or entitlement refusal at the first API call rather than a model working and failing — and then concluded success and posted "No review: the reviewer did not produce a result", a sentence that reads like a verdict on the diff. Eleven pull requests merged with no automated review before anybody noticed, three of them releases. A reviewer that runs and says nothing is worse than one that plainly is not running, so the pull_request trigger is removed until the Codex failure is understood; workflow_dispatch stays, because the fix has to be testable against a real pull request. Adding the ai-review label now does nothing at all. CLAUDE.md and code review say so, and the latter records that its own "a failed run says so" claim is what #311 disproved — making a failed run report as a failure is the second half of that issue and is not done.

[0.0.33] - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• The Prefect runner no longer starts every queued flow run at once. aserve declares limit: Optional[int] = None and hands that straight to Runner(limit=...), where None means no cap — while constructing a Runner without the argument falls back to Prefect's own default of five. Calling aserve(*deployments) and saying nothing was therefore the one spelling that removed the ceiling entirely. Starting the stack after three days of downtime, the runner found the backlog of once-a-minute rag-sync-check runs and started 71 prefect.engine processes at once — each a fresh interpreter importing the whole application, about 120 MB apiece. 6.02 GiB of a 7.75 GiB host, and the kernel resolved it by OOM-killing the API container's worker.

Added

• PREFECT_RUNNER_LIMIT (default 5) — how many flow runs execute at once; the rest queue. A memory ceiling rather than a throughput dial, and the moment it matters is the restart after downtime rather than the steady state. Documented in configuration.

0.0.32 - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• A dynamic specialist's definition is now owned per delegation, not keyed by name (#292). What each specialist a model invented was built from rode a single per-run store keyed by the specialist's name, and the build factory overwrote it on a repeat. Two delegate calls in one turn with the same name but different instructions — which Pydantic AI may run concurrently — both wrote that one entry, so whichever delegation opened its panel later stamped the other specialist's definition onto its SubagentStarted frame, and the chat's "Promote to a draft agent" control (#177) then carried someone else's instructions and model. Each delegate now owns its own copy; the name-keyed store is kept only for the create_agent specialists a task reaches by name, which are one-per-name and cannot collide. Narrow and self-inflicted — no cross-tenant or permission impact.

0.0.31 - 2026-08-06

Changed

• The chat "Promote to a draft agent" control now pre-validates the model-chosen name (#293). A dynamic specialist's name is whatever the model chose, and the delegation library allows names the backend SpecialistSpec rejects — its pattern (^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) and its 64-character limit. The chat control passed that name straight to the promote request, so an over-long or oddly-punctuated one failed with a raw 422 surfaced as an error toast — for a name nobody can edit in chat. The control now disables and shows the reason when the name would be refused, the same guard the Builder's specialist editor already puts on its own promote button.

0.0.30 - 2026-08-06

Added

• Promote a specialist to a draft agent — the honest way to keep one (#177). A dynamic specialist is never persisted (keeping one means publishing an agent, a person's action), and an inline specialist lives only in its parent's spec — so the only way to keep either was to copy its instructions out of a chat log, producing an agent whose provenance nobody can see. A Promote to a draft agent action now sits on an inline specialist in the Builder's delegation section and on a dynamic specialist in the chat delegation panel while the run that created it is still on screen. It creates an ordinary draft from the specialist's instructions, model profile, capabilities, collections and skills, through the same SpecialistSpec.to_agent_spec() conversion — and stops there: it does not publish, does not pin the new agent as a delegate of its parent, and does not remove the inline specialist, each of which stays a decision the author makes next with the usual validation in front of it. The draft is owned by the person who promoted it and subject to the usual AGENTS_EDIT check — a specialist created inside someone else's run does not become their agent. A promoted dynamic specialist publishes without further editing and answers, when run, what it answered inside the run it came from.

0.0.29 - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• An inline specialist's spend under a published delegate now reaches an agent's month (#228). Spend attribution (0.0.7, #192) stamps every SpendEntry with the delegation that booked it and reads a delegation's cost as its share of the ledger — but an inline specialist gets no agent_runs row, only published delegates do. So an inline fact-checker under a published researcher booked its spend to its own key, which is in no run row, and the innermost stamp meant it was not in the researcher's share either: on a $0.75 run the researcher's row read $0.50, and $0.25 reached no agent's month. The organisation total was always right (the top-level row is the whole ledger), which is why nothing failed. An entry now carries a second attribution — who spent it (for the delegation panel's own-share cost_usd) and which agent row it bills to (for the month): an inline specialist bills to its nearest published ancestor, so that row is whole again while the panel still shows the specialist's own share, with nothing double-counted. Holds through an inline specialist nested under another inline specialist, too.

0.0.28 - 2026-08-06

Fixed

• A create_agent specialist created by a nested delegate survives an approval park (#254). 0.0.20 (#175) carried a top-level dynamic specialist across a park — its definition serialised into paused_state and re-seeded on resume through the same factory — but only at the root. A specialist a delegate one level down created was still lost when a nested delegation parked and resumed: the nested level's registry was rebuilt empty, so task answered "unknown subagent" for it. The specialist carry now descends the parked tree, so a kept specialist at any depth is re-seeded on resume and reachable by name, metered on the run's shared ledger exactly as it was the first time. max_agents still bounds each level, so a resume cannot exceed it by rebuilding.

0.0.27 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A delegation panel closes when an approved resume's continuation raises (#262). The panel reconciliation from 0.0.16 (#173/#250) closed an awaiting panel from the resumed run's status — but only when the resume returned one. If the continuation raised, AgentRunnerService._run recorded the run failed/cancelled and re-raised, so POST /runs/{id}/resume returned no result, the frontend skipped reconciliation, restored the already-decided approval, and left the panel on awaiting_approval forever — with a retry then refused because the run was already terminal. The resume route now conveys the recorded terminal status even on the raising path, without swallowing the failure the caller still sees, so the panel reaches failed/cancelled and the spent approval is not restored.

0.0.26 - 2026-08-05

Added

• The agent map is interactive, and shows delegates as their own nodes (#126). The map — the read-only picture of "what is this agent, in total?" — now draws delegation. A published delegate (pinned, navigable), an inline specialist (no page of its own), and a pin the organization no longer has or the caller cannot see (named as unreachable rather than dropped) each render as a distinct kind of node — an agent, not a tool — grouped under a Delegation heading and edged to the hub by the same measured layout the capabilities use.

And it is a control now, not a picture: every node is a focusable button, click or Enter/Space lights its edge and dims the rest and opens a detail panel, Escape or a click away clears it, and a published delegate's panel links through to that agent's page — so the delegation tree is walkable one hop at a time. It stays read-only (the forms own the fields) and keeps pan/zoom. Rendering the tree recursively inline is a deliberate follow-up, #276.

0.0.25 - 2026-08-05

Changed

• ruff now lints alembic/ and the guard scripts, and the dead ignore is live again (#229). ruff was only ever invoked on backend/app and backend/tests, so backend/alembic/ and the repository-root scripts/ (the three guards — check_backticks.py, check_i18n.py, docs_drift.py — that gate every PR) were never linted, and the per-file-ignores entry for alembic/** silenced rules on files ruff never read. make lint-backend and both pre-commit ruff hooks now run ruff check . ../scripts from backend/, so all three trees are linted and the config stays one definition across make, pre-commit and CI (test_ci_parity.py still holds). No genuine code defects surfaced: alembic/ was already clean, and the 21 findings in scripts/ are legitimate patterns relaxed with a documented reason (T201, since printing is the guards' purpose; S603/S607, the same literal-argv git invocation already accepted for the migration test). The alembic/** ignore is kept and now genuinely live, covering autogenerated migrations' downgrade stubs and raw op.execute SQL. A model edited without a migration — x == 2 under alembic/versions/ — is now refused where the old command passed it silently.

0.0.24 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A parked run whose spec no longer builds stays resumable (#176). resume flipped the run to RUNNING before fetching and building its spec, and claim_parked_run only claims a run in AWAITING_APPROVAL — so if the build then failed (a secret a binding named was deleted, a model profile removed, a capability dropped in a deploy, an MCP connection unshared), the row was stranded in RUNNING and could never be resumed again, with a person's approval recorded against work that would not continue and nothing reporting it. The spec is built first now, and the run is marked RUNNING only once the build has succeeded; a build that raises leaves the run AWAITING_APPROVAL, so the same approval can be resumed once whatever the spec named is restored.

0.0.23 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• The E2E suite runs beside another checkout's dev server (#223). playwright.config.ts hardcoded ports 3000 and 4010, so the suite could not start when a make dev or a second checkout already held them. The frontend port now derives from E2E_PORT (default 3000) and the stub model server's from E2E_STUB_MODEL_PORT (default 4010), driving baseURL, both webServer URLs, each server's PORT, and — the part that has to agree — the stub URL the specs write into the model profile the backend dials, so server, specs and backend all read one value. Same shape as #189: the value is derived from the environment, not setdefault, so CI is exercised on the new path rather than silently left on the old one. The loopback binding is kept, so the host-uvicorn path works and the containerised-backend constraint is not falsely implied.

0.0.22 - 2026-08-05

Added

• A sync delegate can ask the person already waiting on its parent (#184). An author can turn on questions for a delegation, so a sync specialist can ask "which currency?" of the person waiting on the parent run instead of burying an assumption in its answer — answered through the run's own ask_user channel, the same one the parent uses. It is off by default and gated tightly, because the reasons this was once declined are real: a background delegation has handed back a task id with nobody waiting, so it is never granted the ability (nor is an auto delegation, which may become one); a specialist a model invented at run time is never granted it either; and a surface with no ask_user (the API, a channel, a schedule) refuses rather than hangs. The library injects ask_parent for a caller-supplied delegate only since subagents-pydantic-ai 0.2.17, which is why this rides on the 0.2.18 floor adopted in 0.0.21.

Concurrency came with it: two delegate questions in one turn would race the single ask_user channel, so the channel is serialised — the same class of fix as the approval writes in 0.0.17, and for the same reason.

0.0.21 - 2026-08-05

Changed

• Adopt subagents-pydantic-ai 0.2.18, which fixes the general-purpose delegate at the source (#174). The delegation library used to default its default_model to a hardcoded string, so a consumer with no usable default — which AgenticOS is, on purpose: there is no deployment-wide model — got a general-purpose delegate that either failed or, worse, ran one tenant's work on whatever provider key happened to sit in the process environment. AgenticOS had already removed the switch from its own surface (0.0.7) and refuses a modelless dynamic specialist in DelegatingToolset._refuse_dynamic; 0.2.18 removes the fallback upstream too, so the library now refuses a modelless dynamic call of its own accord rather than compiling an unmetered one. The pin moves to >=0.2.18 and the local comments and the capability reference are corrected to describe the removed fallback in the past tense. #174 closes now that AgenticOS is on the fixed version.

0.0.20 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A create_agent specialist survives the approval park that interrupts it (#175). A specialist the model writes at run time is documented as lasting for the reply, but it did not survive a second approval park: the library's dynamic-agent registry belongs to the built agent, and a resume rebuilds the agent fresh, so task answered "unknown subagent" for a specialist the model was told it could keep. The specialist's definition — a name, instructions, a model — is now carried in the run's paused_state alongside the spend, timings and approval rows already kept there, and a resumed turn re-seeds the registry through the same factory, so the specialist arrives with the run's shared budget guard and approval channel exactly as it did the first time. max_agents still bounds how many one run may keep, so a resume cannot exceed it by rebuilding. This survives within one run; a dynamic specialist is still never persisted across runs — keeping one past its run means promoting it to a published agent, which is a person's action.

0.0.19 - 2026-08-05

Added

• An offline audit of the skill bindings a published version can no longer reach (#186). Publish-time validation (0.0.8, #179) stops a new version binding a skill its publisher cannot see, but a version published before that check keeps loading whatever its spec named — so a published agent may be reading another member's private skill right now, and nothing reported it. agenticos cmd audit-skill-bindings sweeps every runnable published version — not just each agent's current pointer, but versions a non-terminal run will resume on, reached through the delegation pin-closure — and names the agent, the version, the skill and the publisher for each binding that publisher could not reach today.

Two edges it gets right, because an audit that cries wolf is one an operator learns to ignore: the pin-closure honours max_depth, so a binding only an unreachable grandchild holds is not flagged; and a disabled skill, or a delegate whose agent has been archived, is dropped rather than reported, since neither can actually load. A version whose publisher has since been deleted is a third answer, not "reachable" or not — the report says so, because published_by_user_id is SET NULL and an operator needs to know the difference. It reports, never unbinds: taking a skill off a published version would change what a published agent does without anyone deciding, which is the opposite of what publishing means here.

0.0.18 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A run count is an ICU plural, and the guard that missed it now catches the shape (#199). A run count was built as "{n} runs" — a plural only English forms that way — and scripts/check_i18n.py, the gate whose whole job is to refuse exactly that, passed over it. Both halves are fixed: the count is now {count, plural, =1 {1 run} other {# runs}} with the component passing count, and the guard is closed so the next English-only plural is refused rather than merged. A guard verified only by a green suite is a guard nobody has tested, so the change writes the offending shape into a fixture and confirms the script rejects it.

0.0.17 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• Two gated tool calls in one model step no longer race the request's session (#169). A gated tool call writes an approval row, and pydantic-ai runs the tool calls from one model response concurrently — so an agent with two gated tools, answering one step with both, hit db.add + flush on the request's shared AsyncSession from two coroutines at once, and AsyncSession is not concurrency-safe: the damage reaches the parent run row and the conversation, not just the approval. Delegation widened the window, since a sync delegate keeps the parent's channel. The approval rows are now queued during the run and written once when it parks — the shape delegation already took for its child run rows — so nothing writes to the session mid-run. A run whose model emits two gated calls in one step parks once naming both, with two rows of distinct ids and a session still usable for the terminal write.

Two follow-ups the write path surfaced, both fixed here. A delegate deleted between the park and the deferred write no longer breaks the park: the write first locks the delegates still present, and a parked call whose delegate is gone is written with a null subagent_agent_id (the SET NULL foreign key) rather than a reference that would fail the insert and roll the parked run back — the approval survives and a person can still decide it; only the delegate attribution, which no longer exists, is dropped. And the lock that holds the surviving delegates takes FOR KEY SHARE rather than FOR NO KEY UPDATE (with_for_update(read=True, key_share=True)), so it blocks a concurrent delete without also blocking an ordinary agent update.

0.0.16 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A delegation panel reaches a terminal state when its delegate parked on an approval (#173). When a sync delegation parked for a human approval in web chat, its panel showed the delegate as still working and stayed there — because POST /runs/{id}/resume runs over HTTP with no subagent_events sink, so no subagent_complete frame ever reached the WebSocket reducer, and the panel sat on awaiting_approval forever after the approval was granted. Web-chat resume doesn't stream, so the panel is now reconciled from the HTTP answer: the resumed run's own status is applied to every panel still awaiting — completed, failed/budget_exceeded→failed, cancelled — while a resume that parks again is left waiting, preserving the continuation case. Streamed text is kept; cost and tokens stay null rather than invented, since the frame that carries them never arrived. This covers a resume that returns a status; a resume whose continuation itself raises returns no result and still leaves the panel waiting, tracked as #262.

0.0.15 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A sync-only delegating agent is no longer offered the background-task tools (#185). An agent configured mode: "sync" can never have a background delegation, yet its model was still offered the six tools that only make sense for one — check_task, wait_tasks, list_active_tasks, send_message_to_subagent, and both cancels. Six tool descriptions in every turn's context for actions that cannot happen, and tool descriptions are the strongest prompt surface in this product. This is the same defect class as #182 (0.0.8) and extends its mechanism: the offered set is now computed per run. The six tools are withheld only from an agent that can never reach a background delegation — mode sync, no delegate whose preferred_mode is async or auto, and dynamic specialists off; anything that could still produce a background delegation (an auto agent, or an auto-override on a delegate, or an enabled dynamic-specialist path) keeps all of them, since the model decides per delegation there. A dedicated test pins the exact tool set each of those configurations is offered; the capability drift table is unchanged and does not itself catch this, since its widest fixture is background-capable by construction.

0.0.14 - 2026-08-05

Changed

• alembic check is a usable gate again (#183). It had failed on main for reasons unrelated to any change under test — index-naming drift from early migrations that the models and the migrations disagreed about — so the one command that would catch "somebody edited a model and forgot the migration" could not be run, and it hid real drift behind noise a reader had to filter by hand. The drift is resolved (the models and migrations now agree on the index names), and alembic check is wired into both make check and CI, on both sides of tests/test_ci_parity.py, so it stays green rather than rotting again. This is the fourth check to have existed and not run — after make check equalling CI (#143), spelling over the tree (#188) and the CodeQL config (#220) — and, like those, the value is in the check running at all.

0.0.13 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• bootstrap ensures the model profile it names, rather than adopting any it finds (#172). On a database that had been used before, make platform-bootstrap adopted whatever model profile already existed instead of ensuring the one it was told to create — so the agent it published ran on a profile nobody asked for, and several E2E specs that assume the named profile failed on any database not freshly created. It now ensures the profile it names, creating it when absent and matching by name when present, so a second bootstrap is idempotent rather than dependent on what the database happened to hold.

0.0.12 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• A delegated run's recorded time span survives an approval park (#191). A delegated agent_runs row reads its span from the library's TaskHandle, which is correct for a single-turn delegation — but one that parks on an approval and resumes runs in two processes, and the resume rebuilds a fresh handle stamped at the resume, so the row began when the person answered and dropped the entire pre-park segment. The earliest start is now carried across the park the way spend is (0.0.8, #180): ParkedDelegation holds it, paused_state serialises it, and the resumed turn folds it back in — the span is the first segment's start and the last segment's end, and unlike cost the segments are not summed. A pre-task refusal, which finds no handle, still writes no row at all.

Changed

• Run-history routes read through the service, not the repository (#197). A route reaching agent_run_repo directly is one of this codebase's named hard boundaries, and it was crossed here — which is not merely stylistic: a route that reaches the repository bypasses wherever the service puts the tenant scope, so the next filter added to the service is one a hand-written route keeps its own answer to. list_runs now scopes to the caller's organization inside AgentRunnerService, the one tenant boundary the rest of run history already reads through, and the delegated-run parameters added in 0.0.11 (parent_run_id, include_delegations) thread through it rather than sitting in the route.

0.0.11 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• Run history can tell a delegated run from one a person started (#181). The columns (parent_run_id, subagent_task_id) had existed since delegation landed and nothing read them, so a fan-out turn listed as several independent runs and a page that summed a column double-counted every delegation — a parent's cost already contains its children's. AgentRunRead now carries both, and withholds the delegation handle whenever the parent is gone (a foreign key can only null its own column, so subagent_task_id outlives the delete that nulls parent_run_id); list_runs filters parent_run_id IS NULL for the history list, and answers the run-detail query — "what did this run delegate" — by parent_run_id, which is the lookup the migration's index was speculative weight for until it had one.

A delegated run is badged in the table and reachable from its chat panel, so the fan-out reads as one tree rather than a list of strangers. The monthly sums keep the existing (organization_id, started_at) index, with the null test applied to rows it already found.

0.0.10 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• The E2E seed no longer depends on a product bug to pass (#132). Five sites created a row through a dialog and then asserted it was on screen, with no wait on the write that put it there; four flaked, and three branches paid a diagnosis for it in one day. Two causes, both now removed from the test's path. An open Radix dialog takes the rest of the page out of the accessibility tree, so getByRole resolved to nothing while the dialog was up and the assertion reported element(s) not found for a refusal it never looked at — a shared submitDialog waits on the write's own network response instead, and through the client's transparent 401 retry so it matches the request that settled rather than the one that was retried. And a fixture step now asserts through the API, never on the row appearing, because the refetch after a write is sometimes answered the pre-write list — which is a real product bug (#230), left open, not a broken fixture.

A failing [setup] or [seed] step is a Playwright project dependency, so its failure skips every product spec — the log reads "1 failed, 7 passed, 17 did not run" and looks like a product regression. e2e/fixture-reporter.ts now prints a banner saying exactly that, so the next reader does not spend the diagnosis a fourth time.

0.0.9 - 2026-08-05

Fixed

• Five WebSocket frames the frontend declared but no backend surface sends (#195). use-chat.ts and WSEventType named llm_started, llm_completed, todo_event, context_usage and context_compacted — two with live case arms and a test asserting a dead branch behaves. That is #144 in the opposite direction: #144 was the frontend matching tool names the backend had stopped sending; this is frames it never started. With app/services/agent_session.py now fully covered and in the gate (0.0.8, #165), the set of frames a surface actually emits is knowable exactly — none of the five is among them, on the dashboard socket, the channel surface or the embed. The union members, the case arms, the payload interfaces and the test for the dead branch are gone, along with two per-event interfaces whose field names disagreed with the wire (TextDeltaEvent.data.delta for the wire's content, ToolResultEvent.tool_name/result for tool_call_id/content).

0.0.8 - 2026-08-05

Everything that landed after delegation and before the next feature: the branches that were stacked behind it, plus two more the same work surfaced. Nearly all of it is a defect delegation created or uncovered, and several are about a check that reported green while the thing it checked went unchecked.

No schema change, SPEC_VERSION unchanged at 7.

Fixed

• A delegation's recorded cost is its own, not the run around it (#180). Cost was measured as the growth of the run's shared ledger between the delegation starting and being settled — and a background delegation is settled when it is next polled, which is arbitrarily later than it finished. So a delegate that spent $0.01 while the parent went on to spend $0.50 was recorded at $0.51, on its own run row, in its monthly total and in the delegation panel.

Every SpendEntry now carries the delegation that booked it, and a delegation's cost is its share of the ledger rather than a window over it. That also fixes the second half: a mid-tree delegate no longer counts what its own delegates spent.

has_unpriced_models travels with the share and survives an approval park, so a row cannot claim a precise cost for a delegation that had an unpriced request before the approval.

• A cancelled run is recorded cancelled, and the row survives (#171). _run caught BudgetExceeded and Exception but not CancelledError, which derives from BaseException — so a cancel passed straight through with the status left at its initial FAILED, and because a propagating BaseException skips the session's auto-commit, even that write rolled back and the row stayed RUNNING forever. It now records CANCELLED, commits explicitly, and keeps the tokens already spent — the streaming surface had this right and said so in a comment the non-streaming path did not follow. Delegation reaches this path too, so a cancelled delegation now keeps its cost rather than losing it.

• skill_ids is validated at publish, at both levels (#179). It was the one reference a spec could make that publish never checked — and skills carry grants that nothing enforced, so a publisher whose role gives SKILLS_VIEW: Scope.SHARED could bind another member's private skill by UUID and every runner of that agent then read its body. Refused now, with the same deliberately indistinguishable "not found" wording the collection check uses, so ids stay unprobeable. Versions published before the check are a separate problem, tracked as #186.

• A delegation tool nothing could reach is no longer offered (#182). answer_subagent exists so a parent can answer a question its delegate asked, and no delegate here can ask one — the library injects ask_parent for neither a configured delegate nor an autonomous specialist. So it was a tool description in every delegating agent's context, on every turn, for an action that cannot happen; tool descriptions are the strongest prompt surface in this product.

It stays declared — a tool absent from a capability's tools= can be neither gated nor renamed, and that half of the failure is silent — and the drift test now subtracts an explicit table rather than skipping the capability. Seven tools are offered, nine under allow_dynamic, ten declared.

Changed

• The chat wire format is behind the coverage gate at 100% (#165). app/services/agent_session.py decides every frame the dashboard WebSocket sends and every frame it accepts, and it was in neither the coverage nor the ty include list — 63% covered, with process_message and both terminal complete frames untested. Every surface reads this format, so a frame renamed here is a frontend branch that silently stops matching, which is #144 exactly.

Now 100% of 194 statements and 72 branches, in both lists, with 56 tests that assert the frame that reached the socket rather than that a method was called. The author mutation-tested it — 19 mutations, every frame name renamed, both terminal flags flipped, the disconnect re-raise swallowed — and all 19 were caught, because 100% coverage is a claim about lines executed and not about tests that would notice.

Two dead branches came out with it, one of which would have silently dropped the frame carrying a run's answer had it ever been reachable.

• CodeQL's false positives no longer block a merge by hand (#220). github-code-quality posts each alert as a review thread, and the ruleset requires every thread resolved — so one idiomatic pattern (py/ineffectual-statement on a bare await <task>, which suspends and re-raises and is the whole point of the statement) cost eight hand-written replies on a single pull request, with no .github/codeql/ config in the repository to tune it. There is one now, suppressing only what is demonstrably wrong for this codebase's idioms and leaving everything else reporting — the inverse of #188 and #203, which were checks looking at too little. docs/code-review.md now documents the CodeQL half: how alerts arrive, that they gate through the ruleset, and where the config lives.

0.0.7 - 2026-08-05

Delegation. An agent can hand work to named specialists instead of carrying every intermediate result in one context — and three checks that existed and did not run were made to run, which is how two of the defects below were found.

SPEC_VERSION is unchanged at 7: every field delegation adds is optional with a default, so a spec stored before it reads unchanged. Two migrations, 0007_delegated_runs and 0008_approval_delegate, both additive and both reversible.

Added

• Delegation (#40). Two kinds, and the difference is deliberately visible rather than smoothed over:

• a delegate is a published agent pinned to a version — permission-checked at publish, with its own capabilities, model and collections. A pin whose version is gone fails the run and names the delegate; never a quiet fall back to the current version, because the point of pinning is that nothing changes without somebody deciding.

• an inline specialist carries its own bindings but is not versioned: nothing can reference it, and editing the parent changes it.

What makes something an agent here is versioning, a permission check at publish, its own capabilities, and being metered and capped. A specialist has three of the four, and the one it lacks is the version — which is the whole design, and why there is one spec type, one validator and one builder used recursively rather than a second agent format.

A delegation streams into its own collapsible panel per task, so a fan-out is legible rather than a quiet gap in the transcript; a gated tool inside a delegate parks the run and resumes in place rather than re-running the delegation; sync, async and auto modes with the task-lifecycle tools; and a model may invent a specialist at run time behind allow_dynamic, built through the same build_agent everything else goes through so its requests are priced and counted.

Cost is the part worth reading twice. One run has one spend ledger, and every delegate records into it — which is what makes the parent's cap see a delegation's spend before its next model request, at precisely the moment delegation multiplies what a turn can cost. So the caps that bind inside a delegation are the parent's. A delegation to a published agent also gets an agent_runs row of its own carrying parent_run_id, and the two monthly questions want opposite arithmetic: what the organization owes excludes child rows, what one agent cost includes them.

Fixed

• A delegate's own knowledge collections never reached the running delegate (#166). The delegation library runs a child on clone_for_subagent of the parent's deps, so the deps our factory built for it — collections and all — were discarded before its first request. A delegate configured with a collection resolved it, never saw it, and answered "No active knowledge bases selected" to every search while looking correctly configured.

• Three spend aggregates double-counted a delegated run (#170), and one of them was emailed as the organization's bill. On a $1.00 run of which $0.40 was a delegate, the bill read $1.00 and three breakdowns read $1.40 — with the delegate's $0.40 appearing under two vendors at once.

• The liveness probe reported version 1.0.0 from every deployment, however many releases it was behind. GET /api/v1/health/live read getattr(settings, "VERSION", "1.0.0") against a setting that has never existed, so the fallback was the only answer it ever gave — and the getattr is what made it silent rather than an AttributeError on the first request. It now reports app.__version__, the same source OpenAPI and the CLI already read.

Found by the automated reviewer on this release's own pull request, which is the right place for it: the one claim a release makes is that the version is the same everywhere. The test that should have caught it is named test_liveness_probe_reports_the_build and asserted the status and the environment — everything except the build.

• Every integration run gets a database of its own (#189). tests/integration/conftest.py called drop_all against a fixed database name, so two suites at once dropped each other's tables — two runs of the same commit produced different failure sets, which is the signature of a race rather than a bug. Four people lost time to it in one day. The name now carries the pytest process id, created and dropped by the fixture; both safety rails are kept and one added.

Changed

• make check now runs every job CI runs (#143). It was documented as "what CI runs" and ran about half: bun run build, pip-audit and mkdocs --strict had no local equivalent at all, and eslint, prettier and tsc sat outside make lint, so it passed on a branch with a type error in a .tsx. One divergence ran the other way and is the sharper one — the i18n check was local-only, so a pull request could merge an untranslated string in a product whose frontend rules lean on that script.

Fixed structurally rather than by copying commands: the workflow calls the Makefile's targets, and backend/tests/test_ci_parity.py asserts both directions, so a job added to one and not the other fails the suite.

• Spelling is checked over the tree, not over the files a commit happens to touch (#188). One misspelling was sitting on main, waiting for whoever next opened that file for an unrelated reason. Exactly one existed once the scope was right, verified two ways — the per-file scope had not accumulated a backlog, it was hiding one word and would have gone on hiding the next. .codespellrc now records that omitting the en-GB_to_en-US dictionary is deliberate: this repository writes "behaviour" on purpose.

0.0.6 - 2026-08-04

Dependencies only. No behaviour change, no schema change, SPEC_VERSION unchanged at 7 — this is here so the version literals and the lockfiles move together rather than drifting until somebody notices.

Changed

• TypeScript 5.9.3 → 6.0.3 (dev). A major, so it was checked rather than assumed: tsc --noEmit, eslint --max-warnings 0, the coverage gate and next build all pass with no source change.

Dependabot bumped frontend/package.json and left bun.lock alone, which two CI jobs would have refused — they run bun install --frozen-lockfile, and that fails outright when the manifest and the lock disagree. The lock is updated here, so the next such bump should be checked for the same omission.

• ruff 0.15.0 → 0.16.1 (dev). Ruff is the formatter as well as the linter, so a new rule or a changed format would have turned make lint red after the merge rather than before it. ruff format --check reports 476 files already formatted and ruff check passes, so nothing in the tree needed touching.

• boto3 1.43.59 → 1.43.62.

0.0.5 - 2026-08-04

Every sign-in lands on the dashboard, and a deep link interrupted by the login form is resumed rather than dropped.

Changed

• One post-sign-in destination, decided in one place. Password sign-in forked on is_app_admin, the OAuth callback always went to /dashboard, and the magic link always to /chat — three call sites that each decided on their own and disagreed, so which door somebody came through decided where they landed. postSignInDestination() in src/lib/auth-landing.ts is now the only answer.

The default is the same for every role on purpose. What a role may not see is handled by not rendering the widget, never by a different landing page — a role fork there quietly splits one product into two.

• The mobile tab bar's Home tab targets /dashboard for every role, and its unused useAuth dependency is gone.

Added

• ?returnTo= survives the login round trip. AuthGuard appends the path it refused when it sends a visitor to /login, and the visitor resumes there after signing in instead of being dumped on the dashboard having lost where they were going.

Deliberately not for OAuth: that needs the state parameter round trip, and the flow is being rewritten separately.

Security

• The returnTo guard refuses anything off-origin, so the login form cannot be turned into an open redirect. Two checks, both load-bearing: a pattern that demands a single leading slash, and an origin comparison after parsing. The pattern alone misses control characters, because the URL parser strips tab, LF and CR before parsing — so /<tab>/evil.example resolves off-origin. The origin check alone would accept a bare relative path like agents, which resolves against wherever the visitor happens to stand.

Refused values are not sanitised into something safe. A fixed-up open redirect is still an open redirect, so anything suspect falls back to the dashboard.

0.0.4 - 2026-08-04

An agent can have a workspace: files, and on a container-backed host a shell. SPEC_VERSION is unchanged at 7 — capabilities is an open list, so adding an id is additive and every published agent keeps loading.

Added

• The sandbox capability. Seven tools — ls, read_file, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file, execute — over one of two backends. state stores a JSON document in this database and needs no infrastructure, which is what makes the feature real on a default install; service runs a container or a cloud sandbox on a connection an operator registered.

code_execution stays. The two are not a subset of each other: it computes with no infrastructure anywhere, and state has no shell at all, so an agent granted both computes with one and remembers with the other.

• backend is infrastructure; session_scope is a data-sharing policy. Getting the first wrong costs a feature. Getting the second wrong shows one person another person's files — so agent scope warns at the field, the file panel names whose workspace it is, and setting it is recorded in the audit log.

The spec never names an image, a mount, a network mode or a ceiling. A spec is authored in a browser by anyone holding edit on an agent, and one that could name a container image could name one whose entrypoint mounts the host.

• Attachments stop being context and become data. A file used to be parsed and pasted into the message, at its full token weight on every turn forever, and a 50 MB CSV could not be attached at all. With a workspace it is written to /uploads/ and the model gets a reference plus twenty lines. Images go both ways under a ceiling: a path is no substitute for looking at a picture, and looking at one is no substitute for being able to resize it.

• Sandbox connections, with their credentials in the vault — a per-organization row rather than a deployment setting, which is what makes two hosts possible and what bills a Daytona sandbox to the organization that opened it.

• Read-only workspace routes and a browser. Folders, whole-tree search, previews and downloads. A container-backed workspace is read off the host volume, so a week-old conversation lists its files after its session was reaped.

• A file panel in chat, beside the transcript, and a Workspaces page scoped per reader — an operator sees the organization's, everybody else sees their own files and the shared workspace of an agent they have talked to.

• sandboxd runs beside the app and is the only service holding the Docker socket, which is the whole reason an agent can have a container while this application has no Docker access. Never published, its own dashboard off, reaching the daemon by supplementary group rather than as root.

Changed

• Approval is per tool. sandbox is the first capability that genuinely reads and writes, and one flag cannot describe it: marking the capability side-effecting makes an agent ask permission to list a directory, and not marking it lets a write run unattended. CapabilityToolInfo.side_effecting overrides the capability's answer per tool — additive, None defers, every existing capability behaves exactly as before.

Only execute is gated. Writing into scratch space deleted with its conversation is not the act sending an email is, and an agent that must ask before every write cannot do multi-step work at all.

• The ruleset denies, the platform asks. The library ships allow/deny/ask, and its ask is an in-run await that dies with the socket, while this platform's persists a row, mails somebody and parks the run. So "ask" never comes from the ruleset, with ask_fallback="deny" as the backstop.

• Requires pydantic-ai-backend>=0.2.25, which fixes three things this repository had worked around: a ruleset's per-path rules are enforced by the library (and it also filters grep and checks a command's path arguments), WorkspaceArchive.read_bytes serves a file a decode would have ruined, and stop(purge=...) means the same thing on every backend.

• Attachment routing moved out of the WebSocket into the chat runner, because where a file goes depends on whether the agent has a workspace and only prepare knows that. Every surface behaves the same instead of the WebSocket owning the only implementation.

Fixed

• Paths an agent may not touch are refused: credentials (**/.env, **/*.pem, **/.ssh/**) and the system tree. A grep cannot return a line from one, and a command naming one is refused.
• A Daytona sandbox is deleted when its run or its conversation ends. It used to be deleted on neither, once per run, on the organization's own cloud account.
• A workspace is keyed on the host it runs on, so moving an agent between connections opens a new one instead of reattaching to a row naming the host it has left.
• Writes are capped at the call site rather than at the flush. Refusing later accepted the write, reported success to the model, and dropped the run's work in a finally block while the agent kept reasoning about a file that was never kept.
• A file too large to store is named and sampled rather than pasted whole — the fallback used to run backwards, since a write is only refused for a file too big to paste.
• The chat file panel is always reachable, and lists what people attached as well as what the agent wrote. It used to appear only once a workspace row had been flushed, so it was absent for the whole of a turn parked awaiting approval.
• Approving a parked call shows the resumed answer. POST /runs/{id}/resume executes the agent and returns its output; the chat discarded it, so an approval looked like it had done nothing until the page was reloaded.

Security

• Every secret at rest goes through the vault, including the sandbox service token and a Daytona key. There is no second mechanism.
• A workspace file served inline gets an opaque origin, nosniff, a CSP sandbox and filename* only — .svg and .html are never inline, because "the agent wrote it" is not a trust boundary.
• The address a client asks the platform to probe is validated, so a holder of connections:manage cannot turn the API container into a fetch proxy for anything on its network.
• A user id is hashed rather than sanitised when it keys a workspace. Dropping the characters a session id forbids mapped a.b and ab onto one workspace, which is one person reading another's files.

0.0.3 — 2026-08-02

A frontend release, and almost all of it is about one thing: what a browser is still holding when the account or the organization changes underneath it.

Security

One tenant's data could reach another tenant's screen, and one account's could reach another account's. Nothing here crossed a server-side boundary - every refusal the backend makes it still made - but the browser kept and re-showed answers it had already been given, which for a multi-tenant product is the same outcome by a different route.

• Uploads went to the wrong organization. ingestFile sent no X-Organization-Id, and the backend reads a request without it as the caller's personal organization - so uploading into a collection whose name exists in both wrote the file to the wrong tenant and reported success under the right one. The one write across the boundary in this list.
• Switching organization changed a label and nothing else. Most query keys name no organization, so with staleTime at five minutes one tenant's agent names, knowledge bases, secrets and conversations stayed on screen under another's. Everything cached is dropped on a switch now - dropped rather than marked stale, and before the paint rather than after it.
• Signing out left the previous account's data in memory. The query cache and the Zustand stores both survived a sign-out, so the next account signing in on the same browser could be served the previous one's conversations, agents, and the device names and IP addresses on their profile. Emptied when the signed-in account changes, keyed on the account rather than on the act of signing in - a password login, an OAuth callback, a magic link and the dashboard's own auth check are four different doors, and only one of them was covered.
• A request already in flight could refill what had just been emptied. A conversation's messages, a page of the list, a knowledge base's documents, a chat message queued while the socket was down: each now checks the account and the organization it started in before writing anything.

Added

• apiClient.raw() — the Response without the JSON parse, for downloads and previews, so reaching for bytes no longer means giving up the organization header, the 401 refresh and ApiError.
• useChanged — one tested hook for "adjusting state when a prop changes", replacing the effects that wrote state after rendering the stale value once.

Changed

• eslint-config-next 15 → 16, which turns on the React Compiler's hook rules; the frontend broke them in 31 places and no longer does. Server reads moved to the query layer where they belonged, and the flat config is imported directly - through FlatCompat the plugin graph is self-referential and ESLint dies serializing it.
• admin/ratings fetched its fixed thirty-day summary again for every page of results, and rendered a failed half as zeroes beside a full table. Two queries, two error states.
• admin/system polled health on an interval that kept running in a hidden tab.
• The RAG document list, the ratings page and the admin user drawer rendered a 502 as "nothing here". They say what happened, and offer a retry.

Fixed

• /rag polled a document's ingestion status exactly once. It armed the next poll from the identity of an array React Query deliberately keeps stable, so a document stuck at processing never updated without a reload.
• The /rag sync tab emptied itself on an organization switch and stayed empty until the user clicked away and back.
• The sync wizard discarded a half-filled form when a background refetch reordered the collection list.
• The admin user drawer vanished instead of closing when its row was deleted.
• "Revoke all others" from the second page of sessions listed the devices it had just revoked.
• The agent builder could sit on its skeleton after a rollback to a version structurally equal to the current draft.

Removed

• MANUAL_STEPS.md, a generator leftover in which nearly every variable name was wrong. docs/configuration.md has it correctly, and now has the two external click-paths that file was the only place to carry.

Notes for operators

Nothing to do. No migration, no configuration change, no API change. A signed-in user is signed out of nothing; the first page load after deploying refetches more than usual, because a browser holding a cache from before this version identifies its tenant and starts again.

0.0.2 — 2026-08-02

A dependency patch, and the first release cut through the path 0.0.1 built.

Changed

• tavily-python 0.7.26 → 0.7.27, which is what the web_research capability searches with.

0.0.1 — 2026-08-02

First tagged version. The platform is usable end to end — build an agent in the UI, publish it, run it from chat, an HTTP API, Slack or an embedded widget, with budgets and approvals applying identically to all of them — and the interfaces below should be treated as unstable until 0.1.0.

Added

The agent model. An agent is data, not code: instructions, a model profile, a set of capabilities and a budget, versioned on publish and exportable as YAML into a client's own git repository. Spec, version, exposure and run are the four nouns everything else is built from.

Capabilities — seven, registered in code and composed by configuration: knowledge search, skills, web search (DuckDuckGo, native, Tavily, Brave, Exa), sandboxed Python, charts, reasoning effort, and a clock. Per-tool approval and per-agent tool renaming key on a stable tool id, so a rename cannot detach an approval gate.

MCP — any Model Context Protocol server by URL, over streamable HTTP or SSE, with 58 common servers in the picker and full OAuth 2.1 (discovery, dynamic client registration, PKCE, refresh). Connections are personal or organization-wide; only the latter can be bound by a published agent.

Models — 27 providers, per-organization credentials, fallback on outage, and self-hosted Ollama or a LiteLLM proxy. Model ids stay free text, with live and curated pickers, because a provider ships something the morning after any list is warmed.

Knowledge and skills — collections with pgvector retrieval over uploaded documents, Google Drive and S3; and skills, which are written know-how the agent loads only when it decides one is relevant.

Governance — monthly budgets checked before each model request and recorded even when a run fails, human approval for side-effecting tools, per-agent alerts with an audience, and an audit trail.

Permissions — three layers: the deployment superadmin, an organization role composed from a permission catalog, and per-row visibility plus grants. Effective access is max(role scope, grant), so sharing one resource never means promoting somebody.

The vault — envelope encryption for every credential at rest, sealed to the organization or member that owns it, so a ciphertext moved between tenants cannot be decrypted. There is deliberately no second mechanism.

Surfaces — web chat, HTTP API, Slack, Telegram, Mattermost and embeddable widgets, all behind one runner.

Multi-tenancy — organization isolation enforced by database constraints rather than by service code alone.

Dependency freshness as a policy. FastAPI, Pydantic AI, Logfire and genai-prices are uncapped and meant to track their newest release — genai-prices especially, since it is the price snapshot budgets are computed from. make deps-upgrade bumps them, a scheduled framework-freshness workflow tries the newest on a Monday and opens an issue when it breaks, and Dependabot opens the PR. Majors are not held back: delaying one does not avoid the upgrade, it only makes the eventual jump wider.

Pre-commit, covering both halves of the repo: the standard hygiene hooks, codespell, yamlfmt, zizmor over the workflows, and ruff / ty / prettier / eslint / tsc. pre-commit had been a dependency and make install had been running pre-commit install for a while, but there was no config file, so the installed hook did nothing.

Fixed

• Every path that created a user was broken. The user repository still passed role= to the model after the column was dropped in 0066, and SQLAlchemy raises on an unmapped keyword — so registration, Google OAuth, agenticos user create and agenticos cmd bootstrap all failed. Bootstrap is the command the install instructions open with.
• agenticos cmd seed --clear deleted nothing, for the same reason: it filtered on the dropped role column. It now keys on is_app_admin.
• The chat WebSocket 500'd on handshake in local development. docker-compose.dev.yml claimed in its header to be identical to docker-compose.yml, had drifted, and had lost --ws websockets-sansio — and it was the file make dev used.
• Production ran without a route to the internet. The only network was marked internal: true, which blocks egress, so no agent could reach a model provider. Split into an internal data network for Postgres and Redis and an edge network for the app.
• Production ran no background work at all — no Prefect server or runner, so document ingestion and collection syncs never happened and an upload stayed unsearchable forever.
• The test guarding the coverage gate could not run on the interpreter that ships. It used Path.full_match, added in Python 3.13, while CI installs 3.12. backend/.python-version now pins 3.12 so local matches.
• The security CI job never audited anything — it errored installing pip-audit outside a virtualenv, with two more argument errors queued behind that.
• Icons and diagrams in the documentation rendered as their own source, for want of pymdownx.emoji and a mermaid custom fence.
• FastAPI 0.141 stopped flattening included routers into app.routes, so every route sweep in tests/api/test_platform_routes.py silently ran over zero routes. Rewritten on the public iter_route_contexts. Found by upgrading rather than by a Dependabot PR, which is the argument for the freshness workflow.
• Agent.updated_at was typed string | undefined while the API sends null, which made the honest test for "never edited" a type error.
• The workflows ran with a broader token than they need and left the checkout credential on disk. Every action is now pinned to a commit SHA, persist-credentials: false everywhere, contents: read by default, and Pages write scoped to the one job that deploys.
• backend/.pre-commit-config.yaml shadowed the repository root and carried a ty hook that failed on an argument the pinned ty does not accept.

Security

• A conversation was readable and writable across tenants. GET /conversations/{id}/messages returned a full transcript — tool calls and their arguments included — for a conversation in another organization, and POST to the same path appended a turn to it, role: "assistant" included, which rendered to its owner as the agent's own words. organization_id is now a required argument on every conversation read and write; a caller that genuinely reads across tenants passes an explicit sentinel.
• The avatar proxy forwarded a path traversal to the backend. It is the one route handler served without a session, so an anonymous caller could drive arbitrary GETs against the internal API and read the response.
• A channel bot missing one configuration value stalled the whole API. The Slack and Mattermost supervisors retried a start that returns without awaiting, which never yields — so the event loop starved and every request, health check included, stopped being answered.
• Icons are resolved from the directory listing, not by joining a request parameter onto a path, and a symlink out of that directory is refused.

Added — the toolchain that keeps it honest

• An automated pull request reviewer that reads this repository's own rules from the base branch rather than a generic checklist. See Code review.
• main is protected by a ruleset with no bypass actors: pull request required, CI green, squash only, no force push. See Branches.
• A weekly freshness job that upgrades the entire lockfile, transitive packages included, runs the suite against it and opens an issue when the newest release breaks us.

Changed

• One compose file per environment, with a matching frontend file beside it: docker-compose.yml (local), docker-compose-dev.yml (dev server), docker-compose-prod.yml (production), each with a .frontend.yml sibling. make stage is kept as an alias for the new make dev-server.
• One long-lived branch. Work reaches main by pull request from a short-lived branch, squashed on merge. A dev branch existed briefly and was removed; see Branches. CI's lint job matches make lint, and the integration suite refuses to skip when CI is set: an unreachable database there means the service container failed, and skipping two hundred tests to report green is worse than failing.
• Pydantic AI 2.x is the agent runtime, and the frontend is on Next 16.
• The documentation is the single copy of how the system works, with a trigger map from code path to page in CLAUDE.md and a Stop hook (scripts/docs_drift.py) that names the pages a change owes.

Removed

• users.role, UserRole, User.has_role(), RoleChecker, CurrentAdmin and CurrentSuperuser (0066). Authority inside an organization is a membership row plus the permission catalog.
• CHANNEL_ENCRYPTION_KEY and the deployment-wide Fernet keys (0038). Everything seals through the vault, bound to an owner.
• app/agents/assistant.py and app/agents/prompts.py. There is no single agent object and no system prompt in code; an agent is assembled per run from the capabilities its spec names.
• Conversation-level knowledge-base ids (0059). An agent's spec is the only thing that decides what it may search.
• ENV_VARS.md, superseded by Configuration.
• .fastapi-fullstack.json and the make upgrade* template-merge targets. This codebase has diverged from the generator past the point where a 3-way merge helps.